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Abstract
For over two decades, preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) has proven
a daunting challenge for foreign assistance policy makers and implementers. The
challenges are rooted in its rapid emergence, continuous and uneven development, and
lingering skepticism about its future and effectiveness. The purpose of this study is to
provide policy makers and practitioners with a deeper understanding of how certain
factors have driven the development of P/CVE policy. The research questions focused on
the nature of policy alignment at all policy levels and the identification and nature of the
factors that have driven rapid P/CVE policy change. The theoretical framework included
the use of punctuated equilibrium theory, policy feedback theory, and path dependence.
A qualitative case study and document analysis design was used. The study completed 7
semi-structured interviews with P/CVE specialists and a document analysis of 37 policy
documents. Data from the interviews and documents were coded and categorized for
thematic analysis and comparison. Results indicated a robust policy alignment across
policy levels but also reflected a very uneven policy evolution due to numerous
intervening factors. Participants also expressed a significant degree of skepticism about
P/CVE effectiveness and its distinctiveness from other development tools. The
implications for social change include informing practitioners and policy makers of the
importance of effective, coordinated, and well-considered P/CVE policy at all levels of
government. Doing so assists policy makers and practitioners to achieve important
foreign assistance objectives and improve the lives of those adversely affected around the
world.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) is a field that has become
increasingly important in international development and conflict intervention. The U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) has taken a leading role in providing
thought leadership and practice in this field, developing foreign assistance policy and
managing several P/CVE related programs around the world for many years (USAID,
2018). As this study will examine, P/CVE related policies have changed rapidly through
modifications of existing policies or the creation of new related policies. As we will
explore, P/CVE policies reflect both types of changes over time.
Further, this study will examine the how the nature of P/CVE today has evolved
when compared to its earliest originating concepts. Even the term itself has undergone
changes, moving away from military-themed terminology to more assistance-oriented
terminology. Such significant change in a short period of time has created challenges in
understanding the reasons and the drivers of these policy changes. This rapid change has
created a lack of clarity regarding the definition and objectives of P/CVE, particularly
when numerous organizations contribute to the implementation of P/CVE policy. This
study aims to shed light on the factors that have led to this change, as well as whether the
implementation can be accomplished in accordance with such rapidly changing concepts
and policy evolution.
Given the challenge of trying to understand the feasibility of policy
implementation in times of rapid change, it is increasingly important to analyze and better
understand the nature of P/CVE changes over time and to examine the factors that have
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driven these rapid changes. Understanding these aspects of the policy and practice will in
turn help better inform whether P/CVE is having the intended results and if these changes
are having the intended effects necessary for the success of America’s foreign policy and
its foreign assistance goals. This study seeks positive social impact by helping to fill gaps
in scholarly research, assisting practitioners with future program design, and giving
policy makers a better understanding of the nature of P/CVE policy evolution. As such,
this study provides new scholarly analysis on the nature and factors contributing to the
evolution of P/CVE policy.
This chapter provides an overview of the study, broken into thirteen sections. The
first section explores the problem statement. This section describes the gaps in scholarly
knowledge and explains why exploring these issues and offering scholarly analysis and
explanations will benefit practitioners, scholars, and policy makers. I discuss the purpose
and the aim of the study, highlighting gaps in scholarly research, and frame the problem
by building upon previous research. The third section covers the significance of this
study. This covers the intent of the study and the research paradigm that was used. This is
followed by the research questions, which are guideposts for the information collection
and analysis of the entire study. The research questions also help serve as the scope,
defining the parameters and delimitations of the study. Next, the theoretical framework of
the study is introduced. Following this, the theoretical framework is presented, describing
the theories that are used to explain the observed phenomena. In doing so, I detail the
context of these theoretical frameworks and the way in which they apply to the observed
phenomena relevant to the findings.
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Within chapter one I describe the conceptual framework and nature of the study.
This chapter provides the topic of investigation. These topics of the study are inherently
identified within the research questions. However, this chapter further develops and
defines the conceptual topics within a contextual and logical framework. This chapter
also addresses the key concepts and phenomenon being investigation, as well as the
methodology being employed in the study. Next, necessary definitions for the study are
presented to offer clarity. This is followed by assumptions relevant to the phenomena.
Next are the scope, delimitations, and the limitations of the study. The scope and
delimitations define the parameters of the study, the population selected, and the specific
aspects of what the study will address. The limits of the study are meant to transparently
communicate to the reader the methodological limits, limits to transferability of the
findings, and any identified biases by the author. All this together will comprise the
chapter and a broader overview of the study.
Chapter 2 serves as the literature review, examining foundational concepts that
have contributed to P/CVE and its predecessor policies. Chapter 2 also reviews the
theoretical frameworks that contributes to this study. Chapter 3 is an overview of the
methodology of the study. This provides greater detail about the methodological tools
and processes that were employed throughout the study. The findings are then addressed
in chapter 4 presenting the results of the full study. Chapter 5 is the final chapter where
the conclusions of the study are presented. This chapter serves to include the broad
analytical conclusions, taking into consideration the interviews and document analysis as
well as the way in which the theoretical frameworks apply to the findings. Chapter 5 also
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discusses recommendations as well as implications of the study.
Background
This study addresses an identified gap in the scholarly literature by exploring the
causative factors of P/CVE policy change and the nature of these changes. To address the
gaps, this study examines the drivers of regional and agency foreign assistance policy
change as it pertains to P/CVE. As the literature review illustrates, comprehensive
scholarly analysis of the factors of P/CVE policy change is a relative rarity, and no
literature has been identified that offers an explanatory theoretical framework for these
changes. Further, this study explores the unique aspects of USAID P/CVE policy
implementation, which is yet another topic rarely addressed in scholarly peer-reviewed
studies. Therefore, this study is needed to fill important gaps in the literature. In doing so,
this helps inform practitioners tasked with implementing policy through effective design
and execution of programs in the field, as well as assist policy makers and government
leaders to more fully understand the factors and consequences of rapid P/CVE policy
change as it pertains to U.S. foreign development assistance.
The United States has a lengthy history of foreign interventions in countries
affected by violent extremism. Such interventions have taken the form the
counterinsurgency operations, stabilization operations, humanitarian assistance, and
traditional international development assistance (e.g., programs related to health,
economics, governance, and education). Likewise, foreign aid intervention has come in
many variations, such as stabilization operations, counterinsurgency, economic aid, and
military aid. P/CVE is yet another approach, albeit usually a very technical and niche
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focus as part of a broader foreign assistance approach. What sets P/CVE apart other than
its focused technical approach is that it is also currently experiencing tremendous growth
and attention. For example, in early 2015, a summit was held at the White House in
which senior leaders from dozens of countries, multilateral bodies, civil society and
private sector organizations, all gathered together to develop a plan to fight violent
extremism (White House, 2015, para. 9). Thus, there are strong indications that P/CVE
will remain a global phenomenon for some time to come. Considering that the U.S. is the
largest donor to the U.N. (OECD, 2016, p. 2), this will invariably involve U.S. foreign
policy coordination and consideration. Therefore, P/CVE will likely remain an important
issue for U.S. foreign policymakers regardless of domestic politics.
Historically speaking, the concept of P/CVE has significantly earlier roots than
9/11. Some scholars, such as Ramakrishna (2014) placed an emphasis on the Cold War as
important for fully understanding the history of countering violent extremism policy
(para. 5). This is likely accurate due to the writings of foundational strategic theorists
such as Beaufre (1967), who advocated non-military interventions as the best approach to
effectively counter insurgencies during the Cold War, which remains a dominant theme
among P/CVE scholars and practitioners today. It was therefore during the Cold War era
in which non-military interventions as a national security tool first took root in Europe
and the United States. Also, as Cold War experiences and thinking continue to affect
policy today this period requires attention to fully understand this phenomenon. Thus,
this study will present some background information as it pertains to violent extremism
during the Cold War era.
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However, the most significant changes in P/CVE related foreign policy occurred
following the Cold War. Terrorism and extremist organizations have become major
challenges around the world. While this was a rising concern, the paradigm radically
shifted on September 11, 2001 with the attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon. America’s Global War on Terror (GWOT) was launched, followed by new
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, which gave rise to increasing instability in the region and
the rise of new radicalized organizations, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. The
Global War on Terror eventually morphed into various iterations of counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency, which ultimately led to the P/CVE foreign assistance policy,
including the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) which forms the basis
of the case study in this study.
Due to broad definitions, compounded by domestic and international applications
across a broad array of approaches and objectives, P/CVE remains complex and poorly
understood by academics and practitioners alike. This ambiguity has occurred largely
because CVE has both domestic security contexts and international foreign assistance
contexts, yet both are labeled CVE (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2017).
Naturally, law enforcement organizations, such as Homeland Security and the Federal
Bureau of Investigations, have long worked in the field of preventing and countering
violent extremism. But foreign policy is the other side of the CVE policy coin, using
similar language but working in quite different contexts.
Making this distinction between domestic and foreign policy, the Bush
Administration’s 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS) highlights USAID’s foreign
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policy development and democratization role being integral to combating terrorism. The
policy identified the 3Ds, which were comprised of defense, diplomacy, and development
(Rasmussen, 2015; USAID, 2012). However, this did not fundamentally change the way
in which USAID worked overseas, but rather placed additional expectations on the
agency and the way in which it coordinates, such as with the Defense of Defense and the
U.S. Department of State (DOS). Today, in addition to these modern P/CVE approaches,
USAID provides support to P/CVE in a broad array of traditional ways. For example,
USAID has continued to employ soft power approaches such as youth engagement,
reconciliation, economic assistance, social inclusion, local governance, and conflict
management projects, among other approaches (USAID, 2017, para. 3). Also, the term
preventing violent extremism (PVE) has recently begun to emerge and take policy hold,
possibly through the United Nations’ term which has influenced foreign aid agencies. In
the future, if this distinction becomes more commonplace, which it appears to be, it may
have an effect of better separating domestic and military terminology (i.e., CVE) from
foreign aid terminology (i.e., PVE).
However, contrasting the changing nature of P/CVE, USAID has operated P/CVE
programs since 2006 in West Africa and has over a decade of experience in implementing
these programs (USAID, 2016, para.5). Given the amount of time P/CVE approaches
have been active, P/CVE can no longer be described as a novel concept, as it has existed
for over a decade in its modern form. In addition, P/CVE also incorporates development
approaches that have existed for decades. What is new is the terminology encapsulating
those approaches (Ghattas, 2015). In a recent publication, scholars summarized this
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challenge stating that semantic ambiguity has led to broad policy responses that lack the
necessary focus and precision (Harris-Hogan, Barrelle, & Zammit, 2015). As a result,
P/CVE has come to represent a broad array of tools, issues, and approaches, yet it is also
at times specific to given contexts. This contrast can make coordination, analysis, and
policy implementation a challenge. This study, which explores P/CVE policy at various
policy levels, will illustrate this complexity.
Further, the policy evolution of P/CVE is not entirely clear. For example,
Ambinder (2010) argued that P/CVE is a rebranding of the term the global war on terror,
which began two decades years ago. Prior to that, some concepts closely related to
P/CVE date back decades, such as Cold War era writings of the strategist Beaufre
arguing for non-violent strategies, akin to modern stabilization operations and
counterinsurgency, and including good governance and economic reforms to counter
revolutionary movements (cited in Ramakrishna, 2014, para. 5).
The modern concept of P/CVE only emerged as formal policy in 2011, with
USAID’s policy of using development as a response to violent extremism (USAID,
2011). Since 2001 and constantly changing until today, P/CVE policies have formally
emerged that have a direct relationship with foreign assistance and diplomatic policy,
such as those found in DOS and USAID policy documents. Modern foreign assistance
P/CVE policies and strategies are comprised of a complex mixture of hard power
approaches (i.e., military-centric), such as counterterrorism, and soft power approaches,
such as development and diplomacy (i.e., economic development programs). The current
P/CVE conceptualization has often been referred to as whole of government, or whole of
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society, blending many aspects of intervention, both hard and soft approaches (Williams,
2016).
Uncertainty remains as to the purpose and effectiveness of P/CVE policy
approaches. While hard power and soft power have combined over time into so-called
smart power foreign assistance paradigms, it remains unknown how this rapid policy
evolution occurred at key points and whether this new paradigm is effective, or at least
more effective than previous related models. Because of the lack of knowledge in the
body of scholarly literature as to what occurred over time and the effectiveness of these
changes, it is difficult to determine which models served best under various conditions.
Understanding why policy has evolved over time is important to determine policy
effectiveness. This significant shortcoming in the current body of knowledge does a
disservice to policy makers and project implementers alike.
To make better P/CVE policy, the puzzle pieces must be assembled more
coherently. As Rasmussen (2015) argued, terrorism and extremism remain some of the
greatest challenges to security because the current tools to defeat them are failing (p. 75).
Without effective policy tools, based on a sound understanding of what is required to
counter violent extremism, at best the status quo remains, and at worst the conditions will
deteriorate. As such, the longer the struggle against violent extremists continues to grow
in scale and intensity, the more damage is done to lives, families, economies, and the
social fabric of communities. This said, there is currently a gap in knowledge related to
the nature of P/CVE policy interconnectivity at various levels. This gap inherently leads
to other unknowns, such as whether policy is being developed in an effective manner to
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produce maximal desired results, particularly at the point of implementation.
In sum, this study is required to help close important knowledge gaps regarding
P/CVE policy development, alignment, and implementation. As argued, P/CVE is an
important policy approach within broader foreign assistance policy which delineates how
the United States intervenes in many challenged regions around the world. These
approaches have affected the lives of millions and underlie the rationale of billions of
dollars in expenditure. It is therefore increasingly important as government budgets have
become unsustainable and global engagements in several challenging regions have failed
or worsened. Further, there is exceptional complexity to the nature of policy evolution of
P/CVE. The policy predecessors that helped give rise to modern P/CVE date back
decades and are marked by unique periods of foreign policy. An understanding of these
differing foreign policy periods, and how those changes affected the policy evolution of
P/CVE, will further shed light on the factors leading to these changes. These are critical
questions pertaining to the future of American foreign policy and efforts to counter
violent extremism.
Problem Statement
The United States’ P/CVE related policies have changed dramatically since 2001
until today. This analysis of modern P/CVE can be broken into two periods, the first
being 2001 until 2010, which is the period of policy precedent, setting in place policies
that would eventually lead to the formal concept of countering violent extremism. This
period is noteworthy for the historical aspects of development. The second period is that
of 2010 until today. In 2010, countering violent extremism formalized in terms of its

11
name, but conceptually continued to undergo multiple changes over the years. For
example, the addition of preventing violent extremism came into use during the debate
between the role of foreign aid assistance and military intervention. As such, the
differentiation between soft power and hard power approaches, creating an emerging
distinction between PVE and CVE. further, P/CVE only began being incorporated into
formal foreign policy documents in 2011, with USAID’s policy guidance which
advocated development as a response to violent extremism (USAID, 2017).
Within only a few short years, P/CVE emerged as a pillar of American foreign
policy (The White House, 2015, p. 13). However, despite numerous foreign policy
interventions with P/CVE objectives, including Iraq and Afghanistan, the very definition
of P/CVE remained unsettled and continues to mean different things to different
organizations (Challgren et al., 2016). There is no clear understanding of what is driving
these rapid policy changes. This has been further burdened by the dearth of rigorous
analytical studies related to P/CVE policy and implementation (Nasser-Edine, Garnham,
Agostino, & Caluya, 2011, pp. 1-2). Further, the studies that do exist offer no explanatory
theoretical frameworks in which to compare its nature of change with other comparable
historical policy approaches. This creates further obstacles to learning and understanding
the evolution of P/CVE.
Despite P/CVE policy growing in prominence in American foreign aid policy,
there are important foundational questions that remain unresolved. This is especially
noteworthy as it pertains to P/CVE foreign policy evolution and the identification and
understanding of key factors driving this policy evolution over time. The topic of
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USAID’s unique role in P/CVE implementation remains an important foreign policy
topic currently under debate. Therefore, this study will shed light on the field of P/CVE
by undertaking an analysis of the factors that have driven change in P/CVE as it pertains
to foreign aid policy and the nature of USAID’s role in this work. This study will also
seek to illustrate the nature of P/CVE policy alignment between agency policy and that of
policy at the point of implementation, in this case, the P/CVE related policies governing
the TSCTP. This study will attempt to clarify these unresolved questions and how they
impact USAID’s unique role by examining these research objectives and applying
explanatory theoretical frameworks for scholarly analysis.
Purpose
The purpose of this qualitative study is to understand how and why foreign policy,
as it pertains to P/CVE as part of foreign assistance within USAID programs, has
changed in recent years. As such, the study will aim to shed light on the nature and the
drivers of P/CVE policy changes, emphasizing USAID P/CVE related foreign assistance
policy. Secondarily, this study aims to provide an informative higher-level analysis for
policy makers, practitioners, and academic researchers. In this context, the study will
examine high level policy, such as congressional and executive branch mandates to
USAID as well as internal USAID policy itself. This contrasts with implementation level
policy, including the implementation of the TSCTP, which serves as a case study for this
paper. The study seeks to illustrate that both high level policy and implementation level
execution are important. Alignment and coordination between the differing levels are
critical for effective policy execution, as is a clear understanding of the policy direction at
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all levels.
To understand policy, and the nature of its emergence as policy, there must be an
understanding of the logical interconnectivity from the highest levels of policy
development to the point of policy implementation. In this study, this is accomplished by
examining the interaction between foreign policy, development assistance policy, agency
policy, regional policy, and official development assistance policy pertaining to P/CVE.
To offer additional analytical value, and to frame the study in the case study
model, this study will examine a long-standing and ongoing regional program that has
evolved from counterterrorism to preventing and countering violent extremism. The
program is called the TSCTP, which was implemented in 2005 and covers the program
implementation in eleven countries that comprise the partnership (Algeria, Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Tunisia, and Senegal).
Further, the intent and purpose of this study is timely and relevant because P/CVE
policy is an increasingly important concept in American foreign policy considerations.
The United Nations has also expanded its role, asserting that the world is currently
entering an era of humanitarian disasters not seen since WWII, which will likely have
effects on international stability (BBC, 2017). Further, while P/CVE is frequently
discussed in terms of its relative novelty as a formal foreign policy and/or strategy, the
reality is that it has a long lineage. This policy lineage tells an important story in how
P/CVE has moved from being part of a policy backwater prior to September 11, 2001 to
now being among the most discussed foreign policy topics (Nasser-Edine et al., 2011).
That historical shift points to factors and catalysts that have influenced and mandated
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those changes over time and this study aims to provide an explanation of these factors
and catalysts of change.
Research Questions
RQ1: Has regional policy, as reflected in the TSCPT, been implemented in
alignment with USAID’s P/CVE foreign assistance policy?
RQ2: What factors have led to changes in P/CVE TSCTP regional policy as well
as the broader USAID P/CVE foreign assistance policy?
Theoretical Framework
The two levels of examination are: 1) a high-level examination of U.S. P/CVE
foreign assistance policy evolution as it pertains primarily to USAID’s agency level
P/CVE policy. This will examine overarching trends in P/CVE related foreign assistance
policy, focusing on USAID’s role, such as the development of new strategies or
approaches in P/CVE (e.g., published formal government strategies); 2) a closer casestudy examination of a major P/CVE policy implementation program, the TSCTP, with a
focus on USAID’s distinct role in the program. A more contextual case-study analysis of
the TSCPT will examine whether this implemented program has addressed some of these
factors or whether the purpose changed at the implementation level. The case-study will
help explore whether regional P/CVE policy and strategy mirrors and aligns with global
P/CVE foreign assistance policy. This will help explore the level of continuity and
coordination, and thus the nature of USAID’s P/CVE policy and implementation.
The theoretical framework applied throughout this study is three-fold: punctuated
equilibrium theory, policy feedback theory, and path dependence theory. Looking first at
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punctuated equilibrium theory (PET), Sabatier and Weible (2014) posited that PET was
developed in the mid-1990s to examine policy stasis followed by rapid change. They
argued that public policy remains stagnate and incremental but is occasionally punctuated
by rapid and large-scale change, resulting from the catalyst of crisis. Based on
background research, I believe PET serves as a keen option to explore P/CVE foreign
assistance policy change. This is because the struggle against radical extremism (e.g.,
counterterrorism, anti-terrorism, counterinsurgency, and stabilization operations) has
grown rapidly since September 11, 2001.
Illustrating the potential importance of PET, the attacks that occurred on 9/11
created a policy paradigm shift on how the U.S. intervened abroad. As I will discuss
further later in this study, prior to 9/11, there were several periods of increased attention
on combating extremism, particularly during the Cold War era. Some of the more recent
changes included the creation of new conflict focused budget funds (e.g., Overseas
Contingency Operations / Global War on Terror funding, implemented by Department of
Defense, DOS, and USAID (Congressional Research Service (CRS), 2017), but focusing
on USAID’s effort in this study), and the creation of several new specialized offices that
address countering radicalization, stabilization operations, and counterterrorism (e.g.,
USAID’s P/CVE Secretariat and the DOS Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering
Violent Extremism). The creation of these new offices provides a snapshot into the many
P/CVE related changes that have occurred in recent years. In short, the attacks of 9/11
created a dynamic shock to the system with reverberating effects in recent years. As such,
these rapid and significant changes lend themselves well to using PET as an analytical
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and theoretical framework.
Policy feedback theory (PFT) will also play a role in my study on P/CVE. PFT
seeks to explore the phenomenon in which the enactment of policies allows for the
restructuring of political processes (Sabatier & Weible, 2014). This theoretical
framework helps to explain the feedback loop that sometimes occurs between policy
(e.g., broad global U.S. policy, such as P/CVE foreign assistance policy, as well as
geographically focused policy such as the TSCTP) and politics (e.g., political imperatives
and mandates by differing administrations and leaders). The theory also helps explore
unintended consequences from policy implementation.
Among the important aspects of PFT is that it shows the complex interrelationship
between policy and politics and the need to understand and learn from the unexpected
and/or unintended consequences of policies and how such policies can interact with
society beyond their intended design. This theory holds value for studying P/CVE in
foreign assistance policy because P/CVE is an issue that is both shaped by policy and
shapes policy. It is both a cause and an effect, at times both changed by external policies
while simultaneously effecting external policies. Therefore, this theoretical framework is
valuable for this study in that it facilitates and explanation of what foreign assistance
P/CVE policy aspects have changed over time, why have they changed, and what effects
those changes made.
Finally, this study will look to the theory of path dependence to understand the
nature of change of P/CVE policy evolution. Path dependence emerged out of the field of
economics but has been applied to public policy in fields such as criminal justice
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(Schneider, 2006) and nation-building (Allen, 2010). Path dependence offers an
important theoretical perspective by examining institutional and historical constraints of
policy change over time. Torfing (2009) defines path dependence as the condition in
which present policy choices are shaped by previously created institutional paths. As
such, path dependence serves as an explanatory model addressing causes that are in part
associated with the proverbial butterfly effect, whereby a small change has the capacity to
create larger cascading effects (Allen, 2010). Therefore, the path dependence theory will
serve as a valuable framework in examining the way in which institutional pressures and
established interests affect policy change over time.
Collectively, these theoretical frameworks provide explanatory frameworks for
public policy issues and will prove useful in my examination of foreign assistance P/CVE
policy. Each of these frameworks offers a unique theoretical approach, explaining various
complexities and phenomena pertaining to P/CVE related foreign assistance policy
change. PET offers insight into the nature of rapid change; path dependence offers insight
on institutional and historical constraints to change; and PFT examines the nature of how
existing policies affect the ongoing policymaking process. Bringing these three
theoretical frameworks together offers an opportunity to observe and report the way in
which P/CVE foreign assistance policy has evolved, using a variety of complementary
theoretical lenses. Each of the theoretical lenses provide distinct explanatory aspects to
different aspects which is further explored in Chapters 2 and 3. In sum, PD assumes
significant alignment between the TSCTP and USAID’s P/CVE policies. If there is nonalignment, then PFT becomes a valuable analytical tool. If a rapid policy or
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implementation rupture is found to have occurred or is underway, then this occurrence
shall be explored through PET.
Nature of the Study
This study is qualitative in nature. This approach will facilitate a rich contextual
study to fully explore the rapidly changing nature of P/CVE policy. The approach is a
case study of the TSCTP, which will contrast higher level USAID foreign aid policy
against implementation level policy, which is that of the TSCTP program, and a program
in which USAID significantly contributed to over many years. The TSCTP is a regional
policy program and not specifically designed to target a single country independent of the
regional context. Evidence of this regional strategic context can also be found in
USAID’s East Africa Regional Development Cooperative Strategy (RDCS), which
explicitly links the regional strategy with the 2015 East Africa Counter Terrorism and
Countering Violent Extremism (EA CT/CVE) Strategy (USAID/Kenya and East Africa,
2016). Specific country level engagement is left to USAID Country Development
Cooperative Strategies (CDCS), though country level activities may link with wider
TSCTP activities, such as that of USAID/Mali’s CDCS (USAID/Mali, 2015, p. 8). In this
sense, the TSCTP is an independent program and not driven specifically by individual
country strategies targeted for TSCTP activities. Further, because there are eleven
individual African countries that comprise the regional focus of TSCTP, an analysis of
each country’s bi-lateral work with USAID, such as program plans found in country
strategies, is not feasible or within the scope of the study. However, those countries with
an active USAID CDCS in place were examined to determine if they tie in with the wider

19
TSCTP. Additionally, these regional policies were contrasted with agency level P/CVE
policies, primarily including the USAID policy document titled The Development
Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency (2011).
The research methodology is governed by the research questions, problem
statement, and purpose. Based on the theory of punctuated equilibrium, PFT, and path
dependence theory, there was an expectation that this study would show that there were
significant catalysts driving policy shifts such as the increasing scale and intensity of
global conflict and terrorist attacks involving the US. In part, this assumption held most
true, but it was learned that lesser known events also contributed significantly as well, to
include policy changes. Just as a lab catalyst is evaluated with results, so too did this
study examine how certain catalytic events correlate with P/CVE policy change. Some of
the results included the magnitude of P/CVE policy implementations, shifts in strategic
P/CVE approaches, and notable changes in P/CVE policies.
Prior to data collection and analysis, I suspected that such catalysts have indeed
driven policy change over the past several years. Based on the literature review, the
expected factors affecting P/CVE policy are listed below. It was expected that analysis
will identify and highlight others, which it did, and those are explored in Chapter 4. Some
of the factors initially considered for analysis included:
1) Number of global conflicts driven by violent extremism which involve the
United States. For example, regions or countries designated as being within
the United States strategic interest, such as allied countries.
2) Number of terrorist attacks targeting U.S. interests abroad. This can indicate a
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strategic effort by militants to destabilize strategic regions with the intent to
stretch U.S. resources in the fight against violent extremism. For example,
some Africa experts, such as de Montclos (2014), have stated that Boko
Haram seeks a more global footprint. In turn, this would likely require the
U.S. to expand its efforts to counter Boko Haram in the group’s expanding
areas of operation. As such, a rise and fall of violence targeting U.S. interests
abroad would likely have a palpable effect on U.S. foreign policy as it pertains
to P/CVE. Several violent extremist organizations are regional and/or
international, compounding the importance of this consideration.
3) Extremist violence in strategic regions. Focusing in this study on countries
relevant to the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership—Algeria, Burkina
Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Tunisia,
and Senegal. Given that the TSCTP exists, this region is known to be of
strategic interest to the U.S.
This study focused on the nature of P/CVE policy evolution over time. This was
examined through a series of methodological steps to acquire and analyze the data.
These steps are as follows:
Step 1: Establish an understanding of P/CVE strategic policy. As such, determine
if P/CVE related policies have shifted based on the degree of relevant global conflict and
terrorist attacks involving the United States. Based on a historical understanding of
P/CVE policy, and given the theory of punctuated equilibrium, the number and intensity
of attacks by radical organizations against U.S. interests likely contribute to P/CVE
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policy shifts (i.e., as relevant violence increases then so too does P/CVE related policy
change). If not, then determine if there are other factors affecting P/CVE policy change
that are not being considered. Determine what role and effect do other agencies have on
USAID’s P/CVE work regarding the TSCTP.
Step 2: Examine the case study, the TSCTP program. This involves an
examination and explanation of why this program began (e.g., due to increases in conflict
and terrorism in the region) and the objectives of the program (e.g., mitigate an increase
in radical violence in the region). This step examines how the policy and its
implementation has evolved over the past 13 years (i.e., the beginning of the TSCTP) and
then determine if those changes are reflective of broader policy change (top down
approach), driven by implementation lessons-learned informing wider policy (bottom-up
approach), or neither. Because this region is also of importance to EU and NATO efforts,
this step will examine international coordination on P/CVE, and that analysis will help
inform the wider U.S. P/CVE foreign assistance policy in the region.
As a case study, TSCTP presents one of the best opportunities to examine the
evolution of P/CVE activities at a regional level. Given the importance of TSCTP to
P/CVE implementation as part of USAID’s foreign assistance policy, the activities of this
program were examined and categorized into the nature of their approach and the
objectives sought. These categories will help examine the nature of change over time.
Step 3: Explain how this study contributes to social change. This study seeks to
help explain the nature of P/CVE policy evolution. Violent extremism adversely affects
tens of millions of people around the world every day. P/CVE seeks to mitigate some of
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the worst perceived causes and effects of violent extremism, as well as achieve U.S.
foreign policy interests. This study aims to contribute to understanding the nature of
P/CVE policy evolution, the factors of that change, and whether P/CVE policy
implementation as part of the TSCPT has been effectively coordinated. In part, the aim of
this study is to help policy makers produce better informed P/CVE foreign assistance
policy.
Further, by examining the case study of the TSCPT, the results of this study will
assist practitioners with their program implementation by providing additional analysis
on “best practices” of P/CVE policy implementation and how to more fully explore and
understand the objectives of a policy, studying it from a top-down and bottom-up
approach. This study will touch upon some of the most pressing policy debates regarding
P/CVE, such as the balance of hard and soft power, and to a limited extent the efficacy of
foreign aid as a P/CVE approach.
Step 4: Determine applicability of the theories of punctuated equilibrium, policy
feedback, and path dependence. In part, this study will help shed light on if P/CVE policy
changes have been prompted by such factors as the scale and intensity of relevant
conflicts and terrorist attacks. If so, this finding would merit additional analysis focusing
on the potential explanatory value of these theoretical frameworks for a more complete
understanding of the nature of P/CVE interventions. This finding would also bring into
question what other policy theories should be considered to gain a more exhaustive
analysis regarding the factors related to P/CVE related policy and its evolution over time.
However, if there is no discernable linkage between these theoretical frameworks, or if
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there is no clear theoretical explanation, then either the theories lack explanatory value
for P/CVE, or P/CVE policy has unique attributes that require additional research.
Step 5: Data gathering methodology. I have chosen document analysis and
purposive interviewing as my two primary research methods for the case study and to
better understand the nature of the policy interaction between varying levels of the
government. My approach to interviewing was purposive, thus selecting key individuals
that have practical knowledge and experience of P/CVE and/or its predecessor policies
and project implementation. The population for planned interviews was drawn from the
foreign assistance community, including non-governmental organizations, international
conflict-oriented think tank experts, relevant academics, and former USAID, DOS, and
DOD P/CVE specialists and practitioners.
Definitions
There are key definitions and concepts that require explanation. These include the
definition of government policy, foreign policy, foreign aid policy, official development
assistance, and preventing and countering violent extremism. For the purposes of this
study, these concepts are related and move from general and broader terms to more
specific and technical. Definitions of the broad concepts mask the complexities that lie
behind them, but the complexities are well understood by those who study the concepts
of foreign policy and development assistance. As such, the more precise the concept
becomes, the complexities become more apparent if for no other reason than that specific
definitions are required to further specify concepts such as policy and foreign policy to
arrive at official development assistance. It is for this reason that careful wording is
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necessary to ensure the scope and purpose of the study remains clear.
To begin with the most general term, policy has been defined as a principle or
course of action by organizations (Oxford University Press, 2018). Going one step further
down, foreign policy has been defined as those policies governing interaction between
sovereign states (Merriam-Wester, 2018). What is evident from these definitions is that
the concept of policy does not mandate one format or another, but at the core it is that
which provides guidance for those individuals, organizations, and agencies that work in
the respective policy arena, and in this case, it refers to guidance to entities that work in
foreign policy. This may involve making more specific policy or implementing the
respective policies.
Moving from the broad concepts of policy and foreign policy, it becomes
increasingly evident that specific policy making is required as specialization becomes
more granular, moving from the high-level policies of the highest offices to the
specialized policies of agencies and other entities. An example of this is shifting from
foreign policy to foreign aid policy. Foreign aid has been defined as the transfer of
capital, goods, and services for the benefit of the recipient country, including economic,
military, or humanitarian purposes (Britannica, 2018). As such, policy that guides foreign
aid is foreign aid policy. However, for the purposes of this study, foreign aid policy is
still too broad as it encompasses all forms of foreign aid, including military assistance. As
such, a more specific subset of foreign aid is known as Official Development Assistance
(ODA). ODA has been defined by the World Bank as government aid designed to
promote economic development and humanitarian welfare but explicitly excluding aid for
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the purposes of military assistance (OECD, 2018).
Yet, this is still too broad as it encompasses all forms of development assistance,
which is wide ranging, including governance and democracy assistance, economic aid,
health, education, humanitarian assistance, and others. To offer the requisite level of
specificity, the study will focus on P/CVE through the lens of development assistance.
Many agencies work in the field of P/CVE, but only P/CVE policy and implementation
that is defined as ODA is addressed as part of this study, namely the work by the U.S.
Agency for International Development, which then in part takes guidance from, and in
coordination with, the DOS. And although P/CVE has moved through several definitional
iterations, the closest definition of P/CVE was written in USAID’s policy document, The
Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency, which states that USAID
uses development mechanisms to prevent and counter such extremist violence (USAID,
2011). This document states USAID policy to use development mechanisms to counter
extremist-based violence, defining such violence as: “advocating, engaging in, preparing,
or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social,
economic and political objectives” (USAID, 2011, p. 2). Thus, this is the key policy
definition most applicable to understanding the parameters of this study.
Assumptions
There were key assumptions at the outset of this study, and which held throughout
the study. The first assumption was that P/CVE was designed intentionally as an essential
component to foreign assistance policy. It was also assumed that policy changes, both at
the agency level and at the regional level, are made deliberately. As such, intentionality
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and deliberate policy design are fundamental assumptions in this study. The analysis
revealed that this assumption was seemingly accurate as no policy was found to have
been made without intentionality. Yet, multiple theoretical lenses were used to ensure
explanatory value remained if these assumptions did not hold to be true. Multiple
theoretical lenses facilitated more perspectives and potential explanations, a trend
Sabatier and Weible (2014) stated is becoming more recognized among scholars. The
recognition that one framework offers more precise or elaborate explanatory value for a
specific phenomenon is not necessarily problematic. Previous studies using multiple
theoretical frameworks have shown that some theories may prove more explanatory than
others, or they may provide useful differing perspectives for the same phenomenon or
case (Sabatier & Weible, 2014).
The assumption of intentionality and deliberate design in policy change was
expected to be insightful as it pertains to the discussion of path dependence and how it
relates to P/CVE policy evolution. Path dependence rests on the understanding that past
processes can be self-reinforcing, such as when actors progress so far down one course of
action that they can no longer reverse or change course. (Pierson, 2004). Given this
aspect of path dependence, it reflects a self-reinforcing dynamic over policy rather than a
deliberate or independent design of policy. As such, past designs and interests often
continue to hold sway over current and future policy decisions. With this framework, in
many ways, what is past is prologue. Therefore, it was expected that if the fieldwork
reveals that P/CVE is not characterized as being heavily affected by previous policies or
vested interests, then path dependence may not provide limited explanatory value for
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P/CVE policy evolution. Further, it was expected that if P/CVE has been affected by PD,
then fieldwork should shed light on whether the assumption of intentionality and
deliberate policy design mattered much once path dependence took hold, or whether
inertia dominated. These assumptions and the associated findings are further explored in
Chapter 4.
The assumption of intentionality and deliberate design also affects the explanatory
power of PET. PET is the theoretical framework that best explains what occurs when a
policy or a process suddenly breaks from incremental change and/or stasis, a concept that
is well articulated in path dependence. But in the case of PET, it is due to some sort of
systemic shock that catalyzes a large-scale departure from the past (Sabatier & Weible,
2014). As such, this framework helps examine both policy dynamics, stasis, and change.
This is important in understanding the nature of stasis and the causative aspects of policy
paradigm shifts when they occur. Given this versatility of theoretical lenses employed in
this study, the explanatory value should remain regardless of whether P/CVE has been
changed through a deliberate or non-deliberate process. However, if it comes to light
during fieldwork and concluding analysis that P/CVE did not undergo a major systemic
change, then PET would be of limited value and will thus rely on other lenses.
Finally, PFT has some logical linkage to path dependence in that both seek to
understand the way in which extant policies or processes continue to have effects on
current and future dynamics. As such, both have causal and temporal aspects. In the case
of PFT, the theory seeks to explain how past policies, once implemented, affect future
political dynamics (Sabatier & Weible, 2014). For PFT, the distinction from PD is the
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focus on political dynamics versus more tangible issues such as infrastructure
development, for example, why certain train track gauges continue even when better
alternatives exist (Puffert, 2002). In this example, PFT facilitates an explanation of the
political dynamics and outcomes that exist as a result of regulating train track gauges,
while PD helps explain the material constraints and vested interests that reinforce the
status quo of enduring train track gauges.
PFT helps us understand how specific policies restructure political processes,
thereby potentially creating second and third order effects, potentially even unintended
consequences (Sabatier & Weible, 2014). Both frameworks require the need to identify
“feedback effects” of prior policies upon rapidly or slowly changing dynamics to identify
factors catalyzing or inhibiting change, whatever the case may be. In this study, it was
expected that PFT would help identify how past P/CVE related policies have affected the
way in which political agendas and policy problems have developed in relation to P/CVE
policy evolution (Sabatier & Weible, 2014). As such, it was expected to provide a
potentially useful explanatory lens in understanding how USAID’s P/CVE policy shapes
the way in which the agency redefines the concept of P/CVE, or perhaps even modifies
its policy agenda on this topic.
A second assumption was that P/CVE policy is deemed relevant by the foreign
policy community, particularly policy makers. If in fact P/CVE was largely considered
irrelevant by agency policy makers, then there would have been a potential that policy
development has not been given enough consideration to extract comprehensive
explanatory analysis with these three theoretic lenses. Even so, such an issue could in part
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still be explained by PFT and PD. Regarding PFT, policy disinterest could have
suggested that the politics of other existing policies precluded P/CVE from developing
into a prominent policy. It was expected that PD may also help explain such a
phenomenon. PD could have shed light on conditions where past policies continue to
facilitate inertia and the creation of vested interests, perhaps due to the prior application
of resources. It is possible that PD helps explain how P/CVE may fade away or fail to
become fully institutionalized to make room for other entrenched interests. Finally,
policy inattention may come as a result of other more banal issues that may not be fully
explained by these theoretical lenses, such as P/CVE concepts never fully convincing
policy makers due to weak data and poor messaging. If this was the case, it would have
reflected poor implementation, performance, and messaging, which is not fully within the
explanatory realm of these three frameworks, but nevertheless an important finding. Yet,
such an analysis was considered beyond the scope of this study and thus no such
conclusion was made.
Scope and Delimitations
This study examines P/CVE policy evolution over a select period. While some
foundational analysis examines the period from September 11, 2001 until today, the
emphasis was placed on the time span beginning in 2005, the year in which the TSCTP
began, until the current period. 2001 was the pivotal year in which U.S. policy oriented
toward counterterrorism due to the September 11th attacks. This factor which led to
policy shifts should be acknowledged and analyzed as a critical period for foreign
assistance policy. These changes in turn led to programs that morphed into what
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developed into the TSCTP, which was originally known as the Pan-Sahel Initiative
(AFRICOM, 2010). This marks one of the earliest events relevant to the study of P/CVE
policy evolution.
This study’s transferability is expected to be limited. P/CVE is a specialized and
nuanced policy which has undergone rapid change in a chaotic period of American
history which has been rife with conflict. However, analysis and results may be
transferable to retroactive analyses of periods of conflict as well as future conflicts
involving nuanced policies directly resulting from conflicts, particularly those involving
unconventional conflict, such as counterinsurgencies. Further, as this study examines
how P/CVE policy changed over time, I will also examine how P/CVE changes over time
impacted USAID’s role in P/CVE. Some of these effects could include elevating funding
for combating violent extremism, the role USAID has played in foreign policy, and the
potentially the increasing securitization of U.S. development assistance. Additional
effects may include significant changes in the foreign assistance roles by the Department
of Defense and the DOS and the effect that has had on USAID’s role in P/CVE policy
and implementation.
For the geographic scope of the study, I selected the oldest ongoing P/CVE
program, the TSCTP, which spans eleven countries. Because the TSCTP is the oldest
such P/CVE program in USAID’s portfolio, this will provide insight into how policy
evolution has occurred over time and the unique role USAID has played in P/CVE. This
case study will include the program’s activities in Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon,
Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Tunisia, and Senegal. While this study
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examines a program that spans numerous countries, the scope of this study does not
include examining the internal P/CVE related policies of these countries. Rather, this
study will address only U.S. foreign assistance policy as it pertains to the TSCTP
program. Therefore, when any other country’s P/CVE policies are discussed within this
study, it is included to support the analysis of U.S. foreign assistance pertaining to P/CVE
policy and implementation.
The interview population was P/CVE specialists, researchers, and practitioners. A
valid source was assessed based on the quality of the source’s published material, such as
those having published peer reviewed journal articles, reputable academic books (e.g.,
widely cited and published by a reputable publishing house), or widely referenced
research papers. Specialists were selected to represent two policy levels, the national
policy level, such as those that contribute and specialize at the agency strategic level
(e.g., higher levels that affect entire agencies or government-wide policies, versus direct
implementation of activities).
Limitations
There are both scope limitations related to the agency of focus as well as
definitional limitations to this study. Looking first at definitional limitations, this study
focuses on international foreign assistance as it pertains to P/CVE. P/CVE is a distinct
concept, and therefore is addressed as a distinct concept within this study. As such, the
study incorporates related concepts such as counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and
stabilization, where there is directly overlap or influence upon P/CVE policy and
implementation. TSCTP was selected as the case study despite it touching on other
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related concepts. Therefore, this study focuses on officially designated P/CVE definitions
and programs, such as defined by USAID. Where this study touches on these other
related concepts is that I seek to explain the relationship between those distinct fields and
their influence on the evolution and implementation of P/CVE.
Another limitation is that this study focuses on U.S. policies related as part of
USAID’s P/CVE foreign assistance policy. USAID is the primary agency for this study
because according to a 2018 Joint Strategic Plan between the DOS and USAID, it serves
as the primary U.S. agency for humanitarian assistance and international development.
However, while USAID’s policies are of primary importance to the study, other policies
are addressed when they directly affect USAID policy on P/CVE. This will occur in
portions of the analysis because USAID routinely works alongside numerous other
agencies in P/CVE programs, including the DOS and the U.S. Department of Defense,
particularly in work pertaining to the TSCTP. Further, while USAID is the lead
development agency, according to the same 2018 Joint Strategic Plan, the DOS is the
primary U.S. foreign affairs agency and the main institution to conduct American
diplomacy.
There are also methodological limitations. For the purposes of data triangulation,
I will use document analysis and interviews as my primary analytical approach. These
documents were drawn from formal government policy documents, reviews, and
analyses. Other documents were drawn from NGOs, independent policy analysis
institutions or centers (think tanks), and relevant published papers. Further, government
policy documents are original primary source material, making them methodologically
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important. In some way, policy documents are akin to “interviewing” a government
agency as it reflects the agency’s perspectives, positions, and interests. Document
analysis helped provide a focused foundation by analyzing and thematically grouping
these documents, and thus help make logical sense of a large body of published public
information. Because of the sensitive nature of P/CVE related government policy, only
publicly available documents were analyzed. Further, publicly available documentation
was more readily available than current government employees, whom I did not
interview due to ethical considerations. Ethical considerations also prohibited me from
asking for sensitive information that is not publicly available. Further, because significant
numbers of published government documents remain available to the public, both current
and historical, document analysis captured the formal position of the U.S. government
over the years as it relates to P/CVE foreign assistance policy.
However, document analysis has limitations. Government documents and
organizational white papers are finished products. These documents present a complete
product but do not speak to the historical and ongoing debates regarding the development
of these documents. Because of the emergent nature of P/CVE foreign assistance policy,
these debates are important to understand because of their ongoing nature and the rapidity
of shifting policy thinking on this topic. To capture this information, and thus fill those
informational gaps, purposive interviews with think tank experts, non-government
organization practitioners, former government employees, and policy scholars provided
important background and contextual information that is not available in final
government documents. There are also limitations to interview methodology, which
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include limited memory, selective memory, and a potential lack of transparency by the
interviewee. To mitigate these limitations, triangulation of these methods helped provide
a strong foundation for valid research findings and effectively helped answering the
research objectives.
Significance
P/CVE has grown and changed substantially over recent years. Historically, while
interventions against extremists have primarily used military means, important changes
have occurred since 2010. Between 2010 and 2016, formal P/CVE strategies and policies
were developed by the DOS and USAID (USAID, 2017; U.S. Department of State,
2017). These policies have increased the attention on P/CVE as a foreign policy tool.
Despite these emergent policies, there has been a great deal of speculation as to the
causes of such rapid P/CVE policy change, but few analytically robust analyses have
been undertaken to explain this phenomenon more precisely (Nasser-Edine et al., 2011).
In terms of practical value to policy makers, analysts, and practitioners, this study
fills a critical gap in the literature by exploring the causative factors of P/CVE policy
change. It helps clarify the effects of such change upon regions with historical and
ongoing P/CVE implementation, while focusing on the Trans-Sahara as a case study.
This study will also address some of the most important aspects of USAID P/CVE policy
implementation, which is yet another topic rarely addressed in scholarly sources. In terms
of theoretical value and addressing the knowledge gap, this study lends itself well to
applying three important public policy theories: punctuated equilibrium theory, path
dependence theory, and PFT.
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As part of my approach, I examine TSCTP, a long-standing multifaceted foreign
assistance P/CVE program (U.S. Department of State, n.d.). Based on background
research, a case study approach examining the TSCTP illustrates a significant program
shift which highlights a period of punctuated equilibrium as it pertains to foreign
assistance P/CVE policy change. Because P/CVE is a global policy affecting many
regions, additional examples were incorporated as needed to highlight other trends and
punctuated changes in P/CVE policy, likely found in other programs in various regions,
to include Iraq and Afghanistan for example.
Another important purpose of this research is to better understand P/CVE foreign
policy through the lens of established theoretical policy frameworks. Often, P/CVE is
examined through the lens of current events but fails to examine P/CVE through the
lenses of policy theories, in this case, punctuated equilibrium theory (PET), PFT, and
path dependence theory (PD). During background research, I found no such examination
that provides a theoretical and analytical explanation of the factors leading to the rapid
rate of P/CVE foreign policy evolution. This leaves an important explanatory gap in the
existing body of scholarly literature.
Finally, another key purpose for this study is to help shape the formulation of
better policy by understanding all the drivers of change. The current dearth of scholarly
literature provides limited information to policy makers and implementers in the field of
P/CVE. This has an adverse impact in the pursuit of sound policy development,
especially in trying to under the broader history of P/CVE and how it led to today’s
policy circumstances. This lack of material prevents the policy making community from
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understanding why and how P/CVE policy has changed, if those changes have been for
the better, and how to better steer the policy into the future.
Summary
P/CVE policy within USAID has rapidly shifted over the past seven years, and
broadly across the entire U.S. government since September 11, 2001. To understand these
changes, the purpose of this qualitative study is to understand how and why foreign
policy, as it pertains to P/CVE within USAID, has changed in recent years. This study
sheds light on the nature and the drivers of P/CVE policy changes, with an emphasis on
foreign assistance policy provided by USAID. Secondarily, this study aims to provide
useful analysis for a range of policy makers and practitioners by providing high level
agency P/CVE policy analysis and a case study of the TSCTP. To accomplish this, two
research questions address the effective alignment of P/CVE regional and agency level
policy, the factors causing the changes in P/CVE regional and agency foreign policy, and
the distinct role that USAID serve in P/CVE foreign policy and implementation. It is
expected that this study will be useful and transferable to the P/CVE policy making and
implementation community.
While this chapter served as a broad overview for the study, providing a glimpse
into what to expect from this study, Chapter 2 will more fully explore the existing
scholarly literature related to P/CVE policies and related predecessor policies. Chapter 2
delves into such issues as the literature of the three theoretical frameworks used in this
study, looking at scholarly literature that attempts to bridge P/CVE literature with PET,
PFT, and PD. Chapter 2 also discusses the key thematic areas most often associated with
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P/CVE scholarly literature and provides an analysis of these broad thematic concepts.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
The purpose of this qualitative study was to understand how and why foreign
assistance policy, as it pertains to P/CVE, has evolved in recent years. In the study, I seek
to describe the nature and the drivers of P/CVE policy changes, with an emphasis on
USAID foreign assistance policy. Secondarily, this study aims to provide a strategic level
analysis for policy makers, practitioners, and academic researchers as a case study of
secondary and tertiary effects of a rapidly changing foreign policy. As a case study, the
study examines a long-standing regional program that has evolved from traditional
counterterrorism (i.e., defined by military doctrine as, “actions and activities to neutralize
terrorists, their organizations, and networks” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014, p. 4)) to now
incorporating non-combat approaches. The program is called the TSCTP and was
inaugurated in 2005. In discussing the TSCTP, the study covers the program’s
implementation in the eleven countries that comprise the TSCTP. These include Algeria,
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Tunisia, and
Senegal. The TSCTP is a collective program and was examined as an overarching
program rather than disaggregated for each country. As there are eleven individual
African countries that comprise the TSCTP, an analysis of each country’s work is not
feasible within the scope of this study, but those countries with an active USAID CDCS
in place were examined to determine if they tie in with the wider TSCTP.
P/CVE is a rapidly emerging field. The concept as we know today emerged on the
development policy scene as recently as 2010 and has grown rapidly in popularity since.
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It is now discussed among policy elites including heads of state, policy analysts, and
researchers around the world. Besides its growth in popularity, it also marks a significant
change in foreign aid policy, in some ways more rooted in counterinsurgency and
stabilization operations doctrine than traditional development aid. This is evinced in
USAID’s policy for preventing and countering violent extremism, which addressed both
violent extremism and insurgency together in a single policy paper (USAID, 2011).
However, the traditional definition of development assistance, as provided by the OECD,
focused on economic growth rather than conflict and violent extremism. Official
development assistance has generally been categorized into several categories: loans and
grants, emergency, debt forgiveness, bilateral or multilateral, and technical co-operation
(Keeley, 2012). Yet, none of these categories demonstrate that development assistance is
designed to counter violent extremism, which is part of the definitional problem of
P/CVE because P/CVE approaches may involve several of these categories depending on
the nature of the drivers of instability. A question emerges as to whether P/CVE is
something that should be addressed through development aid or military aid; or, is it
something unique all together? This challenge is not lost on USAID and was openly
acknowledged in its P/CVE policy document, stating:
Clarifying USAID’s role in the context of violent extremism and insurgency does
not come without controversy. Some hold strong views on whether development
agencies generally—and USAID in particular—should engage on these issues.
Programming resources to respond to violent extremism and insurgency requires
the Agency to assume greater institutional and operational risk (USAID, 2011, p.

40
ii)
This literature review informs these challenges and questions. P/CVE is not a
settled policy issue, making the ongoing discussion even more important. Researchers
know from past literature reviews that P/CVE books and articles have focused on a wide
range of issues to address P/CVE challenges, such as economics, education, gender, and
many other categories. P/CVE is broad and ranging, and the varied literature is rapidly
expanding, and as such is a wicked problem that “has innumerable causes, is tough to
describe, and doesn’t have a right answer…They’re the opposite of hard but ordinary
problems, which people can solve in a finite time by applying standard techniques”
(Camillus, 2008, para. 3). Given the wide-open concept of P/CVE, it is important to
broadly explore its nature and consider an array of different voices contributing to the
discussion. This is particularly relevant in these early years as researchers and policy
makers seek to understand what works and what does not. What is important to
understand in this literature review is that researchers, organizations, and policy makers
are still trying to understand how to prevent and counter violent extremism. As described,
this is a policy question that has created considerable struggle for years and that shows no
sign of abatement.
This literature review was divided into two distinct sections. The first section
deals with three theoretical frameworks considered relevant to this study of P/CVE policy
and practice. This section, which reviews the key theoretic frameworks of PFT, PET, and
PD, is shorter due to the dearth of literature applying these theories to P/CVE. The
second section will deal with literature that pertains directly to P/CVE, such as strategic
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concepts, case studies, various approaches, weaknesses and knowledge gaps, lessons
learned and challenges, the efficacy of P/CVE, and the evolution of P/CVE.
Literature Search Strategy
For this study, I primarily used two types of data platforms as part of this
literature review. Academic material, including the peer-reviewed journal articles, were
sourced from Walden University’s electronic library database using key-word search
term protocols as described in detail within this chapter and Chapter 3. Walden
University’s search engine is Thoreau, which links the researcher to EBSCO Discovery
Service. However, other search engines are also available within Walden University, such
as ProQuest Central. Thoreau was used predominantly for exploratory research while
ProQuest was used primarily to locate and download peer-reviewed journal articles.
The second primary data platform was USAID’s open source online search
engine, known as the Development Exchange Clearinghouse (DEC) system. The DEC is
the agency’s public record knowledge management repository. The DEC is akin to
traditional online research databases, and therefore the search terms were also applied
there. However, because the DEC is specific to USAID, the search protocol focuses on
the TSCTP and related P/CVE project implementation reports rather than strictly peer
reviewed journal articles. The DEC and EBSCO search terms used include preventing
and countering violent extremism, countering violent extremism, P/CVE, preventing
violent extremism, PVE, and Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. Further, policy
analysis documents were searched to provide background context to the study, such as
reports on changes to development policy, which may reinforce interviewees’
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perspectives on the nature of changing P/CVE foreign assistance policy. In addition,
Walden’s dissertation search engine was used to identify graduate level research on
P/CVE. This was done to provide additional scholarly material due to the lack of peerreviewed journal articles exploring P/CVE and policy change over time. Walden’s search
engine for theses and dissertations is ScholarWorks. The same terms used to search
USAID’s DEC and Walden’s EBSCO search engines were used in ScholarWorks to
maintain consistency.
Theoretical Foundation
Theories of development assistance and how it fits into foreign policy date back
over a century, with different policy making leaders having different goals regarding the
use of development assistance as a policy tool (Phillips, 2003). Development assistance is
relatively new to American statecraft but is now established sufficiently in the U.S.
government that it is discussed in theoretical terms as part of the broader framework of
foreign policy and foreign aid. Yet, theoretical discussions often trend toward the
technical offerings of official foreign assistance, such as health and education
improvements, or even broader discussions on economic or international development
theory. Further, such discussions and studies are frequently framed in very broad and
abstract ideological theories such as Marxism, neocolonialism, neo-imperialism, and
capitalism (Pankaj, 2005).
That said, there are useful public policy theories that speak to the nature of P/CVE
policy growth and evolution. Three such frameworks are PET, PFT, and PD. To date, I
have found no literature using PET, PFT, or PD to analyze P/CVE. However, each of
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these frameworks offer distinct explanatory lenses that should be useful in the
examination of P/CVE. As such, it is important to explain how each framework provides
explanatory value to this study.
First, I reference PET to provide a theoretical framework to help explain the rapid
change in a specific aspect of policy, such as the perceived rapid emergence of P/CVE as
part of foreign assistance policy. In this sense, it helps explain the temporal aspects of
policy change as well as causative factors that led to rapid change. Second, PFT offers a
theoretical framework on how policies can affect political decisions, such as agenda
setting and how policy problems are defined (Sabatier & Wieble, 2014). Because P/CVE
is an emergent policy, agenda setting may be an important issue for this study as P/CVE
competes for attention and resources with other existing policy approaches. Third, PD
may offer an explanation on why policies often continue in relative stasis, evolving
incrementally due to institutional and historical constraints, even when superior
alternatives might be identified and available (Pierson, 2004). Because P/CVE has
evolved in certain ways, PD may prove valuable in explaining why it has evolved in the
way in which it has. As such, it may help with the relationship between vested interests
and P/CVE policy evolution. Through a multi-theoretical lens, an examination of P/CVE
though PET, PFT, and PD has the potential of furthering the body of knowledge of this
policy approach as part of the broader foreign assistance policy.
The lack of theoretical application using PFT, PET, and PD for P/CVE analysis is
possibly the result of P/CVE having only recently emerged onto the foreign policy scene.
This in and of itself gives credence to the PET framework, which emphasizes the
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occurrence of rapid change brought on by some sort of shock or rupture to the system.
PET was selected because it addresses the nature of rapid change, and sudden
emergence of new policies, such as what is now being observed in P/CVE policy
evolution. For example, following September 11, 2001, there was a rapid growth in
several policy concepts that eventually led to what is now referred to as P/CVE (Selim,
2016), but what is now called P/CVE has only been in existence for a few years. Over
these recent years, policies and papers on P/CVE have burgeoned, yet it remains to be
seen if it persists, as many also have expressed significant doubts about its value given
the difficulty in implementation at the international level (Kopitzke, 2017).
PFT was selected because it speaks to how policies and politics change and affect
one another over time, thus leading to changes to the respective policy. In that sense, it
explains how policies beget policies. This is an important theory regarding P/CVE
because it is a growing policy field, and the politics surrounding P/CVE appear to be
having a major effect on the policies. As such, it is an impressionable policy field due to
its rapid evolution and growing chorus of voices lending new perspectives and analysis.
PD was selected as a theoretical framework because it has the potential to offer
explanations regarding the nature of P/CVE policy change. If during the study evidence
comes to light that better alternative approaches to P/CVE exist, then this framework may
help highlight that P/CVE is being affected by PD. In other words, it is arguable that
P/CVE is controlled by inertia even if the proscribed approaches of P/CVE do not address
the root causes driving violent extremism in a respective context. This framework should
help inform whether P/CVE policy has developed at various levels based on historical
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policy decisions or whether deliberate change has occurred independent of policy inertia.
The PD theoretical framework helps shed light on the way in which higher level policies
set by USAID Headquarters and that at the level of implementation (e.g., TSCTP) have
aligned and reached equilibrium after changes at either level. If incongruence was to be
found, then there would have been potential that this framework could offer relevant
insight into the lack of coordination between policy levels.
Punctuated Equilibrium Theory
The punctuated equilibrium theory serves as a potentially informative policy
framework for policy fields that are experiencing rapid change. PET has been frequently
used to examine a wide range of complex policy phenomena, such as changes related to
various domestic policies and international conflicts, yet it has not been identified during
this study as a theoretical framework used to explore public policy issues related to
violent extremism.
Baumgartner, Jones, and Mortensen (2014) explained that PET seeks to examine
why certain political processes rapidly depart from historical stasis and policy stability.
Baumgartner and Jones (1991, 1993) observed that over time policymaking comprised of
rapid change and then stasis and that American political institutions tended to exacerbate
this phenomenon (as cited in Baumgartner, Jones, & Mortensen, 2014). Further, Cerna
(2013) performed a review of numerous policy theory frameworks and included PET in
the review. She described PET as a competition of ideas in which eventually one erupts
out from the others. She wrote, “Many ideas are competing for attention but then
something happens at some point. The process comes about from external events that

46
disrupt the political system, particularly the ones that are big enough to disrupt or
punctuate its equilibrium” (p. 9). However, regarding P/CVE, the literature review did
not uncover the PET framework within peer reviewed journals to explain the rapid onset
and change in P/CVE policies relating to official development aid.
Among the most important explanations that PET brings to the table is the
explanation why incrementalism is not a sufficiently complete characterization of all
policy lifespans, including P/CVE. With traditional incrementalism or gradualism models
such as PD, there is consistent uninterrupted growth over time as a respective policy
slowly changes. But there is little to explain policies that burst onto the scene and then
fade, some of which leave lasting change and even morph to become the new status quo.
In contrast, the PET model shows that policies can emerge onto the scene, grab the
attention of policymakers, show rapid growth, and then rapidly decline again (Goertz,
2003, p. 136). It remains a question how P/CVE fits into the PET theoretical model, but
based on the literature review, it demonstrates some promise in explaining the
phenomenon of rapid emergence and change.
As such, the PET policy framework helps shed light on the temporal aspects of
P/CVE, which is rapid emergence and evolution over a short period of time. It is time and
rapidity as the operative concepts in this theoretical framework. Further, this
phenomenon cannot be fully explained by incrementalism or gradualism, as it emerged
rapidly onto the field of public policy, potentially catalyzed by the long wars resulting
from post-September 11th invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. As noted, P/CVE erupted
onto the policy scene over a few short years ago and is experiencing rapid change by
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agencies that have embraced it, including USAID, as highlighted above. Even when
considering the likelihood that P/CVE derived from the Global War on Terror, starting in
2001, in the grand scheme of American foreign policy and official development aid, it is
still a recent policy phenomenon, and this fact further reinforces the evidence of rapid
change. However, where PET does not apply is explaining what political policy factors
are driving the change. Such an explanation requires yet another policy framework for a
more complete explanation, one which addresses the topical and specific causative
factors rather than just the temporal nature of policy change.
Policy Feedback Theory
PFT is also an important policy theory framework for consideration in this study.
According to Beland (2010), PFT derives from historical institutionalism, emerging out
of the mid-1960s. He argues that scholarship at that time began examining the
phenomena of feedback from existing policies having effects upon political decisionmaking. He then states that the theory began to develop significantly over the past 20
years and is quite prominent in political science and policy analysis. According to Beland
(2010) over the course of its existence, it has been used to explore many public policy
fields related to institutional change and political decision making.
PFT has potential value in examining P/CVE because it examines the nature of
how policies affect political decision. In other words, it posits a sort of information loop
in which existing policies inform or influence current and future political decisions. This
is an important theoretical perspective, because while PET discusses the potentiality of
policies rapidly shifting over time, it does not in enough detail focus on change from a
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political interest aspect. For example, PET does not sufficiently focus on what specific
politically related interests caused the policy to emerge, change, or fade away. The PFT
framework, on the other hand, places a strong emphasis on the phenomenon of how
policies shape political dynamics, or how past policies influence other policies (Mettler &
Sorelle). PFT is also distinct from PD in that PD helps underscore how past processes
often tend toward self-reinforcement, and how once an entity begins down a path, it
becomes increasingly difficult to change paths (Pierson, 2004, p.10). That said, PD
effects may or may not lead to new political dynamics, which PFT helps explain. The
intrinsic value in PFT is that it provides theoretical explanations for change as it relates to
the broad concepts of policies effecting politics, thus offering a broader theoretical
aperture than PET and PD. In turn, this can lend theoretical veracity for undertaking rootcause analysis in determining the nature and cause of policy feedback effects, particularly
as it relates to political decision making.
It may not be enough to conclude that one policy has affected other policies, but
rather, it may also be equally important to understand more specifically why and how
policy changes have shaped policymakers’ decisions, or even how they led to expected or
unforeseen secondary policy feedback effects. As such, the feedback effects should be
fully explored, and this framework assists in that undertaking. However, to date, there
have been no identified peer-reviewed papers that examine PFT as it pertains to P/CVE.
The decision to use this framework is based on the notion that the evolution of
P/CVE policy fits into the theoretical framework and helps explain the changes in P/CVE
policy. It is expected that this study will contribute to the PFT literature by adding a new
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field of application and perspective, which is that of P/CVE and official development
assistance.
Path Dependence Theory
Yet another theoretical framework with the potential to help explore the evolution
of USAID’s P/CVE policy is that of path dependence theory (PD). PD offers an
important theoretical perspective on the way in which policies lead to other types of
policies which can in part be attributed to institutional and historical interests that grow
and solidify around existing policies. It derives from the historical institutionalist
approach and argues a relatively straight forward concept that historical precedent affects
future decisions, and thus future events. Torfing (2009) summarized path dependence as a
“situation where the present policy choice is constrained or shaped by institutional paths
that result from choices made in the past” (p. 71). David (2007), a leading scholar on path
dependence theory, argued that path dependence is an important theoretical framework
for social science, particularly given its broad application and scope while still offering
explanatory power. He stated that path dependence “is very general in its scope, referring
equally to developmental sequences (whether in evolutionary biology or physics) and
social dynamics (involving social interactions among economic or political agents) that
are characterized by positive feedbacks and self-reinforcing dynamics” (p. 92). Given this
broad spectrum of applicability, PD is expected to provide some degree of explanatory
facilitation for an examination of USAID’s P/CVE policy evolution.
As such, path dependence is not merely rooted in the simplistic approach of
historical determinism, but rather offers a lens to explore the more complex causal
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relationships where inertia and relationships play a critical role in the path individuals
and institutions take, or opt not to take (Allen, 2010). PD is an important explanatory
framework for USAID’s P/CVE related policies because it facilitates insight into the way
in which previous policy decisions continue to affect current and future policy decisions.
This is particularly relevant today as P/CVE and its recent predecessor policies have
undergone definitional and policy changes.
While path dependence theory offers an important theoretical approach to public
policy, no articles were located that examined USAID P/CVE policy and path
dependence. However, one article was discovered that used path dependence theory to
examine and explain the nature of violent extremism and individual choice. Because
violent extremism has a conceptual relationship with P/CVE, it offers some insight into
the potential that PD offers in exploring P/CVE policy evolution. Jaskowski, Wilson, and
Lazareno (2017) used path dependence theory to examine the nature and causes of
individuals and organizations turning toward or away from violence. Their analysis of
violent extremism using a path dependence framework suggests that there is a critical
juncture in which individuals choose to embrace a life of violence, often a long-term and
even permanent decision due to increasingly entrenched personal and economic interests.
Of additional interest, Jaskowski, Wilson, and Lazareno went on to argue other
important points regarding violent extremism and path dependence. They argued that
existing research on path dependence and violence suggests that the choice to embrace or
eschew violent extremism is similar to a career choice whereby the organization an
individual chooses to join plays a significant role in the path an individual chooses,
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particularly in their formative years. As such, these arguments presented by Jaskowski,
Wilson, and Lazareno provided significant evidence that path dependence offers
important explanatory power in the field of P/CVE and how P/CVE policies have the
potential, if designed properly, to identify and address some root causes of violent
extremism. Such findings suggest that PD offers value in that it has the potential to help
demonstrate the method that past decisions affect current and future policy decisions. A
sophisticated understanding of the nature of how USAID’s P/CVE policies have evolved
based on historical decisions has the potential to assist agency policy makers develop
effective P/CVE policies.
Conceptual Framework
The scope of this literature review is limited by the focus of the research questions
and the overall objective of the study. The first limitation is that this study focuses only
on P/CVE and will not look deeply at counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, stabilization,
or other related foreign policy issues. However, this chapter will briefly discuss the
relationship those distinct fields have with P/CVE. Another limitation is that this study
will focus on U.S. policies related for P/CVE foreign assistance policy. USAID is the
primary agency for this study, and therefore USAID’s policies are of primary importance
to the study, but other policies were addressed when they directly affect USAID policy
on P/CVE. Of note, the study will also not address domestic P/CVE policy, such as that
dealing with U.S. local or federal law enforcement, nor will it examine domestic policies
of foreign countries, such as P/CVE policies by TSCTP countries. The reasons for these
limitations are because the study serves as analysis on the topic of P/CVE as part of the
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broader portfolio of official development assistance (ODA) and not domestic U.S. policy
which is an entirely different set of strategies focused on U.S. law enforcement entities on
the home front.
Domestic strategies, such as national and local strategies, are primarily a function
of the U.S. homeland security apparatus, such as national law enforcement, community
policing, security development, or national and international intelligence. With limited
exception, these are not typically within the realm of foreign aid organizations, including
USAID, and thus generally have little to do with foreign assistance development aid. In
fact, GAO reported that USAID provides less than 3% of police assistance in foreign
countries, while the DoD and the DoS account for approximately 97% of such aid (GAO,
2012, p. 8). This is further reinforced by the definition of official development assistance,
as provided by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2016), which provided a clear
definition of what is and is not included as part of official development aid. It stated,
Official development assistance (ODA) is defined as government aid designed to
promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries. Loans
and credits for military purposes are excluded. Aid may be provided bilaterally,
from donor to recipient, or channeled through a multilateral development agency
such as the United Nations or the World Bank (para. 2)
Thus, the distinction between official development assistance and U.S. foreign aid
is distinct. By legal definition, U.S. foreign aid encompasses all forms of aid given to a
foreign country. U.S. law specifies this stating that foreign aid includes:
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any tangible or intangible item provided by the United States Government
[including “by means of gift, loan, sale, credit, or guaranty”] to a foreign country
or international organization under this or any other Act, including but not limited
to any training, service, or technical advice, any item of real, personal, or mixed
property, any agricultural commodity, United States dollars, and any currencies of
any foreign country which are owned by the United States Government.... (As
cited in Tarnoff & Lawson, 2016, p. 1)
This definition illustrates that U.S. foreign aid is far broader in terms of project scope and
strategic objectives than U.S. official development assistance. The two should not be
conflated for the purposes of this study. Therefore, the parameters of this study were
guided by the definition of U.S. official development assistance and not the far broader
concept of U.S. foreign aid.
The second limitation to this literature review is a focus on traditional
international development concepts, such as those implemented by USAID, rather than
including studies related to policing and security forces. The reason for this omission is
because policing and security force capacity building (e.g., enhancement of
counterterrorism capabilities) are often sovereign nation functions, or in partnership with
other countries’ security forces, and thus a distinct body of P/CVE literature has emerged
over time, but which has very little in common with traditional international
development. This subgroup of literature is beyond the scope of this study and therefore
will not be analyzed. As previously mentioned, this is due in part to the definitional
limitations of official foreign assistance, as provided by the OECD, which states that

54
official development assistance focuses on economic development rather than security
aid. Further, while some concepts may be similar, such as discussions on the need for
stable government, security aid is a distinct specialization that focused heavily on
military and police tactics to defeat terrorists or militant insurgents.
Likewise, official development assistance as it relates to P/CVE is also a distinct
specialization, offering expertise in the complex stabilization and development field that
security force organizations traditionally are not designed to deal with, nor have the
mission statement to do so. When security assistance is provided as foreign aid, such
activities are usually done through military and security forces. As discussed, such
security assistance does not fall within the auspices of official development assistance,
even if it does help assist the recipient country develop and become more stable. That
effect is often sought in various forms of foreign aid, whether it is security aid or
development aid, yet that result does not by definition conflate the various types of aid, as
the means used to provide foreign aid are frequently independent of the results of that aid.
In other words, security aid may lead to development, but that result does not classify it
as official development assistance. Likewise, development assistance may lead to
enhanced national security for a recipient country, but that does not make that foreign aid
formal security assistance.
However, aid types can be combined when authorized, such as whole of
government approaches, “emphasizing the urgent need for cooperation between actors
from different policy domains—foreign affairs, security, diplomacy, development
cooperation, etc.” (Olsen, 2013, p. 1829). In fact, P/CVE implementation is often through
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whole of government approaches, such as the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
program which USAID, DOS, and the DOD jointly participate in. Finally, in addition to
definitional limitations, there are also statutory limitations on USAID’s involvement in
security sector reform in foreign countries (McFate, 2008, p. 6). Therefore, because of the
complexity of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, it is important to define the
nature of the aid that comprises this study, which is official development assistance
administered by USAID.
The third constraint is that of timeframe limitations. Traditional standards of
academic literature reviews are constrained to five years, thus much of the material in this
study will fall within this five-year window. Yet, P/CVE is a rapidly evolving field, and
only recently emerged in the field of public and foreign policy, emerging in its earliest
incarnation around the period of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In rapid
succession, this has given rise to the (Global) War on Terror, represented by
predominantly military led operations, including, Operation Enduring Freedom
(Afghanistan, Africa, Philippines); Operation Iraqi Freedom; Operation New Dawn
(Iraq); Operation Inherent Resolve (Iraq, Syria); and myriad smaller engagements around
the globe. Eventually, it became evident that military-centric solutions could not produce
victory alone in those wars, as then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral
Michael Mullen, famously stated, “We cannot kill our way to victory” (CNN, 2008, para.
5). As such, non-military centric thinking began to take greater hold in the interagency
community, allowing agencies such as USAID and the DOS to play a broader role in
P/CVE related engagements around the world. This had the added effect of new and
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expanded policy documents coming to fruition. Many of these key policy documents are
central to this study. However, some of these documents emerged prior to the traditional
five-year academic norm for inclusion but will nevertheless require analysis due to its
significance and the need to understand the evolution of these respective policies.
In late 2006, the DoD released a new counterinsurgency manual, reflecting a new
way of military thinking, and which served as an early seed of P/CVE, as it emphasized
the need to work with communities rather than see the population as a problem or
adversary. As such, it formalized soft power concepts in counterinsurgency environments
(Department of the Army, 2006). In turn, this brought to bear softer approaches in
conflict environments (e.g., projects seeking better governance, education, health, job
skills and employment, to name a few), all in support of the effort to defeat violent
extremism. Only a few short years later, amid wars, USAID produced its first policy
document on mitigating violent extremism, an explanation on how USAID can contribute
to this national security driven effort (USAID, 2011). Given this history and the rapid yet
recent evolution, case study fieldwork for this study looks back as far as 2005, the time in
which the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Initiative (TSCTP) was launched
by the U.S. government with USAID’s participation. Since then, USAID has sought to
offer its development and stabilization tools and perspectives to the wider effort. Given
this, particularly relevant literature review material will date prior to the traditional fiveyear window. This is necessary to providing scholarly analysis and context when
describing that critical period when the TSCTP was launched.
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Key P/CVE Concepts Review
A Need for Better Studies
To begin, it is noteworthy that many scholars have concluded that there are two
systemic limitations that currently undermine the current body of knowledge that cover
the field of preventing and countering violent extremism. Those two challenges are
definition ambiguity and a lack of empirical studies. The first challenge, and perhaps the
most challenging, is that there is no universally agreed upon definition of preventing and
countering violent extremism, which in turn may affect varying levels of strategy,
although it is commonly referred to as a distinct foreign policy approach. This is
problematic for several reasons. First, it hinders the ability to develop a grounded body of
literature. Secondly, it undermines precision of data collection and analysis, sometimes
producing ambiguous results. Third, it creates serious challenges in informing policy
questions. One study summarized the problem stating that it is not surprising that there is
so much definitional ambiguity as it has devolved into a catch-all category that lacks the
necessary precision and focus (Harris-Hogan, Barrelle, & Zammit, 2016). Therefore, it is
important to capture these challenges and limitations within current P/CVE policies both
at the agency and regional levels. As noted, practitioners and academics have clearly
identified the shortcomings, but it remains to be seen if the policy community can or will
address this systemic level challenge.
As of June 2018, two noteworthy systematic literature reviews of existing P/CVE
literature have been conducted. Both reviews resulted in findings that suggest significant
gaps in the literature, as well as methodological shortcomings. It is also a noteworthy
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observation that both critiques cite an overall lack of empirical research and studies using
quantitative methodology, although in the second article Zurcher (2017) placed much
greater emphasis on quantitative approaches and focus his critique on only quantitative
studies with experimental or quasi-experimental designs.
A widely cited review, undertaken by Nasser-Eddine, Garnham, Agostino, and
Caluya (2011), pointed out several of the most salient shortcomings frequently mentioned
throughout the literature on the topic. The authors noted the lack of primary source
material, a shortage of experienced researchers in the field, insufficient fieldwork by the
authors, a reliance on limited analytical and research methodologies, and insufficient
number of critiques of existing P/CVE literature. Similarly, Zurcher (2017) cited several
information gaps and flaws within the P/CVE related body of literature including a very
small evidence base, a limited understanding of causality, and the inability to answer
basic questions relating to aid effectiveness such as the effectiveness of stabilization
funding and other forms of development assistance. After analyzing 19 quantitative
studies taken from 7669 screened abstracts, they concluded that aid in conflict zones
increases conflict and that when aid is effective it is conditional, requiring a relatively
stable local area.
Overall, these two systematic reviews of existing literature support the notion that
there have been too few academic studies on P/CVE. The lack of high quality,
methodological, and academically rigorous analyses creates problems for policy makers
and program implementers in the field. The basic calculus is that poor policy creates poor
interventions, and poor interventions create poor results. Perhaps former congressman
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Lee H. Hamilton stated it best when he argued, “Foreign aid is neither a failure nor a
panacea. It is, instead, an important tool of American policy that can serve the interests of
the United States and the world if wisely administered” (as cited in Hicks, 2011, p. 238).
While this is his opinion on the value of foreign aid, he mentions two important concepts
regarding foreign aid policy: it is a tool, and it must be wisely administered. At its root,
sound policy guides development assistance as an effective tool and is necessary for its
effective administration.
Does P/CVE Work?
Related to the issue of a lack of empirical and methodological studies for the field
of P/CVE, the question of P/CVE effectiveness is also of interest to scholars and
practitioners. There are two scholarly studies of note that approach this question, one
published in 2014 and the other in 2015. The 2015 approaches the question from a
broader comprehensive perspective and the study from 2014 uses a case study method to
explore the practical aspects of P/CVE. Taken together, these studies combine to provide
the strategic and the tactical perspective, and thus a more complete picture of P/CVE
effectiveness.
Looking first at the more comprehensive study by Romaniuk (2015), the author
sought to accomplish several tasks, and discussed the limitations and its rapid growth as a
distinct field. He began by acknowledging the oft cited problem of P/CVE lacking a clear
unified definition. To highlight the problem, he referred to a well-known U.S. Institute of
Peace article that clarified the magnitude of the definitional problem, arguing that it has
evolved into little more than a catchall category that lacks the necessary focus and
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precision to make it usefully distinct from other related fields in international
development (cited in Heydemann, 2014, p. 1). In attempt to remedy this problem, he
provided a type of definitional analysis of P/CVE, arguing the necessity to regularize a
common understanding of P/CVE to improve programmatic outcomes and better
understand best practices for these interventions (Romaniuk, 2015, p. 3). Doing this, he
described common themes that have been helpful in better understand a workable
definition of P/CVE, such as non-coercive measures, persuasion, de-radicalization, soft
power, and the like.
Equally important, Romaniuk discussed the broad policy aspects of P/CVE,
seizing on Neuman’s (2011) argument that P/CVE related approaches are more thematic
rather than being stand-alone policies given they are potentially unlimited to meet a broad
range of challenges (p. 7). Romaniuk (2015) argued that P/CVE policy interventions
comprise four major policy components, which serve as a sort of policy cycle. These
components include assessments (understanding the problem), policy development
(strategy of intervention), implementation (the actual work), and evaluation
(understanding what did and did not work; p. 11). These scholars pointed out the many
challenges that have led to a lack of a clear definition of P/CVE policies. They pointed
out that P/CVE is too broad to allow the flexibility to address causative factors while also
needing to be coordinated with other policy components in a broader policy cycle. Such
factors create complexity in attempting to distinctly define P/CVE as it inherently needs
to be linked to other discrete technical approaches and other broader development
policies.
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Next, looking at the case study authored by Aldrich (2014), several important
themes emerged. Aldrich approached P/CVE through an examination of the U.S.’s multiagency program, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). More
specifically, the author focused most of his analysis on USAID’s contribution to the
TSCTP, the Peace Through Development program. To undertake this study, he focused
on Mali and used a quasi-experimental paired-comparison approach based on the
responses of 200 respondents from two different towns, one of which was a recipient
community for USAID’s intervention efforts. The results illuminated that the soft-power
approach had some positive effects of deradicalization and concluded that there was
strong evidence that a town sponsored by five years of programs had different behavior
and cognitive outcomes than their neighbor that had received no support (Aldrich, 2014,
541). As such, Aldrich was able to show empirically that U.S. P/CVE related
interventions had a measurable impact on the target population of the programs.
Taken together, these two articles shed light on important themes as it pertains to
the current understanding of P/CVE. First, they show that P/CVE is very much a policy
theme more than just an intervention. In a sense, there is a full policy and program cycle
to P/CVE interventions. P/CVE interventions are strategic and tactical, meaning they are
conceptually high level as well as implemented on the ground, and therefore the strategy
and the implementation should be logically linked. Secondly, these articles also show that
P/CVE interventions, when intelligently designed, can achieve positive effects.
Development Aid as a Foreign Policy Tool
One of the most frequently discussed topics on development aid is its specific role
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in foreign policy. While the topic of this paper is P/CVE, it is understood that the
policies, purposes, and desired effects of development aid reach well beyond the limited
topic of P/CVE. In short, the topic of development aid as foreign policy is a vast and
ever-growing field of study. As the literature demonstrates, development aid and its role
in P/CVE and conflict environments, is an increasingly relevant field of study. Many
recent P/CVE related articles, particularly post-9/11 literature, tend to focus on the
efficacy of development aid in countering terrorism and insurgency. However, the topic
has been addressed for decades. Some of the material speaks to the topic in the abstract,
while others are more specific to development aid policy as it pertains to P/CVE related
issues.
When it comes to development aid policy, academic articles tend to fall into two
major themes of 1) donor interests, and 2) recipient needs (McKinlay & Little, 1977, p.
1). As is discussed in this section, much of the literature for P/CVE falls within the
former category, which is to say, P/CVE related assistance often ties to the donor state
interests, such as fighting terrorism abroad before it spreads to the donor country, or the
instability increases strategic risks to an allied country. Bermeo (2016) referred to this
policy approach as targeted development used to decrease the risk of spillover and that
the recipient country’s shortcomings are used as a guide for the development of the aid
package (p.1). Articles that exist before and after September 11th demonstrated that these
categories largely remain the same. For example, Alesina and Dollar (2000) concluded
that the way in which aid is decided is determined equally by political and strategic
considerations, as well as the financial and performance aspects of the recipients. What
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these three studies do reveal is that P/CVE related development aid does not seem to
differ in purpose from other forms of development aid. However, as is discussed below,
the context of the aid can be unique and far more urgent than other forms of development
aid. This is an important point for policy makers and practitioners because it partially
explains why defining P/CVE has been challenging. The broad policy purpose of P/CVE
(e.g., to achieve the interests of the donor country), and the tools to implement and
achieve desired policy outcomes (e.g., programs for education, governance, gender
issues, etc.), are often not unique, yet the context and urgency may be.
Much of the post-September 11th literature reiterates the notion that development
aid has multiple purposes. Yet, terrorism emerges as a specific topic in numerous articles,
several of which are reviewed in this chapter. Further, the literature also shifts heavily to
discussing development aid in terms of pursuing foreign policy goals rather than the
primary objective to meet the humanitarian needs of the recipient country. The Oxford
Research Encyclopedia of Politics (Apodaca, 2017) even defined foreign aid by
reinforcing the focus on pursuing foreign policy goals,
Although foreign aid serves several purposes and not least among them the wish
to increase human welfare, the primary reason for aid allocations or aid
restrictions is to pursue foreign policy goals. Strategic and commercial interests of
donor countries are the driving force behind many aid programs. (p. 1)
However, many of these policy discussions focus on the broader question of why to
undertake development aid, but in the context of countering violent extremism, such as
terrorism, few studies concretely identify exactly how to best implement the policy of
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P/CVE development aid. This is largely because the contexts involving P/CVE initiatives
are heterogeneous, making it difficult to draw generalities from the varied contexts
involving P/CVE. As Kisangani and Pickering (2015) wrote in their article,
We find that ODA [official development aid] flows from traditional donors are
complex, most likely because of substantial donor heterogeneity. Such
heterogeneity has produced contradictory or at least inconsistent findings on many
of the central variables used to understand aid allocation in the
literature…Consistent with much of the aid literature, a good deal of nuance rests
behind these findings. (pp. 225-226)
Thus, the existing literature suggests much more work is required before a more complete
understanding of P/CVE related development aid is achieved. This emerging knowledge
directly affects policy making and policy implementation. The vast array of opinions
suggests that many factors and contexts should be considered if informed policy
decisions are to be made. Many of these opinions and conclusions are reviewed in this
chapter.
Understanding the Causative Factors of Violent Extremism
Important studies within the existing body of P/CVE literature seeks to provide
analysis on the causative factors of violent extremism. However, like P/CVE itself, those
explanatory causes are broad, ranging widely on issues like gender, youth, economics,
psychology, religion, politics, and culture. Like the topic above exploring the efficacy of
P/CVE approaches, this section is also well illustrated by two studies, one in which
approaches this broad set of root causes from a comprehensive perspective, while another
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explores the problem using a narrower case study approach.
Looking first at the comprehensive report by Neumann (2005), this study sought
to explore a broad range of potential root causes of terrorism and violent extremism. The
report summarizes the perspectives of several well-regarded scholars that have
contributed to the field but specialize in specific sub-categories that contribute to
extremism, including psychology, political explanations, economic factors, religion, and
culture (p. 4). In addition to providing a summary overview of each category, this report
also addressed the policy implications and offers policy suggestions. This helps the
reader understand the core issues for each component and helps policy makers and
implementers produce informed policy and interventions. Further, the report provides a
list of contributors to each section, all of whom are respected scholars and practitioners in
their fields, and this in turn helps connect others for future and ongoing work.
As the report above demonstrated, there are many root causes of violent
extremism and terrorism. And each factor that facilitates violent extremism must be
understood through thorough scholarly study. While there are myriad studies that address
terrorism and various causative factors, very few speak specifically to P/CVE. However,
the study by Finn, Momani, Opatowski, and Opondo (2016) explored the issue of youth
and countering violent extremism. This study aims to address what the authors found to
be a gap in the current body of literature regarding Kenyan youth leaders and their
perception of P/CVE policies (p. 164). Indeed, during the research for this literature
review, there was no article identified that addressed this issue, and thus this serves as an
important P/CVE case study helping to bring to light issues pertaining to youth and
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P/CVE policies in Africa. This report found that Kenyan youth saw value in soft-power
approaches such as community-based approaches and did not favor systematic profiling
of individuals based on religious preference (p. 219).
In sum, these two articles help shed light on the many of the factors and root
causes of violent extremism. There are comprehensive studies that seek to amalgamate
these many factors into single studies and reports. Such reports help to provoke thought
among the policymaking and practitioner communities, broadly illustrating the widerange of issues regarding P/CVE and help explore policy tools and approaches when
seeking to prevent, respond to, or counter violent extremism. In addition, there are
equally important specialized studies that seek to explore more deeply specific factors
that contribute to violent extremism, such as in the above case study, the perception of
P/CVE policies as it pertains to youth leaders in Kenya. Of course, many more studies are
necessary to understand the multitude of other root causes more fully and how these
many factors intertwine to produce or mitigate violent extremism in complex societies. In
short, there are numerous gaps in the current body of literature regarding violent
extremism and the efforts to counter such extremism. Indeed, the field is nascent and
rapidly growing.
U.S. Strategy and the Need for Change
There are numerous articles available on this topic, yet only a few scholarly
studies have been published in recent years that at least loosely consider P/CVE as part of
that strategy. Within the existing P/CVE body of literature, there have been several
critical pieces focused on the American strategy and approach to countering extremism.
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Many of these critical analyses approached the issue from a soft versus hard power
perspective. In that sense, many expressed uneasiness about America’s overreliance upon
militaristic responses, and the lack of soft power responses, such as diplomacy and nonmilitary foreign assistance, such as economic aid. The three scholarly articles that
comprise this section present a broad perspective often reflected among prominent
scholars and practitioners in the field of P/CVE. These articles include the studies by
Aldrich (2012), Aysha (2005), and Cordesman (2006).
Aysha (2005) discussed the issue of American strategy from the perspective of the
lack of American soft power, such as diplomacy and foreign aid, in relation to its over
reliance upon hard power, such as military might. She argued that there is a deep
imbalance in global power, which has created hostility to America, which it has failed to
effectively address, or even seeming desires to try to address. She stated, “The declining
status of the public diplomacy budget by itself seems to indicate that the United States’
leaders have resigned themselves to the belief that military power alone can guard them
against the long-term consequences of anti-Americanism” (p. 207). She believed that this
approach is effectively ushering in what former U.S. diplomat, John Brown, described in
his resignation letter as “a century of anti-Americanism” (as cited in Aysha, 2005, p.
207).
To illustrate the complex interplay of many issues when it comes to global power
and influence, and America’s strategy, she described the world as a three-dimensional
chess board; with one layer being military power, another economic power, and the last
being information, all of which must be played simultaneously and affecting one another
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(p. 200). She went on to state that all of this affects what she described as America’s
counterproductive approach to fighting terrorism. She explained that the imbalance of
power, particularly military hegemony, has led to American hubris in international
affairs, forgoing soft power in favor of unilateralism and military aggression (p. 204). In
turn, this builds further resentment and negative public perception, which aids terrorist
organizations in their cause (p. 205).
Contrasting Aysha’s (2005) point that extremism flourishes because of America’s
excessive focus on hard-power approaches, and the global imbalance of power creating
resentment, Cordesman (2006) had a much narrower notion of what creates violent
extremism. Like Aysha (2005) he faulted the American policy of excessive reliance on
military might to mitigate violent extremism, and he explained that in doing so, it creates
a worsening situation (p. 102). However, his perspective deviated from Aysha’s (2005)
argument in that he saw the only way to victory in countering violent extremism is for
indigenous elites (e.g., religious, and social leaders) to lead reforms. On this issue he
stated,
The real "war on terrorism" can only be won if the religious, political and
intellectual leaders of Islamic countries and communities actively confront and
fight neo-Salafi Sunni Islamist extremism at the religious and ideological level. It
will be lost if such leaders stand aside, take half measures, or compromise with
enemies that seek to destroy them and what they believe in (p. 106).
As such, Cordesman’s (2006) focus was squarely on the need for local religious elites to
take control of their own problems, and thus avoid the need for American direct
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intervention. As he argued, direct U.S. intervention should be a last resort, stating “The
West must join in this struggle, but its role should be to help Islamic nations develop the
military and security capabilities they really need and intervene only as allies when
absolutely necessary” (p. 108). In sum, he argued that aid to countries should be oriented
toward the robust role of internal actors.
In part, this approach was implemented approximately one year after the article
was written, with America’s agreement in 2007 to withdraw from Iraq by 2011. It is
therefore a useful study in comparing the policy proposal and its implementation so close
together, something not frequently observed in the field of preventing and countering
violent extremism, which is characterized by wide ranging and strategic observations and
recommendations that are not easily implemented. The somewhat tactical nature of
Cordesman’s (2006) approach makes actionability more feasible for policy makers and
practitioners working on regional policy. However, its narrow focus on Salafism being
the root cause of violent extremism, makes its regional applicability narrow rather than
global, because as previously discussed, scholars now widely agree that there are
numerous causes for violent extremism, religion being only one such cause or merely a
sub-factor tied to other more salient conditions. Neumann (2011) addressed this issue
directly stating, “Most experts agree that there isn’t a simple formula or template that
would explain how people radicalize. Each case is different, and each individual’s
pathway needs to be examined on its own merits” (p. 15). Therefore, a more
comprehensive framework by Cordesman would be necessary if seeking broader
solutions that are more applicable beyond mere religious factors.
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Aldrich (2012) moved the discussion into the more modern framework of P/CVE
thinking. By 2012, P/CVE had become a more sophisticated field in and of itself, moving
beyond simply being soft approaches to terrorism responses, or other extraneous concepts
tied to military or development theories. Aldrich (2012) was among the earlier scholars to
distill these new P/CVE concepts and thus help P/CVE stand on its own with its own
ideas on appropriate responses to violent extremism. For example, the concept of “push
and pull factors” took shape, a result of USAID’s work with various scholars and
practitioners (p. 48). Aldrich (2012) argued that empirical analysis should drive
interventions, stating that “Social science-based CVE policy creates stability and security
by building [community] resilience to VEO [violent extremist organizations] recruitment
and narratives in populations around the world” (p. 49). In this sense, Aldrich (2012)
encouraged the policy community to put away pre-conceived notions about what works
in mitigation of violent extremism, and instead move toward systematic understanding of
these complex environments before creating policy approaches and designing
intervention programs. As such, it was a learning approach toward P/CVE, and thus inline with modern USAID programmatic approaches.
The Whole of Government Approach
Like the concept of P/CVE, the "whole of government" approach to fragile and
unstable countries has been a growing theme over the past decade. Due to the
significance of the whole of government concept upon P/CVE, including its intellectual
underpinnings of this concept upon P/CVE, it is necessary to describe what it is prior to
reviewing the existing literature as it pertains to P/CVE. The whole of government
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thinking appears to have served in part as a sort of conceptual foundation for modern
counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and P/CVE, illustrated by integrated agency policy
approaches that are discussed below. Of course, whole of government approach is not
new, having existed in Vietnam as part of the interagency counterinsurgency programs
(e.g., CORDS). Yet, since September 11, 2001, the whole of government approach to
fragile states has grown significantly in policy importance (OECD, 2006).
The growing interconnection between government agencies and preventing and
countering violent extremism, terrorism, and insurgencies rose to the formal policy
forefront in 2009 with the joint Defense, DOS, and USAID signed publication of the U.S.
Government Counterinsurgency Guide (U.S. Department of State, 2009). This document
was an attempt to align efforts of these agencies to achieve better effects in
counterinsurgency environments, then including Iraq and Afghanistan. As Cohen (2009)
stated, this interagency approach to counterinsurgency was "the first of its kind in almost
half a century" (as cited in U.S. Department of State, p. 4), and thus forged a new policy
approach in the direction of whole of government approaches.
This interagency policy, and the 2006 U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Manual (FM
3-24), which was adopted and referenced across the interagency (e.g., USAID and the
DOS in the 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR)), was
important in providing policy definitions and guidance regarding violent extremism and
eschewing sole reliance upon the military force solution (i.e., hard power policy
solutions). These policies also mandated coordination with other government
stakeholders, including USAID. FM 3-24 states, “Commanders’ situational awareness
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includes being familiar with other U.S. Government organizations participating in the
COIN [counterinsurgency] effort and aware of their capabilities" (p. 2-6). This manual
thus cemented the whole-of-government interagency approach to dealing with complex
violent extremism, beginning first with counterinsurgency. The 2009 DOS
Counterinsurgency Guide reiterated many of these concepts but moved the discussion
more toward civilian agency approaches and capabilities. Two years later, USAID issued
its own policy document, “The Development Response to Violent Extremism and
Insurgency” (2011), moving USAID from focusing on insurgencies to also formally
addressing the agency's role in addressing violent extremism.
The Securitization of Development Aid
A frequent topic among scholars and practitioners of P/CVE is the issue of the
securitization of aid, particularly in conflict-affected countries. The issue of the
securitization of aid has been discussed and analyzed through a historical lens for
decades, particularly as it pertains to the Vietnam War, the Pacification programs of that
era, and their similarities with recent military operations and foreign aid programs
(Nazum, 2010). The topic has reemerged as an important issue due to the post-September
11th era of counterinsurgency and direct military intervention by the United States in
various countries and the overlapping use of development aid to contribute to U.S.
intervention goals (Spear, 2016). This topic is of importance to the policy evolution of
P/CVE, as scholars and senior officials have said that P/CVE often sits at the nexus of
security and development (As cited in Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2018,
para. 2).
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Coronado (2005) examined an earlier period in 2005, which was marked by what
has become known as the Bush Doctrine, which he described in part as “US unipolarity
based on its irrefutable military ability” (p. 323). This was an important period in
American foreign policy in that it has had significant and lasting effect on foreign policy
over the past decade. The article was published only four years after the United States’
invasion of Afghanistan and two years after its invasion of Iraq, and this period places it
during intense insurgency warfare between the United States and various groups in the
Middle East and Central Asia. The core focus of the article is an analysis of America’s
purported emphasis on unilateral “hard power” rather than “soft power,” as defined by
Joe Nye (p. 333). He argued that the significance of this shift is primarily about changing
the rules that have dominated foreign policy over decades, and that this will have
worldwide ramifications. Coronado (2005) argued that as the world’s most powerful
nation, the U.S. changed the rules of foreign policy, departing from international norms
established by such multilateral institutions as the League of Nations (1919) and the
United Nations (1944), but the Bush Doctrine redefined its policy at odds with these
principles. In this, he laid out his argument that U.S. foreign policy was now increasingly
oriented toward military force and unilateralism and this would invariably have far
reaching effects.
Coronado (2005) then went on to explain how this policy had secondary effects
resulting from the War on Terror, including what he deemed coercion of other countries
by conditional development and security aid, and by using diplomats as agents of
intervention (p.328). In short, he saw America’s policy as weaponizing diplomacy and
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aid, alongside military interventions, semi-veiled under the auspices of the War on
Terror. As a now historical piece, this article offers important analysis in that it illustrates
some of the early thinking about America’s War on Terror and helps offer a sort of
analytical baseline evaluation in its evolution, and as such, helps determine if analysis has
also shifted focus along with the P/CVE policies.
Miles (2012) offered a more recent scholarly analysis of the role of development
aid in countering terrorism. This article is perhaps among the most directly applicable to
the topic at USAID’s P/CVE policies and operations in that it discusses several of the
agency’s early P/CVE documents and explains several of the early papers that laid the
foundation of USAID’s early P/CVE work, including the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism
Program, USAID’s oldest P/CVE program. Some of these documents include the “Guide
to the Drivers of Violent Extremism” (Denoeux, 2009), and “Development Assistance
and Counter-Extremism: A Guide to Programming” (Denoeux, 2009). Being current and
relevant agency P/CVE policy documents, these papers were more fully explored in the
field work.
In his article, Miles (2012) argued that at that time there was unprecedented
overlap between development and security aid throughout the world (p. 28). Yet, Miles
(2012) clarified that this is not unprecedented nor surprising, citing the development
scholar Carol Lancaster, who argued that even at its inception development aid did not
exist to eradicate poverty, but rather it was created to serve as a diplomatic tool to build
alliances (p. 28). He argued that foreign aid was originally developed as a countercommunism device that has undergone severe “mission creep” and was institutionalized
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as foreign policy (p. 28). He concluded that U.S. work in Africa, such as that as part of
the TSCTP, presents difficult challenges. For example, USAID continued to play a
smaller relative role in development aid, during increasing complexity, and then
contending with fifteen other U.S. agencies also undertaking aid work. However, Miles
also agreed that there is a risk of negative perceptions by locals witnessing soldiers
distributing aid during military operations, which could undermine benefits, but that this
is a reality until funding priorities change.
Together, these articles reflect what the authors perceived as a new foreign policy
reality that results from national strategy prioritizing military approaches, and thus
resources being heavily oriented toward military operations even in dealings with soft
diplomacy and humanitarian aid.
Conclusion
What can be understood in this literature review is that there are challenges in
easily defining the topic from the beginning. As such, this literature review sought to
capture the wide number of topics that touch upon P/CVE pertaining to official
development assistance. Perhaps the most important point is the explanation of its rapid
emergence on the foreign policy scene. Even its predecessor policy, the Global War on
Terror, initially burst onto the scene, but with maturation faded away and gave rise to
P/CVE. The nearest existing policy body, that of counterinsurgency, has also experienced
a remarkable recent resurgence, although far older and more mature than P/CVE policies.
One can also argue that P/CVE responses are adaptations of containment-era stabilization
and irregular conflict policies during the Cold War era. The point here is that as with
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many policies, there is no perfectly defined line demarking one policy practice from the
other as it is quite likely that analysis of one policy provides feedback to successor
policies. It is important to understand the nature of such feedback and the contributing
factors of rapidly evolving policy evolution.
Given these examples explored in the literature, it is unclear how P/CVE will fare
over time. While it has experienced remarkable agency level support, there are also
critics that question the value of P/CVE, arguing that it is too poorly defined and
impractical to properly implement. Regardless, the three theoretical frameworks
discussed in this literature review will provide insight into the nature of this change.
Looking toward the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory, this paper will explore the rapid rise
of P/CVE development aid policies. Path dependence will examine the nature of
evolution through the lens of historical and institutional constraints and vested interests.
It will explore the nature of how historical decisions continue to affect policy change or
stasis well into the future. Finally, looking through the lens of Policy Feedback Theory,
the study will shed light on the nature of how feedback affects P/CVE policy evolution,
illustrating the way in which this policy is both affected and affecting P/CVE related
policies.
Looking toward chapter 4, the study will move into the fieldwork. This chapter
will describe the findings of the study. Information from interviews were collected from
various individuals. Chapter 4 will highlight the results from the interviews of numerous
subject matter experts, including technical specialists, policy specialists, and practitioners
who undertake this type of work internationally. Data will also be taken from official
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agency policy documents pertaining to P/CVE. Comparative analysis will then be
conducted between the policy documents and the interviews, and the resulting findings
will then be presented.
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Chapter 3: Research Methodology
Introduction
The purpose of this qualitative study is to understand how and why foreign
assistance policy, as it pertains to P/CVE, has changed since September 11, 2001. The
study seeks to describe the nature and the drivers of P/CVE foreign assistance policy
changes. Secondarily, this study aims to provide a high-level analysis for policy makers,
practitioners, and researchers by using a case study to describe the secondary and tertiary
effects of a rapidly changing foreign policy. This qualitative study examines the
interaction between country, regional, and national policy levels. This study is focused on
U.S. foreign policy as it pertains to P/CVE and the TSCTP intentionally omitting analysis
of domestic U.S. CVE policies, as well as omitting analysis of any foreign or domestic
policies of foreign countries, including CVE policies of partner countries that are part of
the TSCTP program. PET, PFT, and PD are the primary public policy theories used to
approach this study and help provide an analytical framework for the policy material.
This chapter is comprised of five primary sections, including research design and
rationale, role of the researcher, methodology, issues of trustworthiness, and the
summary.
Research Design and Rationale
The research questions are as follows:
RQ1: Has regional policy, as reflected in the TSCTP, been implemented in
alignment with USAID’s P/CVE foreign assistance policy?
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RQ2: What factors have led to changes in P/CVE TSCTP regional policy over
time as well as the broader USAID P/CVE foreign assistance policy?
To best respond to these questions, a case study is used as part of the broader
qualitative tradition. This approach was selected because it best facilitates the comparison
of policy effects at the regional and national level and because the complexity and rapidly
changing nature of the topic is not amenable to quantitative analysis. As Creswell (2013)
stated, qualitative research helps develop theories that are currently inadequate for certain
populations or sample sets or when the theories fail to capture the complexity of the
problem. Further, case study approaches are reliant upon data collection methods that are
best suited for this comparative approach, and subscribe to methodology including
interviewing and document analysis, which this topic necessitates. Further, as Yin (2014)
pointed out, the case study approach allows for descriptive, exploratory, and explanatory
approaches to be used to deeply discuss a wide range of phenomena. The phenomena that
this study explores the alignment of P/CVE policy and implementation of TSCTP, as well
as the nature of P/CVE policy change over time.
Role of the Researcher
I approach this study as a data collector, analyst, and observer, but not as an active
participant as an implementer of foreign assistance in the field of P/CVE. Further, this
study has no affiliation with my current work in the field of international development.
This study includes interviews with active participants and specialists, such as those that
serve in specialized P/CVE roles in select non-governmental organizations and
independent policy analysis institutions or centers (think tanks), as well as identified
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researchers and academics who have demonstrated expertise in P/CVE. Because of my
current role in government, and the desire to avoid any perceived conflict of interest, I
did not interview current government officials. While it is useful to speak with
government officials, it is possible to acquire the necessary perspectives and feedback in
the field of P/CVE through non-governmental specialists, as many non-governmental
officials have contributed to policy as well as implementation of P/CVE policies and
programs. In terms of knowledge and experience, non-government practitioners have the
requisite knowledge and experience as sources for this study.
Regarding biases and relationships, I come to this study as a government official
in the field of international development. I acknowledge that my experiences have helped
define my perspectives and opinions. I have experience in the field of stabilization and
counterinsurgency, but not specifically P/CVE, although the concepts have a common
lineage in the sense that they work to reduce violence among target populations (Galula,
1964; Kessels & Nemr, 2016). I have spent several years working in various conflictaffected countries and based on that work I have contributed literature to the field of
counterinsurgency and stabilization methodology. Further, I am currently serving in
government oversight within USAID and have produced reports that address issues
related to foreign aid programs, including community level stabilization and P/CVE
related goals. The reports required analysis on program strengths and weaknesses and
recommendations to address identified challenges. Therefore, I come to this study as an
experienced professional with developed perspectives, albeit within the confines of an
analytical and independent framework. Further, as a government oversight official, I have
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been trained in analytical methodology, objectivity, and independence, which I will also
apply to this study. Finally, to ensure there is no perceived conflict of interest, this study
was reviewed by my organization, though they did not contribute or edit in any way.
Methodology
Participation Selection Logic
The population was limited to P/CVE specialists. The population was selected
from NGO officials, think-tank specialists, university academics, researchers, and former
government officials when appropriate. The selected interviewees did not include current
government officials to avoid any ethical issues, such as conflicts of interest or the in
advertent disclosure of sensitive information. This was necessary due to my current role
as an oversight official in USAID. While government officials may have no objection in
speaking with me within certain ground rules, interviewing USAID and other government
officials on sensitive topics such as P/CVE may create some confusion as to whether my
research is strictly academic or was to be used for a performance audit. While this
research was not and will not be used for a USAID performance audit, misunderstandings
based on individual perceptions can be problematic for the employee and for me. Further,
it is expected that many P/CVE specialists have comparable levels of knowledge in the
field as they frequently communicate and coordinate with agency officials on the topic. In
fact, many agency officials often turn to outside researchers and implementers for the
most up-to-date information.
Given this, ethical considerations are necessary in the population selection. To
identify specific individuals within the general population, certain criteria were designed
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and adhered to. The criteria for participation selection included consideration of quality
participants, defined by the select participants having valid knowledge and experience,
their respective level of renown in the field of P/CVE (e.g., having significant published
literature in the field or being an often-cited expert), and their depth of experience (e.g.,
number of years in key roles in P/CVE programs). Specific experience was also a
criterion of selection. As such, this was a judgmental selection of individuals who have
reasonably sufficient knowledge and experience in the field of P/CVE, both in policy
development and policy implementation.
Because this was a case study approach, I also sought to interview P/CVE
specialists who have worked on the TSCTP program, with a focus on the non-military
foreign assistance components of the program, managed by USAID. While current
government employees were avoided for interviews due to ethical considerations, when
appropriate I sought input from former government officials. This is important due to the
P/CVE policy centrality, longevity, and the policy and programmatic changes that the
program has experienced over time.
There is no specific number of interviewees that is recommended over another,
and the recommended numbers vary depending on the type of study. This is according to
a comprehensive academic study examining the appropriate number of interviews for
qualitative research (Mason, 2010). However, Bertaux (as cited in Mason, 2010) stated
that for all types of qualitative research, which includes phenomenology, ethnography,
ethnoscience, and grounded theory, there should be no less than fifteen interviews. As
such, while there is no set standard number for case study analysis, achieving fifteen
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interviews was the goal for this study. The final number of participants was dictated
primarily by meeting these topical objectives and achieving data saturation, that is, when
enough data has been collected so that clear conceptual patterns emerge, and new data
becomes redundant. Therefore, from the onset of the study, it was understood that even if
fewer than fifteen interviews were achieved, the goal of data saturation remained the
primary objective in the collection of interview data.
Instrumentation
The primary instrument for this qualitative study was the researcher. Because this
study uses interviews and document analysis, the interview guide was also important. The
guide is provided in the appendix. The primary goal of the guide is that it is meant to
logically link the research objectives with the interview questions. In addition, the
interview guide was designed to effectively elicit testimonial evidence that helps answer
the research objectives. However, testimonial evidence alone was not enough, as it is the
weakest form of evidence (Kennedy, 2006). As noted in this chapter, information gleaned
from interviews was analyzed against documentary evidence, including U.S. Government
policy documents, which facilitates data triangulation and leads to more credible
conclusions and findings (Kennedy, 2006).
A cursory review was conducted to identify participants. As part of the literature
review, several participants were identified, including journal and book authors, former
and current government non-governmental program managers and implementers, and
academics and researchers. Bibliographies of peer reviewed journal articles, scholarly
reports, and books also helped identify additional sources. Further analysis was
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conducted through internet searches for P/CVE specialists, including think-tank staff and
academic researchers. This included specialists who were knowledgeable on P/CVE but
considered themselves experts in other related fields tied to P/CVE, such as failed states,
stabilization, counterinsurgency, terrorism, and other closely related concepts in which
many P/CVE specialists also work. The reason for this is that as P/CVE is a new policy
field, many experts still identify publicly as specialists in more widely known and
established policy fields. Nevertheless, there remains a logical and often direct
connection between their work and P/CVE.
Once a base group of specialists was identified, they were contacted via email and
an interview date, time, and location were agreed upon. Because of my current location
overseas, interviews were conducted via phone. Interviewees also offered
recommendations on others that should be interviewed. A spreadsheet of potential
interviewees was maintained for tracking purposes and a record of each conducted
interview was maintained. Sufficiency of sources was assessed as to whether data
saturation was attained. Once a pattern of opinions and feedback was established and data
saturation achieved, no further interviews were sought or conducted.
The population targeted for interviews were P/CVE specialists, researchers, and
practitioners. A valid source was assessed based on the quality of the source’s published
material, such as those having published peer reviewed journal articles, reputable
academic books, or widely referenced research papers. Specialists were selected to
represent two policy levels: the national policy level, such as those that contribute and
specialize at the agency strategic level (e.g., higher levels that affect entire agencies or
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government-wide policies, versus direct implementation of activities) and at the level
closer to implementation of programs, such as regional or country level implementers.
Many of these organizations, and the specialists working for those organization,
were in headquarters buildings, such as those located in Washington, D.C., New York,
and other major cities. In addition, academic researchers were identified, such as those
located in universities. Emphasis was given to academics and researchers who have
contributed to agency level P/CVE policies or programs, such as those provided with
agency grants or contracts to develop policy papers or project designs. In addition,
multilateral organizations, such as UN, World Bank, and the OECD, which have relevant
insight into the United States’ P/CVE policy approaches and project implementation,
were also considered for interviews.
The second type of specialists identified and interviewed were technical
specialists who implement foreign assistance projects. These specialists are often referred
to as “implementing partners” by USAID, as they are the direct foreign assistance
implementers and do so in partnership with USAID management and oversight. The
focus at this level is on the case study, and on implementing partners with
implementation or research level familiarity with the TSCTP program. The objective of
interviews at this level was to understand how U.S. P/CVE policy is being implemented
on the ground and how these policies have changed over time. As such, this helps
demonstrate the reality of policy once implemented and whether the assumptions and
hypothesis of the policy are accurate when designed, and if not, how has the policy or the
programs adjusted to reality. This approach also helped track which factors affected
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P/CVE policy change over time.
The second research approach is document analysis. The primary means in which
documents were collected was via USAID’s publicly accessible website research portal,
the Development Experience Clearinghouse (DEC), which is used to archive program
reports submitted by implementing partners and others. Documents selected for review
must have meet specific criteria, such as being peer reviewed reports published by a
major independent policy analysis institutions or centers (also known as think-tanks) or
sponsored or written by a government agency responsible for P/CVE as part of their
wider foreign aid portfolio. As noted, the focus was on USAID, but other agencies do
contribute to USAID and broader foreign assistance policy, primarily including the DOS,
the Department of Defense, and the U.S. Institute of Peace. Additionally, non-U.S.
organizations also publish important documents used by U.S. agencies and nongovernmental organizations in the development of their own policy. As noted in the
literature review, a few of these documents that contribute to U.S. foreign assistance
policy, including P/CVE policy, were developed by agencies in Australia, England,
France, UAE, and others. As such, when documents are identified as playing an
important role in shaping USAID’s P/CVE policy, then it was included in the document
analysis as appropriate. The criteria of importance in determining if a policy document is
relevant was judged by the frequency it was cited in other policy documents and key
interviews, or whether it was cited in key policy documents. As with the interviews, data
sufficiency in the document reviews was determined when pattern redundancy was
reached, thus indicating data saturation. Data saturation remained the primary objective
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of document analysis from the onset of the study.
Predominantly, only current and recent documents dated September 11, 2001 until
February 2019 was used as part of the document analysis. The only exception to this
document scope was when analyzing the National Security Strategies to illustrate how
P/CVE related concepts shifted over a longer period. The seventeen-year span from
2001-2019 was expected to be adequate to comprehensively include the necessary
documents reflecting the emergence and policy evolution of the P/CVE policy
phenomenon. More historical documents were referred to when additional background or
context is needed. For example, although using different terms, historically important
subject matter was published on P/CVE years before September 11th occurred, such as
those during the Cold War. Many of these key publications continue to be referenced
today within the scholarly and the P/CVE practitioner communities. For example, such
work includes publications by Andrew Natsios (1995), a former USAID Administrator
and published scholar who in part focused on conflict intervention and violent extremism
many years before September 11, 2001.
There were two published data platforms used as part of the fieldwork. As
discussed, for academic material, such as peer reviewed journal articles, these were
sourced from Walden University’s electronic database and using the described search
term protocols. The second instrument was the use of USAID’s online Development
Exchange Clearinghouse (DEC) system, the agency’s public record knowledge
management repository. The DEC is like traditional online research databases, and
therefore the search terms were also be applied there. However, because the DEC is
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specific to USAID, the search protocol will focus on the TSCTP and related P/CVE
project implementation reports. The DEC search terms were “preventing and countering
violent extremism,” “countering violent extremism,” “P/CVE,” “preventing violent
extremism,” “PVE,” and “Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership.” Further, some
policy analysis documents were searched to provide background context to the study,
such as reports on changes to development policy, which reinforced interviewees’
perspectives on the nature of changing P/CVE foreign assistance policy. The DEC was
also used to search for implementing partners’ quarterly, annual, and evaluative project
reports to USAID.
Historical and legal documentation was used as appropriate to provide additional
context and background. As previously discussed in the study, P/CVE is not a wholly
new phenomenon, but rather a repackaging of approaches into a newly defined purpose.
Yet, when combined, these older and varied approaches formed an entirely new approach
in form, function, purpose, and definition. When these previous approaches came
together, in some ways it fostered policy momentum based on the perception of having
an important new tool, and this perceived new approach reverberated across the foreign
assistance community. This derived from the sense that previous approaches including
counterinsurgency, stabilization operations, democratization, and health and education
programs could be harnessed effectively as a P/CVE related program, which bears out in
the policy documents.
As such, historical and current policy documents shed light on how the previously
applied foreign assistance and intervention tools have now evolved into P/CVE related
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tools. For example, documents related to the Cold War and America’s so-called small
wars (e.g., counterinsurgency and other irregular wars, not to include major state versus
state wars, such as world wars) are insightful when discussing the more military-centric
approaches that today partly comprise P/CVE approaches. To illustrate, some historical
approaches during the Cold War (i.e., proxy wars and insurgency operations) involved
training local police officials, coaching local politicians in governance work, or
countering militant propaganda, to name just a few tools. Today, many of those same
approaches are used in P/CVE. What has changed is the purpose, shifting from
countering the Soviet Union and its influence to countering or preventing extremist
organizations from gaining additional influence among local populations. Thus, the
means can be similar, but the objectives have changed over time due to evolving
circumstances. The reflection of feedback from changing circumstances reflect policy
feedback theory while the rapid rate of change based on factors such as a rapidly
changing context illustrate aspects of the punctuated equilibrium theory. As such, the
nature and rate of change to P/CVE policy reflect PFT and PET theoretical dynamics,
such as the processes and forces by which policy change occurs. Path dependence helped
examine policy change and/or stasis from a different yet complementary lens. PD
examines the way in which policy can become locked-in based on previous historical
decisions. This is distinct from PFT in that it looks more specifically at the factors that
lead to an entity opting to stay the course rather than switching to alternative options,
even when superior options may exist. In this sense, it examines the self-reinforcing
dynamics, such as the perception of increasing returns or when prohibitive forfeitures are
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thought to exist (Pierson, 2000, p. 253). On the other hand, PFT explores the nature of
how policies shape politics, which may or may not be characterized by PD. In sum, PFT
places its focus on the causal interaction of policy and political factors, whereas PD does
not place its focus strictly on this interaction, but rather uses a broader aperture of causal
factors.
Path dependence is also distinct from PET in that it does not necessarily explain
why an entity breaks from an established course, particularly when a policy alters rapidly
and significantly, or is rapidly overtaken by another policy due to some sort of systemic
shock. On the other hand, PET offers an explanatory lens when policies rapidly emerge,
sometimes facilitating a rapid break from prior policy approaches. Therefore, the use of
PD lens provides explanatory value if PET is not supported by the fieldwork analysis.
Overall, it is expected that this multiple theoretical lens approach will be more
explanatory than using only one theoretical lens. These theoretical concepts will be
discussed more in depth in later chapters.
Similarly, legal documents were important to consider as many laws and agency
communications are legal in nature. These documents, such as policy documents,
executive orders, and statutes, serve as legal requirements and criteria of performance for
agencies to follow. USAID is no different in this regard, and USAID’s policy documents,
as well as guidance they receive from Congress and the President, are often legally
binding documents. Such documents that were considered were USAID’s P/CVE policy,
Executive Orders relating to violent extremism, and Congressional guidance on P/CVE.
Because this study examined the evolution of P/CVE policy over a span of time, studying

91
the changes to statutes and policies relating to U.S. P/CVE helps illustrate the factors and
rate of change, and are thus critical to this study.
Interview Protocol
Each interview had a purpose for being conducted. The primary purpose for each
respective interview was to answer the study’s research questions. As such, interview
questions will be focused on the two research objectives. The questions linked to each
respective are as follows:
Objective 1: Has regional policy, as reflected in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism
Partnership, been implemented in alignment with USAID’s P/CVE foreign assistance
policy?
1. Which policies do you consider the most important related to USAID work on
P/CVE? Please explain.
2. Which policies do you consider the most important related to USAID work on the
TSCTP? Please explain.
3. Do you think there is alignment between agency P/CVE policy and the TSCTP?
How so?
4. Does the TSCTP policy and USAID P/CVE policy intersect? Are they mutually
reinforcing?
5. In your opinion, has the TSCTP policy been implemented to achieve P/CVE?
How so?
6. If you think there were policy changes to P/CVE or TSCTP policies, has it been
agency wide, regional, or specific to certain countries? Please explain.
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7. Have certain TSCTP countries had more success with P/CVE? Please explain.
Objective 2: What factors have led to changes in P/CVE TSCTP regional policy as well
as the broader USAID P/CVE foreign assistance policy?
8. Has USAID’s P/CVE foreign policy changed over time? How so? Why / why
not?
9. Has USAID’s TSCTP policy evolved over time? How so? Why? / Why not?
10. What events in the past do you think have had an effect on regional or agency
P/CVE policy? Explain.
11. If so, what factors do you think have been the most important in defining
USAID’s role in P/CVE?
12. Have there been any particular circumstances that have led to changes in regional
or agency level P/CVE policy? And for the TSCTP policy?
13. What information or factors do you rely on when trying to understand how the
P/CVE policies have, or have not, changed over time?
14. Have there been any previous regional or agency policies, regulations, or political
decisions related to P/CVE that you think have had an effect on current P/CVE
policy? Please explain.
15. What current policies, regulations, or political decisions do you think have
influence on the way in which agency or regional P/CVE policy is developed and
implemented?
16. Do you think that P/CVE is seen as an important policy approach in the agency or
at the regional TSCTP level? Please explain.
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17. Do you think that P/CVE policy has a viable future in the agency or at the regional
TSCTP level? Please explain.

Interviews followed a strictly defined process. Once recruitment and agreements
were completed for each interviewee, questions were developed and were semistructured. Thus, specific questions based on the stated objective of each interviewee
were developed. There was also an allowance for follow-up questions as needed, making
it conversational in manner rather than rigid questioning. Because this is a qualitative
interview, it was important to gain a rich understanding of the topic through deeper
topical exploration through conversation and follow-up. While at the same time each
interview pursues a specific purpose to keep the interview focused and flowing in a
logical and efficient manner. As such, this falls into the category of semi-structured
interviews. An interview template was developed, which includes the name, location,
time, participants, purpose, and transcript notes for each interview. These were
maintained in the study’s folder for review, categorization, and analysis.
During the interview review process, salient and reoccurring themes were
highlighted, and further analyzed to determine if the pattern is illustrative of an important
pattern that requires a deeper analysis and follow-up with select subject matter experts
knowledgeable on the respective issue. In addition to this pattern analysis, the study also
sought to clearly highlight milestones in the evolution of the P/CVE, such has when new
policies were issued, and how those policies affected implementation in the field.
An Excel spreadsheet was created to track each interview and distill the most
salient points from the interview transcripts. Following this, the interviews were also
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loaded into ATLAS.ti for analysis. The interview transcripts were then coded and
grouped into code groups, using the same format as the document analysis coding, which
helped to gain a deeper understanding of the frequency of themes as well as a common
lens across the document analysis and the interview analysis. This process helped identify
the most important themes from each interview as well as help aggregate and analyze
patterns across numerous interviews. As such, this process helped distill responses that
most clearly respond to the stated research questions and set aside those parts of the
discussion that are not relevant to the study. It was planned that if documents were
provided by interviewees, during or after the interview, those documents would have
been annotated on the interview transcript and the spreadsheet to help ensure organization
and knowledge of the document source. If relevant to the document analysis, then those
documents would have been included in the study. However, this approach was not
necessary as no documents were provided by the interviewees.
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Document Analysis Protocol
Policy Literature
Review

Document Analysis

Interviews

Aggregated
Crosscutting Analysis
Follow-up (as
necessary)

Figure 1. Basic methodological process
Like the interview protocol, documents were selected based on the primary
purpose of the research questions. Also, a Microsoft Office Excel spreadsheet was
created to track and summarize all analyzed documents. The process began with
analytical notes made to each document during the initial and subsequent reviews. Once
these reviews are completed and notes made, then the respective document was added to
the spreadsheet for organization, aggregation, and analysis. In the spreadsheet, the
documents were categorized into its respective category, such as statute, agency policy,
office policy, NGO analysis, academic analysis, and other categories as appropriate.
Once the document was catalogued into the spreadsheet, the notes on the document were
transcribed into the spreadsheet to help provide a synopsis of the most important themes
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of that document. Further, each document was analyzed within the spreadsheet to identify
the objective of the document, the nature of the guidance or information provided by the
document, and the nature of its authority. Once the analysis was completed for these
documents, then an aggregated analysis was completed for each category, which helped
shed light on the broader analytical observations of the documents, such as for example:
key policy milestones, changing objectives of the policy guidance, changes in the nature
of the guidance within the documents, and other significant observations as needed to
answer the research questions.
In addition, coding and code grouping was completed for each document category
to gain a deeper understanding of the common themes through the analysis. To ensure
that the focus remained on the research questions, codes and code groups were in
alignment with the interview analysis, helping to maintain a common lens across
interviews and document analysis. As such, common coding and code grouping helped
ensure that comparative analysis between these two methodological approaches were
consistent enough to identify crosscutting themes.
Finally, once an aggregated analysis of the interviews and the document analysis
was completed, then a secondary analysis contrasting the interviews and document
analyses was completed to see where crosscutting interview and document patterns
existed. For example, if a recurring theme exists in both the document analysis and the
interviews, then that theme was further explored and assessed for inclusion in the study
as an important factor in policy change over time. However, it was expected that there
would have themes not identified in the document review but were frequently highlighted
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by respondents in interviews. In fact, one such pattern was identified, which required
additional research if the theme merited inclusion in the observations. Ultimately, it was
determined that the theme merited discussion due to the theme’s consistency and
emphasis by interviewees as well as its frequent recurrence in the literature review.
Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection
All data was collected by the researcher, including the collection of all documents
and interviews. The documents were collected from a variety of sources, including public
websites of relevant NGOs and think tanks; government agency websites for USAID and
the DOS, to include the Development Experience Clearinghouse (DEC) database;
research databases such as Walden University’s library; and, documents provided by
interviewees, when relevant and appropriate. Document collection occurred as the first
phase of dissertation fieldwork because it built upon the literature review and served as
an informative and useful segue into interviews. Interviews were conducted following the
document collection and analysis and concluded once all select individuals were
interviewed. Both documents and interviews were recorded verbatim. Documents were
recorded on a spreadsheet with the name of the document, the date, author(s), and
noteworthy points of the document. Interviews will also be documented. A transcript was
maintained as well as a spreadsheet to aggregate all interviews for analysis. An additional
spreadsheet was also maintained to analyze the material across documents and interviews
to determine if there are recurring points. It was then determined if additional follow-up
was needed, such as to fill any identified information gaps that arose after analysis. As
necessary, this was completed with targeted follow-up questions via email to address
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specific information gaps. As a formal exit to the study, and if requested by the
interviewee, interviewees were provided a link to the final study, indicating the
completion of the study.
Data Analysis Plan
There are two research questions that required distinct analytical steps to fully
answer. The first question followed the data collection and analytical steps as such:
Research Question 1: How has regional policy, as reflected in the Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership, been implemented in alignment with USAID’s P/CVE
foreign policy?
1) Collect and review the national and regional Trans-Sahara P/CVE policies.
Research USAID’s and the DOS websites for P/CVE policy documents pertaining
to foreign assistance.
2) Disaggregate worldwide P/CVE foreign assistance policies from regional P/CVE
policies.
3) Perform a comparative analysis of worldwide P/CVE policies with those of
regional P/CVE policies.
4) Based on the policy literature review, develop conclusions as to the comparability
of the policies and determine if an alignment (e.g., documented evidence that
clear linkage exists, such as citing other related policies as guidance or for
coordination purposes) exists between regional and worldwide P/CVE policies.
5) Using the policy literature review as reference, prepare the interviews. Develop
interview question that target the question of whether policies align, how they’ve
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aligned, or why there is misalignment.
6) Compare literature with interview results. Determine whether there is agreement
between literature and interview results. Determine if links between the two
policy levels exist. If differences exist, use follow-up questions with interviewees
to understand why there is a lack of agreement between the policy literature and
interview feedback.
7) Make final conclusions following the crosscutting policy literature review and
interview analysis, stating the nature of alignment between worldwide P/CVE
policies and regional Trans-Sahara P/CVE policies.
Research Question 2: What factors have led to changes in P/CVE TSCTP regional policy
over time as well as the broader USAID P/CVE foreign assistance policy?
1) Undertake a literature review of the history of P/CVE related policies in foreign
assistance policy, including predecessor policies that led to P/CVE. The scope of
this review will be from September 11, 2001 until current. The primary references
will be documented policies found on USAID and DOS websites. The goal of this
literature review is to compare policy documents over time and to determine when
notable changes occurred and what perceived factors led to these changes.
2) Once notable changes have been identified, determine if causative factors or any
noted objectives of the policy changes were identified in the policy documents. If
no causative factors or stated purposes for the policy changes were provided, then
add questions to the interview template that address the identified information
gap.
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Throughout the collection and analysis procedure steps, key themes were captured.
As each document is reviewed, repeating themes were identified and recorded in a
spreadsheet linked to the respective document. Once all documents were analyzed for key
themes, they were reviewed for interview follow-up to collect additional context and
background on the respective theme.
Issues of Trustworthiness
To ensure credibility and dependability of sources, there was a selection
methodology in place of documents collected and analyzed. Documents came from four
primary sources:
•

Agency websites, primarily those of USAID, the DOS, U.S. Congress, the White
House, and government archives.

•

Peer reviewed articles, such as those focusing on policy analysis and P/CVE
policy evolution.

•

Non-Governmental Agencies (NGOs), such as those that address P/CVE.
Additional background explanation will be given when an NGO is referenced,
including any political agendas the organization may have.

•

Documents provided by interviewees to support a point they discussed during the
interview or to provide additional context.

Likewise, interviewees were methodically selected. As mentioned, interviewees were
not selected for interview if they are current government employees to avoid a conflict of
interest or misperceptions of the purpose of this research. Former government employees
were considered if they attested that they would not disclose sensitive information.
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Interviewees were primarily selected from the following groups of individuals:
•

Current employees of NGOs and corporations that implement P/CVE programs
(e.g., Chemonics, IRD, RTI). However, due to ethical considerations and other
sensitivities, these employees were not working on current USAID programs.

•

Academics (e.g., university professors/lecturers)

•

Published authors and specialists (e.g., journalists or documentary film makers
who specialize in P/CVE)

•

Think Tank specialists (e.g., Brookings Institution and International Crisis Group)

•

Independent practitioners (e.g., individuals who take contracts and grants to
undertake specialized work such as P/CVE).

Once the documentary and testimonial data was collected via document research and
interview completion, the information then underwent analysis for repeating themes.
Triangulation was then used to determine the nature of the repeating themes. For
example, it was determined if repeating themes were coming from one or varying
sources. If repeating themes were derived from a variety of sources, then those themes
were often discussed in the analysis if they helped respond to the research questions. If a
salient issue is not repeated in varying sources, but deemed potentially important, then
follow-up questions were sent to interviewees and additional document collection was
undertaken to confirm if the potentially important theme is accurate and can be
triangulated.
Due to the subject matter, this study is minimally transferable. This is due to the
specific nature of the study and because it is a study on complex and changing policies.
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However, lessons can be drawn from this study to help address related topics, such as
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. It can be argued that these older fields of study,
which significantly precede P/CVE, helped give rise to it as this independent discipline.
However, the fact that P/CVE is an independent and unique concept that stands distinct
from counterinsurgency and counterterrorism also demonstrates that there are important
differences. Nevertheless, there are common strains between the fields, such as
population-centric aspects, including “soft” (i.e., non-military) approaches to preventing
and countering violent extremism that arises among disenfranchised populations or those
with significant unaddressed grievances. As such, there can be lessons gleaned from this
study that permit limited transferability to related topics.
Dependability was attained using an audit trail approach. As mentioned, the
methodology inherently lent itself to this approach. As material was collected, analyzed,
and presented, documentation was produced, such as analytical spreadsheets and decision
matrices developed for each research question. The decision matrix refers to the
spreadsheet that aggregates analysis to aid in the decision of whether to include or
exclude themes in the observations. To expound, codes and identified themes were
maintained in a spreadsheet and then broadly presented in this study. A modified decision
matrix was used to select repeated themes that have enough support for further
development. For example, the decision matrix highlighted the number of times a theme
was discussed in document reviews and interviews, the level of importance the theme
was to the overall discussion or policy document, and the level of confidence the
interviewee had on the theme discussed.
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Confirmability was also be considered throughout the study. If an identified
theme was determined to have strong support based on triangulation of data, then the
theme was likely to be included in the findings. If moderate support existed, then followup was conducted to determine the veracity of the identified theme. If there was little or
no support, other than a single individual or document, then the theme was deselected for
any additional follow up and was thus excluded from the findings.
Ethical Procedures
There were no required ethics-based agreements necessary for this study. Further,
there were no necessary IRB approval documents for the treatment of human subjects.
However, there was one ethical concern that was considered during the design of this
study. This concern led to the decision to omit the recruitment of government employees
for interviews and specific contractors or grantees under an active P/CVE related contract
or grant from USAID. This decision was made due to the concern that the specific nature
of the interview questions on a topic that may be sensitive in nature could place pressure
on interviewees to inadvertently discuss information not approved for public
consumption. Therefore, the study omitted current government and active USAID
contracted employees. This omission was also clearly stated in the recruitment letter so
any individual that falls within this limitation was able to readily exclude themselves.
Former government employees were interviewed, but it was communicated at the
beginning of the interview not to discuss any subject matter that is sensitive in nature.
Regarding document collection and analysis, it is unethical and illegal to use any
classified information. There are strict government rules for the marking of classified
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documentation. Each document was examined to ensure that no classification markings
exist. This was not expected to be a problem considering that the policy documents were
taken from public government websites which are reviewed by their public relations
officials. However, on rare occasion, classified information is inadvertently, and
sometimes intentionally, put into articles and news releases. If any classified information
was contained in any source used for this study, then that source would have been
immediately removed from the data pool, and all traces of the material would have been
immediately removed from the paper. However, this issue never arose during the study
and therefore was not problematic.
Interviewees were advised that notes were being taken based on the interview
question responses. To maintain anonymity, pseudonyms were given to each interviewee,
such as “Interviewee A,” “Interviewee B,” and so on. As such, the interviewee remains
anonymous to the reader and this study does not share the identity of participants.
Information will not be used for any purpose outside of this study. Data was kept secure
by password protection, data encryption, and pseudonyms. If any confidential material
was recorded as a result of the interviews it would have been deleted, however this did
not occur during the study. Interview transcripts and documents will be retained
according to university IRB standards. This information was provided to the interviewees
to ensure that the participants fully understand how their interview feedback and data was
handled. This approach helps ensure replicability and transparency of the study while
remaining ethical in its approach.
As an employee of USAID, conflicts of interest were an important point of
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concern. To mitigate any conflicts of interest, I advised our office’s legal counsel that this
study as being implemented and requested approval to conduct the work. I received a
response that there was no apparent conflict of interest based on the information
provided. Further, several controls were put in place to avoid any real or perceived
conflicts of interest, such as opting not to interview government employees or those
actively working on a USAID P/CVE related contracts or grants. It was determined that
while it would have been helpful to include those sources, they ultimately were not
needed considering the wealth of information that exists outside of those circles, such as
those found in academia, think tanks, NGOs, and particularly in finalized policy
documents. Finally, to avoid any conflict of interest, only publicly available information
was used for this study. As such, no “internal use only” or “for official use only,” or
“sensitive but unclassified,” or any other such related documents under protection were
collected and/or referenced as part of this study.
Summary
In summary, there was a precise methodology that this study will attempt to
replicate. Rather, the process began with a general policy literature review. This provided
a baseline level of knowledge of the various foreign assistance policy documents
pertaining to P/CVE that existed in USAID over a scoped period. Second, USAID’s DEC
archives were searched, and selected documents were collected that provide a sample of
P/CVE programming. Reporting was collected and analyzed for thematic patterns,
evidence of policy evolution, regional policies pertaining to the TSCTP, and significant
areas of concern. Those reports, likewise, helped target the interview questions with
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select individuals who met specific criteria. The report reviews also helped confirm
which types of P/CVE subject matter experts were the most beneficial to interview,
making it a purposive interview selection approach. Third, interviews were prepared and
conducted. The interviews were then analyzed for thematic patterns using ATLAS.ti,
which aided in the organization of documentation and the coding spreadsheet presented
in this study. Once the interviews were complete, a comparative analysis was then
conducted between the interviews and the document review in order to determine if there
were any thematic issues that are common across the documentation and the interview
responses. Once this analysis was completed, then a draft of the findings was completed
for chapter 4 of this study and then further examined through theoretical lenses found in
chapter 5.
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Chapter 4: Results
Background
The purpose of this qualitative study was to understand how and why foreign
assistance policy, as it pertains to P/CVE, has evolved since September 11, 2001. The
study seeks to describe the nature and the drivers of P/CVE foreign assistance policy
changes, as well as explore the nature of the policy coordination at various levels of
government. Secondarily, this study aims to provide a high-level analysis for policy
makers, practitioners, and researchers by presenting a case study describing the
secondary and tertiary effects of a rapidly changing foreign policy. The research
questions are as follows:
RQ1: Has regional policy, as reflected in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism
Partnership, been implemented in alignment with USAID’s P/CVE foreign assistance
policy?
RQ2: What factors have led to changes in P/CVE TSCTP regional policy as well
as the broader USAID P/CVE foreign assistance policy?
This qualitative study examined the interaction between policies at the country,
regional, and national levels. This study of U.S. policy focused on foreign aid as it
pertains to P/CVE and the TSCTP. This study omitted analysis of domestic U.S. CVE
policies as well as analysis of any foreign or domestic policies of foreign countries. This
omission included CVE policies of partner countries that are part of the TSCTP program
as well as policies of international organizations, such as the United Nations.
This chapter is comprised of eight sections: background, setting, demographics,
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data collection, data analysis, evidence of trustworthiness, results, and summary. The
background will give an overview of the issue. The demographics section defines the
participant demographics and characteristics relevant to the study. The setting describes
conditions that influenced participants or their experience during the study that may
affect the interpretation of the results. The third and fourth sections involve data
collection and the nature of the data analysis. These sections focus on issues such as the
number and type of participants, data variation, coding, categories, themes, data
limitations, and other important points of consideration. The fifth section involves
evidence of trustworthiness. Important points in this section include credibility,
transferability, dependability, and confirmability of the study’s strategy. This section will
also include areas in the study which required adjustment in order to make the findings
more methodologically sound. The sixth section includes the results for both research
questions, presenting data to support each finding, and discusses any discrepancies or
limitations. The final section is the conclusion, where answers to the research questions
are summarized before transitioning to Chapter 5.
Setting
A reading of National Security Strategies since 2001 reflects a significant period
of evolution for P/CVE, culminating in the height of support under the Obama
Administration. However, the current administration does not appear to share the same
level of enthusiasm for P/CVE, or perhaps foreign aid in general, and this was discernible
in the policy documents and in the interviews. This is not to pass any form of judgment
that the administration is correct or not, or that current practitioners and researchers see
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P/CVE disappearing, or that there is grave concern about P/CVE. It is just a realization
that the policy focus has shifted, as it sometimes does from administration to
administration. Further, those interviewed were more concerned with sound policy and
implementation than high-level politics and shifting priorities from one administration to
another. For this reason, the shift in the current administration’s priorities was not a
driving concern by interviewees or within the policy documents themselves. Rather,
overall effectiveness of P/CVE related programs and a desire to learn from past lessons
and experiences were the dominant themes throughout the research.
Not only does this study examine the evolution of P/CVE, but it also overlaps
with a period of rapid change of P/CVE policy. As I will explore in this chapter, this
rapid change created definitional and even conceptual challenges. The information
collected from policy documents and interviewees at times reflected different lenses that
P/CVE was being viewed through which was often significantly shaped by personal
experiences. This was particularly the case depending on the era in which the individual
worked on P/CVE programs. Therefore, some interviewees were completely unaware of
many important modern P/CVE policy documents, but instead had a strong understanding
of the early roots of the field, such as when it was just beginning to detach from such
feels as counterterrorism and insurgency. For example, practitioners who were in active
government service in the early 2000s during the Global War on Terror experience CVE
in different ways than those that worked in P/CVE programs in the last few years
following more precise P/CVE policy guidance. Further, the way in which P/CVE is
discussed among policy makers and practitioners has changed, reflecting a more nuanced

110
and matured conceptualization and terminology of P/CVE than when it first emerged or
was conjoined with other fields such as counterterrorism. Going into this study, I
expected these changes over time as it is relatively well understood in the international
development community that P/CVE has rapidly changed over the years, and thus I was
previously familiar with some of these iterative changes in my own career. Further, the
purpose of this study was to understand the causes of this change and the way in which
the policies have or have not been standardized, coordinated, and socialized across
USAID and the interagency as these changes occurred.
The study occurred in two different environments: interviews and document
research. The interviews were conducted via voice only Skype. Skype facilitates secure
encrypted voice conversations. These calls were conducted in an office space and there
were no notable distractions. The interviewees participated from a setting of their choice,
mostly in homes and personal offices, and at a time of their choosing. The interviews and
document analyses were conducted at a time of significant policy uncertainty regarding
the future of P/CVE in USAID as well as the broader development and even defense
communities. It was also conducted during a time where the concept of preventing
violent extremism was beginning to be used more frequently. It was a period of
significant ongoing change, one of policy, budgetary, and even conceptual evolutions.
Further, the interviews reflect more recent reflections than most of the policy related
documents themselves, some of which were written several years prior to the interviews.
Thus, the interviews offered a perspective of some degree of reflection on the nature and
efficacy of the P/CVE policies and their implementation.
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This issue of evolution is at the heart of the study, and thus presents unique
challenges as well as timely opportunities. Yet, it is akin to studying a moving target
when policies are rapidly shifting and a common understanding across the field of
practitioners and academics is not yet uniform or well established. The challenges of
studying this rapidly evolving field were minimized by establishing a clear scope and
adhering to those limits. Yet, further future analysis will need to consider how the
emergence and growth of these concepts will affect P/CVE policy and implementation in
the future. Thus, this study serves as a snapshot in the lifecycle of P/CVE, and it will
almost undoubtedly continue to evolve well into the future.
Finally, participants in the study have experienced a transition in the political
setting, and the documents reflect this transition. Various administrations have supported
P/CVE in different ways and at different levels of intensity. In recent years, P/CVE was
supported and emphasized by the Obama administration, which oversaw it as it
progressed into what it is known as today, which is often a dual focus on preventing and
countering violent extremism by using tools of international development and
stabilization. Yet, the current level of support for this approach to P/CVE is less certain,
an important theme that will be addressed in this chapter.
Demographics
Interviews were conducted to gain additional context regarding how policies are
developed and implemented at the federal, regional, and local level. Further, interviews
were conducted with academics and non-governmental employees. The interview
questions adhered strictly to the purpose of answering the study’s objectives, which are
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focused on policy coordination and evolution. Given this, the criteria for interviewee
selection was determined strictly on experience and knowledge in the field of USAID’s
P/CVE work at the federal, regional, or country level. Interviewees were recruited from
the following groups of individuals:
•

Current employees of NGOs and organizations that implement P/CVE
programs

•

Academics

•

Published authors and research specialists

•

Think Tank intellectuals

•

Independent practitioners

Of note, there was a limited pool of non-government employees with relevant
experience in USAID’s P/CVE policies and programs. While 18 interview candidates
were identified and recruitment attempts were made, 7 interviewees responded in the
affirmative and agreed to be interviewed. Of those that declined, most cited lack of time
to conduct the interview. Others, such as the researchers and academics, stated that they
already committed to published papers on all they know on the subject and had nothing
further to add to this body of knowledge. However, others simply did not respond to the
interview request. Nevertheless, 7 interviews still adhered to the necessary threshold for
qualitative analysis. Further, this study was designed from the onset to rely heavily on
formal finalized policy documentation to augment the interviews.
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Table 1
Interviewee Profiles
Interviewee
Code

Ethnicity

Gender

Education

Background

A

Caucasian

Male

Master’s

B

Caucasian

Male

Doctorate

C

Caucasian

Male

Master’s

D

Caucasian

Male

Doctorate

E

Caucasian

Male

Doctorate

F

African
American

Male

Doctorate

G

Caucasian

Male

Doctorate

Current NGO leader specializing in irregular
conflict, counterinsurgency, stabilization
operations, and CVE. Has over 20 years of direct
experience in CVE and related field.
Retired senior diplomat. Has several decades of
direct and indirect government experience on
CVE and related policy development and
implementation.
Experience as an NGO director and published
academic who specializes in foreign aid program
evaluations. Has 20 years of experience in the
U.S. government and NGO sectors. Has several
years of experience in evaluating foreign aid
programs, including CVE and related programs.
NGO researcher and published academic who
specializes in CVE in the foreign aid in the
Africa context. Over a decade of NGO
experience on CVE and related programs.
Academic and former international organization
analyst who specializes in violent extremism,
terrorism, and national security. Has led and
contributed to numerous scholarly papers and opeds on CVE related topics. Has over 20 years of
research experience in CVE and related topics.
Academic, NGO leader, and former government
analyst specializing in extremism and CVE. Has
over a decade of experience in the fields of
national security research and program
management in fields related to violent
extremism.
Academic and published author in the field of
national security. Written numerous academic
papers on CVE and foreign aid programs, as well
as consulted to NGOs and government agencies
on CVE policies and programs. Has
approximately 20 years of experience on CVE
and related topics.

As Table 1 shows, approximately 70% of the interviewees held a doctorate level
degree. All the interviewees were male, and the majority were Caucasian. While women
were asked for interviews, none responded to the invitation. One interviewee is African

114
American. Other interviewees of varying ethnicities were invited for an interview, but
also did not respond. In addition, the interviewees’ ages ranged widely from late 30s to
early 80s. All interviewees had over ten years of experience in international development
and/or foreign affairs, and all were experienced in P/CVE or similarly related work, such
as using foreign aid tools for the purposes of counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and
stabilization. Further, all respondents had also served in some type of academic research
in the field of P/CVE, ranging from actively teaching in the field to researching and
evaluating P/CVE programs, such as consultants and evaluation leads for formal P/CVE
program evaluations.
Data Collection
The document research was conducted entirely online. Thirty-seven core policy
documents were collected for analysis. Policy documents were the primary focus for
document analysis and were collected because they represent original source material
directly from U.S. Government agencies and are easily obtained as public documents. As
documents were discovered and collected, they were categorized into document
categories. The document categories include the following:
•

National policies and strategies (e.g., those polices and strategies above

agency level guidance)
•

USAID P/CVE related policies

•

USAID P/CVE program assessments and evaluations

•

USAID policy support documents (e.g., policy addendums)

•

Peer-reviewed academic papers were also identified and reviewed for
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background information. However, the academic papers were not used for the
purposes of analysis.
The primary locations that were used to locate the papers included Walden
University’s digital library, USAID’s Development Experience Clearinghouse (DEC)
online database, and organizational websites, primarily USAID, DOS, and the White
House websites, all of which are cited in the references section. Some historical
documents that are no longer official policy were taken from organizations dedicated to
archiving historical documents for historical analysis, such as the National Archives and
Records Administration (NARA) and the National Security Strategy (NSS) Archive. The
NSS Archive was the only website that was not government operated as it is a product of
The Taylor Group, a national security consulting firm (National Security Strategy
Archive, 2019, para. 2). Further, USAID’s DEC also maintains extensive historical
documentation for research purposes. The bulk of USAID’s historical policy, strategy,
and evaluative documents were retrieved from the DEC. All current official policies were
taken directly from current agency websites, including their official policy landing pages,
to ensure that the most up-to-date policies and strategies were evaluated. To ensure that
the most current policy documents were analyzed, I cross-checked the update times on
the pages with those of the current and past policy documents. USAID also consistently
updates their policy pages and the policy documents themselves to reflect what sections
were changed and when those policy updates were made.
The documents were easily located and downloaded for review and analysis.
Agency policies and strategies were generally provided on agency landing pages or
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archives, thereby also helping ensure authenticity and credibility. Further, many of the
documents referenced other agency policies and strategy, either directly within the text
narrative of the document or in the reference lists. This facilitated a clearer understanding
of how these documents were interrelated in terms of hierarchical levels of government
guidance and to what degree they were consistent across various organizational levels. Of
note, the importance of these documents referencing other supporting policy
documentation cannot be overstated as it proved to be among the most important
evidential aspects that supported the conclusion of robust P/CVE policy interconnectivity
and coordination.
For the purposes of organization as the data was collected, documents were
classified into categories for later analytical purposes. The categories were defined by the
purpose or policy role of those documents. These document categories include the
following:
•

National policy and strategy (e.g., national security strategies)

•

Assessments conducted by the agency or contracted specialists (e.g., PDEV II
Impact Evaluation)

•

DOS and USAID strategies (e.g., 2010 QDDR)

•

Agency policy support (e.g., material found on USAID’s CVE website)

•

P/CVE Policies (e.g., USAID’s Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism)

The intent of the document classification was to categorize according to the
themes and policy focus of those documents to help maintain organization of hierarchical
levels and organization of policy themes and focus. In other words, national strategies
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categorized together, agency level strategies together, regional strategies together,
supplemental policy implementation guidance together, and so on. This was a preanalytical process to understand the purpose and contributions of each policy document,
which would then help to develop a better understanding of how each of these documents
may help answer the research questions. In short, to determine whether each policy level,
or policy theme, offered something unique to each of the study’s research questions.
Once categorization was done, it was a manageable analytical process to distill the codes
and policy focuses into broader themes and observations, which in turn were used to
answer the research questions.
To further expound upon these identified themes, the first category included the
national policy and strategy, which examined the highest-level policy guidance, often at
the White House level, such as National Security Strategies. These often included such
documents as National Security Strategies or other high-level strategy guidance, some of
which delved into detailed issues such as countering extremism, making it directly
applicable to the study. The second, agency assessments and evaluations, are formal
assessments on programs, such as commissioned impact evaluations by scholars and/or
analytical groups, such as the frequent USAID monitoring and evaluations partner,
Management System International (MSI).
The third, DOS and USAID strategies, included joint strategy and policy between
USAID and the State Department. This category was necessary to be separated from
agency policy, a distinct category for the purposes of this study, as DOS retains foreign
policy agenda-setting authority, which therefore provides specific and conceptual
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guidance to USAID. As such, the DOS has considerable authority over the nature of
USAID’s work as it pertains to P/CVE programs. Further, the DOS has high level budget
authority over much of USAID’s program budget, and thus policy guidance from the
department holds sway over foreign aid. This is of importance as P/CVE programs being
a source of funding. Further, some of the most relevant policy and strategy documents
were joint strategy documents, including such landmark policies as the 2010 and 2015
QDDR, which placed a strong emphasis on P/CVE work by DOS and USAID.
The fourth, agency policy support, included documents that provided
implementation level guidance on how to take broad agency policy and implement it in
the field, or served to expound upon the policy guidance for clarity. The fifth, agency
policies, were the core policy documents by USAID on the topic of P/CVE and/or the
TSCTP. These documents not only included the foundational policy documents, but in
some cases were core addendums to the policy, some of which sometimes predated the
policy themselves. For example, this category includes a key USAID P/CVE guidance
document, the Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism (USAID, 2009), which
predates by over two years USAID’s primary CVE policy, The Development Response to
Violent Extremism and Insurgency (USAID, 2011). As such, in many ways, it was this
pre-policy guidance document that served as a sort of acting policy as the P/CVE policy
process was being established and evolving. There were also other documents that served
similar purposes, such as updating or bridging policy, which were also included in this
category.
Interviews were also conducted as part of data collection in addition to document
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collection and analysis. Eight interviews were conducted based on the previous selection
criteria. The primary purpose was twofold. First, interviews serve as primary data and
provide perception data that cannot be found in the document analysis. As such, the
interviews were an additional analytical component to the study that contributed to the
final observations and answers to the research questions. Secondly, the interviews also
contributed context to the formal policy documents which informed more broadly the
way in which implementation occurred. In short, interviews helped provided the type of
contextual awareness that is generally not included in final policy documents, which are
finished formal products that serve as guides for the agency and its sub-units. Further,
interviewees often understand the history of why those policies were designed in the way
they were, highlighting critical factors that led to policy evolution, policy stasis, policy
alignment and interconnection at different levels. This process is further discussed in the
data analysis section later in this chapter.
Interview recruitment was conducted via email. Each prospective interviewee
was sent a pre-approved Walden University Consent Form. The Consent Form contained
detailed interview information, such as the purpose of the study and why the interviewee
was being recruited for an interview. The Consent Form also provided example questions
so that the interviewee understood the nature of the conversation as well as the ground
rules of the interview. If the prospective interviewee agreed to an interview, then they
responded in the affirmative and consented to an interview.
The interviews were recorded verbatim. There was a total of 17 questions asked to
each interviewee. The interviews lasted between 45 minutes to 1.5 hours. The responses
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were documented into a computer-generated Microsoft Word document. The Word
document was then compiled into a spreadsheet with all interviews. The spreadsheet
assisted in initial analysis to determine the broad cross-cutting concepts that were
discussed. As will be discussed further, all interviews and documents were compiled into
spreadsheets to determine broad themes and repeating topical patterns. Thus, compiling
the interviews into a spreadsheet was the first step in this cross-cutting analysis.
There were no limiting circumstances that were not already identified prior to the
beginning of the study. Those known limiting factors included: 1) that there are relatively
few specialists outside a few key employees within USAID that are fully aware of the
nature of U.S. P/CVE policy evolution; 2) There are relatively few specialists outside of
USAID that are knowledgeable about the linkage between national and agency level
P/CVE policy/strategy and that of the TSCTP and the PDEV (I and II) and related
program policies and implementation. This study was designed to offer new perspectives
on P/CVE, considering that this area has limited empirical research conducted on it, and
therefore very few specialists exists with this specific knowledge. As such, the limited
number of interview candidates was not especially limiting given that this was a known
issue and therefore the study was designed to rest on documentation analysis with
contextual interviews for support and additional leads. Further, data saturation was
obtained rather quickly seeing that the interviewees largely repeated the same themes.
Given these conditions, the limited number of interviewees was not seen as a crucial
limitation for the study, but rather is noteworthy because it is a reflection of how little the
field has been studied at a policy level and how nascent the concept of P/CVE remains
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despite the high level of attention it's enjoyed in recent years.
Data Analysis
The data analysis was conducted in three primary stages: interview analysis,
document analysis, and data triangulation. This methodology offered a sound approach to
ensure that data saturation was reached and that patterns were identified and mutually
reinforcing across the source material, in this case, within both policy documents and
interviews. The overall process was undertaken as illustrated by Figure 2 below.

Figure 2. The Analytical Process.
As an overview, Figure 2 illustrates that the initial phase was data collection,
which was necessary to organize the large volume of collected document data in a
manner which efficiently responded to the research questions. Following this, for both
interviews and documents, coding was completed, then followed by code grouping. Data

122
triangulation of both data sets was then done to establish a broad understanding of the
themes related to the objectives of the study. Triangulation allowed for the comparison of
code groups between the interviews and documents, which then helped identify themes.
Following this, each theme was then assessed as to whether it addressed one of the
research questions. If a theme was deemed sufficient to help address a research question,
it was then developed into a research observation. Each of these respective steps are
addressed in additional detail below.
Interview Analysis
After document categorization and interview transcription was completed, interview
analysis was undertaken. As an overview of the interview data organization, the
documentation for each interview included: 1) A verbatim transcript of each interview; 2)
the name of the interviewee; 3) data and time of the interview; 4) interviewer notes; 5)
analysis of themes; and 6) applicability of respective theoretical lenses. The analysis was
included in 5 and 6 and these two elements were used for aggregated analysis to distill
themes across all interviews. For the process of aggregated analysis, I evaluated the most
salient and recurring themes, for example, those issues that were discussed in several, if
not all, of the interviews. I then analyzed whether any of the identified theoretical lenses
were supported in the content or context of the interview.
Each interview transcript was inputted into ATLAS.ti for coding and analysis. The
interview text was logged into the program and coded using either open codes (i.e., code
terms) or coded in vivo (i.e., using the phrase as the code). This coding process resulted
in 179 different codes being created that were derived from 276 coded words or phrases.
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These 179 codes were then classified thematically into code groups. These code groups
included the following eight code groups:
•

An overreliance on military solutions was not achieving success

•

Changing policies have helped drive P/CVE evolution

•

Confusion and uncertainty on P/CVE remain a challenge

•

Ongoing conflicts have led to P/CVE rapidly evolving

•

P/CVE policy has evolved due to a combination of major and minor events

•

Policy coordination generally occurs at all levels

•

P/CVE has evolved in phases

•

USAID takes policy guidance from internal and external sources

The list of codes was then further analyzed into code groups, which reflected the
broad themes and repeating patterns for further development into observations. These
themes and patterns were then assessed as to the way in which they help answer the
research questions. If the themes and patterns were deemed appropriate in responding to
one of the respective research questions, then the theme(s) were developed into
observations related to a respective research question. The code groups that helped
identify themes are listed below in Table 2.
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Table 2
Interview Code Group Frequencies
Interviewee Code
C
D
E

Code Groups

A

B

F

G

Totals

An overreliance on military solutions was
not achieving success

5

2

3

2

2

1

1

16

Changing policies have helped drive
P/CVE evolution

6

3

4

7

4

3

8

35

Confusion and uncertainty on P/CVE
remain a challenge

10

11

16

15

12

21

17

102

Ongoing conflicts led to P/CVE rapidly
evolving

7

4

9

7

5

2

4

38

P/CVE policy has evolved due to a
combination of major and minor events

6

0

4

0

7

5

2

24

Policy coordination generally occurs at
all levels

0

1

1

1

3

9

0

15

P/CVE has evolved in phases

4

3

8

8

2

3

4

32

USAID Takes policy guidance from
internal and external sources

0

1

3

3

4

3

0

14

Totals

38

25

48

43

39

47

36

276

As the table reflects, discussion involving the challenge of P/CVE confusion and
uncertainty was frequently discussed in terms of the evolution of the policy as well as the
factors that have driven the P/CVE policy evolution. Of note, the interview themes were
like those captured in the document analysis, which will be discussed later in this chapter.
This was not entirely unexpected as the interview questions were designed to respond to
the research questions. However, the interviews uncovered one distinct observation. This
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observation was undergirded by consistent references to confusion about P/CVE polices.
Naturally, formalized policy documents would not reflect a perceived lack of clarity and
certainty regarding the issue the policy it is addressing, and thus triangulation with policy
documents was limited.
Document Analysis
The document analysis process began by aggregating the collected data on a
spreadsheet, organized according to categorization. The document analysis spreadsheet
collected the following: 1) title of the article or policy document; 2) author; 3) publication
date; 4) source; 5) objective; 6) summary; 7) how it relates to the study’s objectives; and,
8) the theoretical lens the article/document may fit within. The final two items reflect the
primary analysis and item 7 is where coded patterns and themes were identified for
aggregated analysis of all documents.
Once the documents were coded and subsequently documented within each
spreadsheet, then the article was assessed to determine if it fit within one of the specified
theoretical lenses, which includes punctuated equilibrium theory, path dependency, or
policy feedback theory. Each paper was then summarized for aggregated analysis of all
documentation.
The aggregated analysis phase consisted of looking across all identified themes,
and then repeating that process for all identified theoretical lenses to determine the most
salient themes and whether there was sufficient support for the theoretical lenses, and if
so, what were the conditions (e.g., nature of the topic, nature of the analysis, and year(s)
of analysis) for each theoretical lenses. Collectively, this information helped shed light on
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whether the theoretical lenses were appropriate. It also helped distill the most salient and
recurring themes relating to the research objectives.
Table 3
Document Code Group Frequencies
Code Groups

National
Policy and
Strategy
2,384

Agency or
Specialist
Assessments
36

DOS and
USAID
Strategy
322

Agency
Policy
Support
11

P/CVE
Policies

Totals

2,169

4,922

Changing policies have helped
drive P/CVE evolution

919

577

2,279

52

919

4,746

Ongoing conflicts of led to
P/CVE rapidly evolving

874

539

388

225

874

2,900

P/CVE policy has evolved due
to a combination of major and
minor events

1,793

116

2,667

297

1,793

7,666

Policy coordination generally
occurs at all levels

1,692

589

2,403

73

2,315

7,072

P/CVE has evolved in phases

3,088

613

2,601

83

3,088

9,473

USAID Takes policy guidance
from internal and external
sources

1,692

589

2,403

73

2,315

7,072

Totals

12,442

4,059

13,063

814

13,473

43,851

An overreliance on military
solutions was not achieving
success

Table 3 illustrates the coding frequencies that assisted in the development of the
code groups and themes. The coding lens applied to the document analysis focused on the
development of coding groups that helped effectively answer the two respective research
questions. Like the interview analysis, codes were made throughout the documents which
focused on the nature of P/CVE policy evolution and agency coordination. The coding
was done in conjunction with contextual analysis as coding captures frequency of phrases
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and key terms but does always capture the overall context of the policy document. The
primary codes used were “defense,” “military,” “diplomacy,” “development,”
“terrorism,” and “extremism.” The rationale behind those codes were that they all directly
informed various aspects of the research questions. For example, when defense and
military concepts are discussed in government P/CVE related policy, it was frequently
discussing the nature of interagency civilian and military coordination, more commonly
known as civ-mil coordination. Those terms were also often part of guidance touching on
the nature of implementation, such as defense or military dominant approaches. The
terms diplomacy and development similarly dealt with passages that provided policy
guidance on civilian interagency coordination and the specific roles and responsibilities
between USAID and DOS as they pertain to P/CVE policy development and
implementation. Finally, because USAID and frequently defense P/CVE policies and
strategies address development tools pertaining to countering violent extremism, and at
times countering terrorism, the terms extremism and terrorism helped to aggregate and
capture the focus on those concepts for each respective policy and strategy document.
These codes and the frequency were then developed into code groups as
illustrated in Figure 3. The most frequently referenced themes reflected the way in which
policy evolved in phases. Second, the documents also frequently referenced coordination
and guidance provided from external (e.g., DOD and DOS) and internal USAID sources.
Further, it should be noted that some document groups contributed more to the code
aggregates due to the lengths of certain documents, as well as the nature and focus on the
document. For example, some documents cover a broad set of issues while other policy
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and guidance documents were dedicated solely to P/CVE and related topics. Naturally,
the longer the document, the more frequently the document may reference coded phrases.
In addition, some documents were keenly focused on P/CVE issues, and therefore
referenced salient points that were coded and weighed heavily in the analysis. Therefore,
while some document groups show fewer coded passages, it does not reflect the degree of
importance over other document groups. For example, while the agency policy support
section shows fewer codes, it is no less important than the other categories. That said,
some of the key documents during this study tended to be derived from two key sections,
including the national policy and strategy documents and the DOS and USAID strategies
documents. These two sections often contained the core national and agency policy
documents which were of major importance to the study.
To offer additional context in the way in which these documents interacted and
were analyzed, there are senior level policy documents that provide overarching guidance
throughout the government. The archetype of that level of policy is the National Security
Strategy, which is produced by the White House. Those high-level policies are for the
most part, meant to filter down to the respective agencies charged with implementing
specific aspects of the NSS guidance. For example, foreign policy guidance would be
further refined and implemented by such agencies as the DOS. DOS would then send
some policy guidance to USAID as well as USAID developing its own policies on
specific issues it is tasked with leading. These policies would then be further refined into
agency level policy and regional level policy. These hierarchical levels are captured in
the document grouping, ranging from the highest levels, such as the National Security
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Strategy, to the mid-level, such as the DOS and USAID strategies, and then very focused
lower level policies, such as P/CVE policies, and then finally to aspects of country and
regional strategies. The way in which this process can be tracked is by identifying
whether policies reference other policies, for example, country strategies citing USAID’s
violent extremism policies and strategies.
In short, policies interact and filter down through and to lower levels of
government. However, greater specificity and policy precision is achieved as polices
filter through the agencies to develop finer points to address specific issues. For example,
for the purposes of this study, the highest level policy are the NSS documents, and those
documents serve to set the overall policy tone for the entire U.S. Government in a variety
of disciplines, ranging from foreign policy to domestic homeland security, and many
other issues. Thus, a large part of the NSS is not relevant to this study, but nevertheless in
part required analysis. This is due to their overall strategic importance of the NSS
documents and because those documents set the tone on issues such as P/CVE. That
focus and tone is important to identify because some NSS documents place a strong focus
on P/CVE while others make no mention of it whatsoever or instead focus on related
policies such as counterterrorism. Understanding the focus is important to understanding
whether a specific presidential administration will concern itself with P/CVE, and
especially so if the administration seeks to make changes to that policy, which is again
the focus of this study.
Looking one level down in government policy there are USAID and DOS
policies, which take guidance from the NSS. At the interagency and agency levels, there
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is more focus on topics relevant to this study, such as a broad strategic focus on
countering violent extremism. Yet, at this level the issues are still addressed broadly and
rarely give specifics and cover a broad range of other issues not relevant to this study.
Looking yet another step down, there are USAID P/CVE related policy documents,
which are some of the most specific P/CVE documents relevant to this study. However,
all three of those levels are still strictly policy and strategy documents. Two other
categories were determined to be relevant to shed light on the policy context, which were
supporting documentation found in agency websites and evaluation documents, which
provides some of the most detailed information on the way in which policies ultimately
are implemented. Therefore, these two categories provide important contextual
information that provided additional background and candid analysis that cannot be
found in final formal policies.
Data Triangulation
Data triangulation served as the final analytical stage. This stage involved the
comparative analysis between the document analysis and the interview analysis. Like the
document and interview analysis, I conducted an aggregated analysis in a separate
spreadsheet that described each salient and recurring theme found in both the interviews
and the documents. This process was designed to address recurring themes across both
mediums. Recurring themes were identified as relevant to the study, but other themes
identified solely in the document analysis were also identified as being relevant to the
objective of the study. This is because the document analysis was far more robust and
detailed than the interviews, primarily a result of a significantly larger data pool to draw
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from than there was for the interviews, which were inherently limited due to the dearth of
non-agency specialists knowledgeable about P/CVE policy evolution and USAID’s
contribution to the TSCTP. In short, a large majority of the useful data was found during
document analysis, which was expected at the outset of the study.
After coded data sets were documented, they were then aggregated into informal
general themes, which were then developed into specific formalized themes if deemed
relevant to responding to the research questions. The process of developing these specific
themes was done by analyzing and amalgamating numerous data points into a more
clearly articulatable observations that were linked to a respective research question. This
approach to coding into observation groups provided an evidence based and
methodological approach to answer the study objectives. This also facilitated the audit
trail approach of research, which allows future researchers to clearly see how the research
was conducted for replication, further research, or critical examination.
Looking at the first research question, higher level policy can take many forms,
such as agency level policy (i.e., USAID strategies, policies, or concept papers), or
national level policies, including White House policies such as National Security
Strategies (NSS) and Presidential Policy Directives (PPD), and Congressional mandates.
The policy authority levels for the purposes of this study derive first from the White
House, then to the DOS, then USAID, then agency buraus and offices, and then the field
missions. Each document documented category was assessed as to whether it supported a
respective observation. These results highlight two phenomena in policy. First, that
different levels of government often provide distinct form of policy guidance. Higher
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level policy is often broad and conceptual, while lower level government policy often
delves more into the minutiae of policy details. Generally, the closer the policy is to the
point of implementation, the more specific and detailed the guidance for implementation
purposes. This is particularly the case as it pertains to a niche field such as P/CVE, which
at the point of implementation can be specific enough to name specific program and
projects, such as those found in USAID’s regional and country strategies, more
commonly known as the RDCS and CDCS respectively.
To further expound on how the P/CVE policies interact with one another, they
tend to filter down from the highest levels of government to the point of implementation,
often beginning as vague and conceptual and then become increasingly specific as they
approach the point of implementation. Nevertheless, as the observations reflect in this
chapter, the tone of the policy is important, and it is discernable at the operational levels
of government. In a general sense, there is a form of trickle-down policy making, starting
from the highest levels of government, and working its way down to the point of
implementation.
In addition to tone, verbiage and definitions are also important. As has been
alluded to several times throughout this study, definitions have been problematic for the
field of P/CVE. This was illustrated in the literature review as scholars have come to the
same conclusion. However, in studying this field it is important to discern the
relationships between similar or predecessor disciplines, such as the differences and
similarities between preventing violent extremism, countering violent extremism,
counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, stabilization, conflict resolution, governance, and
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other fields and sub-disciplines. Suffice it to say that analysis becomes increasingly
unclear when those fields are not clearly defined. This is a challenge for researchers of
P/CVE as often interviewees and implementers can be unclear themselves and provide
their experiences without realizing their talking about different disciplines. Further,
interviewees and practitioners do not always recognize terminological shifts. For
example, if a practitioner worked in the mid-90s on CVE, they may have undertaken
programs that would be defined as CVE today but were termed counterterrorism at the
time. To mitigate this, it is important is to understand the objectives and general
conceptual framework of the program. Otherwise, it is easy to in inadvertently compares
apples to oranges. It was for this reason I sought to understand a little about the programs
the interviewee discussed as examples. This helped ensure that their work was related to
the modern definition of P/CVE, even though an interviewee may describe it in different
terms.
Further, it is equally important to know which parts of government tend to focus
on those respective fields of practice, whether it be USAID, DOD, or DOS. This
awareness is important for agency policy makers because the highest-level policies and
strategies, such as the NSS, do not always specify taskings by agency. This is important
to understand the nature of how P/CVE is changing, as well as how it will be coordinated
within the government. For example, if an Administration’s NSS focus support P/CVE,
then this places a mandate upon one or more agencies to develop the capabilities to
undertake that line of work. This phenomenon is reflected in the Obama-era NSS policies
which provided a policy mandate, and therefore a window of opportunity for P/CVE
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policies to be developed and institutionalized. Three of those key resulting policies
include the 2010 and 2015 QDDRs and USAID’s 2011 The Development Response to
Violent Extremism and Insurgency.
Of note, one document group was found to be unique enough to be explored
beyond the scope of the study to provide a broader understanding of the evolution of
P/CVE. This additional analysis also helps placed the issue of policy evolution into
additional context for further research in the future and to help demonstrate to the reader
the breadth of policy evolution. This document group was the National Security
Strategies and these documents were deemed most important to understand the highest
level of policy emphasis for foreign policy and foreign aid, those were assessed
separately to highlight key areas of emphasis in order to conduct a trend analysis of
themes that put P/CVE into comparative context with other themes. To do this, each NSS
from the first in 1987 to the latest in 2017 was assessed for specific code terms,
including: defense, military, diplomacy, development, extremism, and terrorism.
Evidence of Trustworthiness
As described in Chapter 3, credibility and trustworthiness were ensured by setting
strict criteria for data collection, including for both document collection and interviewee
candidate selection. The criteria for document/article selection was as follows:
•

Agency websites, primarily those of USAID, DOS, U.S. Congress, the White
House, and government archives.

•

Non-Governmental Agencies (NGOs), such as those that address P/CVE.
Additional background explanation will be given when an NGO is referenced,
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including any political agendas the organization may have.
•

Documents provided by interviewees to support a point they discussed during
the interview or to provide additional context.

Likewise, interview candidates were selected methodologically. As described
previously in this study, no current USAID staff were selected for interviews. Former
government employees were considered, and selected, if they were no longer undertaking
work of USAID’s P/CVE contributions. This selection and omission based on established
criteria helped maintain the proper boundaries of the research and thus enhance the
transparency of the study. However, it does place some limitations of the research which
can be elaborated upon in future research, particularly in research conducted by USAID
or by organizations with an established mandated to interview employees within the
agency.
Interviewees were selected with a focus on substantial P/CVE related experience as
well as deep knowledge in the discipline. To provide a glimpse into the depth of
experience and knowledge of the interviewees, those selected for interviews fell into
these categories:
•

Former U.S. ambassadors

•

Scholars and professors who have conducted specialized in-depth research on
or for USAID’s P/CVE work

•

NGO founders and leaders who have directly led and worked on P/CVE
programs independently and/or under contract to USAID

•

Former chiefs of party who have led P/CVE programs in the field.
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The transferability of the study’s results is limited in some regards. For example,
as the case study, the study included the TSCTP which are in West Africa and in an
extraordinarily volatile area that in many areas lacks governance and resources. As such,
the circumstances in other environments around the world stands in stark contrast to
many of the countries included within the TSCTP, particularly PDEV/PDEV II areas of
implementation. Further, CVE and PVE interventions and programs are often specific to
local sources of instability. For example, as part of the TSCTP the design of a PDEV
program in Mali may be quite different than a USAID CVE/PVE program in Eastern
Europe, or anywhere else for that matter. In these cases, local context and other factors
plays an especially important role in the nature of the program design and
implementation.
However, there are some aspects of transferability of the results of the study that
may work well. For example, this study examines the nature of CVE and PVE policy
evolution at a broader agency level. As such, the study relied upon higher level agency
and federal policy and strategy documents to understand how CVE and PVE has changed
over time. This is valuable insight for those understanding what occurred in the past and
what is occurring today as it relates to this field of work. For example, if a policy maker
is developing policy based solely on what was implemented during the period known as
the War on Terror, which followed September 11, 2001, then the observations would be
based on approaches that in many ways does not closely resemble work USAID is
implementing in many parts of the world today. Rather, this study aims to highlight the
fact that there have been major policy and strategy shifts over the past two decades,
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which has created distinctly different implementation approaches to CVE and PVE. The
lessons learned from understanding the differences in how CVE and PVE programs were
affected, and were or were not successful, through a process of policy evolution are
transferable to another related research.
As discussed, dependability was attained through the audit trail approach. The
overall methodology facilitated this approach. The interview and documentary material
were collected, analyzed, and then analytical notes were included in the spreadsheets.
The spreadsheet then allowed for an analysis of multiple sources within a single
spreadsheet facilitating pattern recognition. Patterns were assessed as to which research
question they applied to, if any, which ensured that each observation fit within the scope
of the study. The process helped identify repeating themes that were relevant to the
objectives of the study and that had enough support for further development.
Confirmability was also considered. Triangulation was the primary method used
for confirmability, which was not a deviation from the original plan. The strength of the
observed pattern and/or theme was determined via triangulation of the data to include the
documentation analysis, interview analysis, and relevance of the observed pattern and/or
theme in answering the objectives of the study. If there were clear patterns detected
across the documentation, interviews, and prior scholarly papers, then that was
considered enough for strong confirmability. If there was inconsistent patterning detected
across these sources but was clearly evidence in some of the source material, then it was
deemed that moderate support exists. Modern support required further analysis, such as
weighing the credibility of the source and the how strong the pattern existed within one
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or two of the sources, such as within documentation, interviews, or prior scholarly
research. If there was no clear pattern recognition, such as a sole interviewee, sole
document, or sole scholarly paper, then the respective issue was deemed to have too little
support for inclusion. This is not to say that unique issues with no pattern support are not
important, but deeper research would have been required for confirmability, and some of
those issues were deemed outside the scope of this study and therefore excluded from the
observations. As such, it was primarily patterns and relevance to the study objectives that
were weighed heaviest for inclusion in the findings.
Results
This study explored two research questions. The first question examined the
nature of regional policy being implemented in alignment, such as via coordination or
with communicated guidance, with higher level P/CVE foreign assistance policy. The
second research question examined what factors, if any, have led to changes or evolution
in P/CVE TSCTP regional policy, as well as to the broader USAID P/CVE foreign
assistance policy.
RQ 1: Has regional policy, as reflected in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism
Partnership, been implemented in alignment with USAID’s P/CVE foreign
assistance policy?
This first research question explores the issue of whether regional policy, as
reflected in the TSCTP, has been implemented in alignment with USAID’s P/CVE
foreign assistance policy. This research question appears straight forward, however,
government agencies are complex entities with numerous forces affecting policy
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development and the nature of implementation. Such forces include the shifting political
winds of policy making, political ideologies of senior political leaders, past experiences
of senior agency leaders, competing interests with international and foreign
organizations, international partners’ preferences, and host nation culture and politics, to
name a few. While on the face this question might be answered with a simple yes or no,
in practice the nuances of implementing policy do not allow for simple answers. This
question exposes countless opportunities for further research which will be discussed in
chapter 5. However, the simple answer to this question is that there is indeed substantial
evidence that regional TSCTP policy is being implemented in alignment with broader
foreign assistance P/CVE policy. In the following pages, I will illustrate this policy
alignment from the central government and agency level down to the point of
implementation.
For this study, I chose to look at the TSCTP P/CVE program due to its longevity
and the fact that it presents clear evidence of policy, conceptual, and ideological
evolution over the past two decades. And while there are numerous other regions and
P/CVE programs that can and should also be explored, for this study it was determined
that the TSCTP program presents the most plentiful and accessible evidence that can be
obtained to understand evolution and coordination of P/CVE policy. As such, in the
following paragraphs, I will present the most consistent observations across interviews,
agency and third-party analysis and published papers, as well as policy documentation.
To begin, I reiterate the answer to the first objective, whether P/CVE related
policy is coordinated between the agency level and the implementation level, using the
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case study of the TSCTP. The answer is yes, there is significant documentary and
testimonial evidence that regional policy has been coordinated with higher policy and
strategy. Over the course of several years, there have been numerous policy documents,
policy guides, and various coordination efforts to establish an alignment within USAID’s
P/CVE foreign assistance policy, from the agency level to the implementation of
USAID’s contribution to the interagency TSCTP. This documentation also provided a
relatively robust audit trail to gain insight into how that coordination evolved over years
as the policy and the programs changed.
Theme 1: In terms of P/CVE policy and strategy, USAID takes significant guidance
from external and internal processes, and these processes ensure policy coordination
within the agency down to the point of implementation.
Interviewees offered varying perspectives on the nature of USAID and DOS
coordination. Overall, coordination between these two agencies was rarely pointed out as
being problematic or lacking in recent years, although evolution of that coordination was
evident. Interviewees pointed out that the most important policy guidance that gave
policy traction to P/CVE was that of a joint DOS-USAID policy document, the 2010
QDDR (Interviewee C, March 2019; Interviewee G, April 2019). One interviewee, a
well-published P/CVE scholar, pointed out that the important of the 2010 QDDR cannot
be overemphasized in terms of its early importance for joint coordination and guidance
for USAID’s P/CVE efforts stating, “Those two internal documents, the QDDR and the
USAID VEI strategy, are the most important. Without those two there is nothing to begin
with. Beyond those two documents, there has not been much else. (Interviewee G, April
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2019). Another interviewee, an experience P/CVE implementer, supported that
conclusion stating, “I would say at that time, the QDDR was important. It entrenched the
idea of whole of national security” (Interviewee C, March 2019). These two interviewees
discuss the important point that there are key policies that mandate P/CVE related
interagency coordination, but in doing so also reveal that this coordination is relatively
emergent in that it has been formally supported in USAID and DOS policy for
approximately a decade.
In addition, several other interviewees pointed out that policy coordination at the
higher levels was occurring. In fact, no interviewees identified this aspect of P/CVE as
problematic. Rather, they clearly felt that DOS and USAID were clearly coordinated at
the policy level. Yet most were not familiar enough with the policies to recall them by
name. Rather, there was broader conceptual references to policy coordination.
Some argued that while coordination at the high level was occurring, the
challenges existed elsewhere in the process, such as a weak understanding of root causes
of violence, a lack of interest in data, risk aversion, and a lack of political will. As one
interviewee stated, “I think there is alignment in the stated policy goals for CVE policy
efforts in the region. I think we had all the right ingredients but not the right political will
to implement” (Interviewee A, April 2019). Yet another interviewee undertook an
examination of this precise phenomenon and concluded that coordination was occurring.
He stated, “I think there was alignment. Especially when I was doing the evaluative study
of the TSCTP. I went in to talk to seven different embassies and there was good
alignment between those. There were varying degrees of understanding, but it was
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generally aligned” (Interviewee C, April 2019). Thus, while interviewees concluded that
coordination was occurring, at least at the higher agency levels, they frequently discussed
other challenges beyond the high-level policy coordination between USAID and DOS,
such as the quality and capability in implementation.
However, equally important to the interviewees’ perspectives on present P/CVE
coordination on policies shared between USAID and DOS, was the discussion of the lack
of coordination prior to such policies as the QDDR and other joint strategies. The notion
that policy was not being coordinated until recent years reflected a need to better
understand the nature of policy coordination between DOS and USAID. According to
one interviewee, the longest serving official amongst the interviewees, such coordination
that exists today did not exist as recently as the mid-2000s. Further, there was much more
siloed thinking within the key agencies that undertake P/CVE work overseas. The
interviewee provided his reflections as a diplomat and scholar working on the TSCTP
region during that period, stating:
My impression was that there was not much coordination then. Everyone was
doing their own thing. With AFRICOM, there was better amalgamation, but DOD
had all the money and the civilians did not have much in terms of CVE. Not sure
that has changed. The military had the money and so much of this was being done
by the military, but there were pseudo development projects that DOD was not
suited for. But USAID had better expertise and follow up ability to ensure
sustainability. So, implementation was problematic. DOD was kinetic too and was
not focused on the development aspects. (Interviewee B, April 2019)
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In examining this statement, it shows that prior to the emergence of joint strategies and
coordinated policy, agencies tended to do their own things with less regard to interagency
coordination and sustainability. Thus, the implementation of the QDDR and joint
strategies was a distinct break from those past practices of siloed thinking and noncoordinated policy. This reflects an important aspect of policy evolution moving
significantly toward favoring interagency approaches.
However, while the interviews demonstrated that there was clear break from prior
approaches that lacked coordination, the interviewees’ explanations and recollections
lacked a comprehensive and detailed explanation of how and why that occurred. That is
largely because few diplomats, development officials, and defense professionals examine
P/CVE purely from a policy and strategy perspective, from the agency levels down to the
point of implementation. Also, this evolution occurred over a span of many years, and
without a specific study on the manner in which these policies evolved, it would be
nearly impossible for an individual to be able to capture the necessary level of detail to
understand and explain exactly how this evolution occurred. Therefore, to capture the
necessary information for robust analysis requires going to the original source material,
the policies, and strategies themselves.
USAID is an independent executive agency, but it is not a Cabinet-level agency
like the DOS. This is particularly important in the case of USAID, as foreign aid is a
subset of foreign policy, which is guided by DOS. USAID is led by an administrator, not
a cabinet secretary as in the case of the DOS, and the administrator’s authorities are
delegated by the U.S. Secretary of State (USAID, ADS 101, p. 5). As such, the Secretary

144
of State, and thus the DOS, maintains considerable influence over USAID programs,
through such mechanisms as funding oversight and policy agenda setting, as stated in the
delegation of authorities from the Secretary of State to the Administrator (NARA, 2007,
p.1). This is also particularly relevant in the case of P/CVE, as both USAID and DOS
have considerable P/CVE roles. The DOS maintains a Bureau of Counterterrorism and
Countering Violent Extremism, which has been reformed several times since 1972 (DOS,
2019), including the CVE component as recently as 2016 (Foreign Policy, 2016). Given
this, it is a policy agenda item that has been at the forefront of both USAID and DOS, and
thus requiring extensive coordination for implementation and continuing reforms.
Further, all executive agencies take overall direction from the President of the
United States, from such documents and processes as the National Security Strategy
(NSS), which presents and emphasizes the most important national security topics
according to the administration. These NSS policy issues are important for the agencies
to understand as those are likely to be the areas that will be, or have already been,
focused on and resourced, and will continue to be so in the immediate future. Further, it
is often the case that agency leadership has been advocating within the interagency and to
the president for those topics to be included in the NSS, and therefore work is often
already ongoing in those policy areas. (CSIS, 2017, p. 11). For example, both QDDR
documents in 2010 and 2015 respectively, were heavily focused on P/CVE related topics
and a result of DOS-USAID coordination, and were thus critical documents submitted to
the National Security Council (NSC) for NSS coordination (CSIS, 2017, p. 167). Of
additional note, this is a relevant example in the way in which policy feedback has had
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affects within the P/CVE policy coordination and evolution, a topic that will be further
explored in the next chapter.
The NSS provides guidance on both foreign and domestic policy. It is among the
most important foreign policy guidance documents within the U.S. government and thus
provides important direct foreign policy guidance to the lead foreign affairs agency for
the U.S., the DOS. Because the department is the lead foreign affairs agency, much of
USAID’s foreign aid policy focus is coordinated with and even guided by the DOS. This
coordination is reflected within USAID’s policy framework, explaining the leadership
lines of authority as, “Taking its direction from the United States’ National Security
Strategy (NSS) and the DOS and USAID Joint Strategic Plan (JSP), the Policy
Framework translates the goals outlined in the NSS and JSP specifically for USAID”
(USAID, 2019, p. 6). As such, there is a built-in system of policy control and
coordination at the agency level between the DOS and USAID and originating with the
White House’s NSS.
Given the overall importance of the NSS, understanding the level of attention that
is placed on P/CVE helps shed light on the nature of policy emphasis the White House
and the NSC place on an issue. The NSS documents were the first set of policies
analyzed, ranging from the first being Ronald Reagan’s 1987 NSS to the most recent
being Donald Trump’s 2017 NSS. And while the pre-9/11 NSS documents were outside
the core scope of this study, it was important to gain a broad understanding of how
P/CVE and its predecessor concepts evolved. As will be discussed further in this study,
the NSS documents generally focused on similar foreign policy related concepts over
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time but shifted focus at times according to global challenges and policy trends, P/CVE
policy being one of those trends.
Each NSS offered somewhat differing guidance and emphasis from previous NSS
documents. However, not every NSS was always materially dissimilar. Some
administrations tended to build upon themselves from prior years, particularly absent
punctuating events, just as some administrations opted to not issue many NSSs until they
felt the need for an update. But every administration issued them, without exception, and
thus made it possible to understand how each administration perceived how countering
extremism, and its related policy concepts, fit within the broader policy framework. It
also reflected how each administration understood those issues and, in some cases,
ignored them. Quantifying these concepts helped provide insight to better understand
how the topic of countering extremism compared to other dominant topics such as the
military, defense, diplomacy, and terrorism. Thus, it reflects that while P/CVE is a
relevant policy topic today, it remains relatively small and emergent.
For the purposes of this study, and particularly in relation to the first two themes,
the NSS offered important data relevant to understanding the nature of policy
coordination. After all, the NSS is the senior most foreign policy document in the United
States, and all other agencies’ strategies and policies should take guidance from the
current NSS. In this sense, government policy is intrinsically hierarchical.
The NSS documents highlighted punctuated periods of extreme policy change,
often leading to wholistic policy reorientation, such as the fall of the Soviet Union and
the attacks on September 11, 2001. It also reflects policy topics that have remained
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dominant over the past 30 years. In this respect, it highlights periods of path dependency
when viewed through that theoretical lens. The NSS documents reflected periods of
policy uncertainty and radical redirection to attempt to deal with periods of domestic and
international shock and change. And in this case, it helps offer explanations when viewed
through the lens of punctuated equilibrium. As we will explore, P/CVE policies were
equally affected by these punctuated changes and burst onto the scene in 2010 and 2015
and remain a relevant albeit less dominant policy topic today.
In addition to the NSS, there have been other important White House generated
policies that affected USAID’s focus on P/CVE. Even more central to P/CVE was the
Obama administration’s direct focus on CVE, President Obama spoke about CVE in
several international forums, including in a UN General Assembly speech in 2014, where
he called for greater focus to identify and mitigate the underlying grievances that feed
into violent extremism and advocated for specific tools such as religious leader
engagement, improving civil society in troubled regions, and youth engagement (The
White House, 2015). He also directly contributed to CVE related objectives, with the
June 2009 speech in Cairo titled, “A New Beginning,” which advocated for interfaith
dialogue, democracy and improved governance, and other P/CVE related themes often
attributed to grievances that lead to radical extremism (The White House, 2009). To
illustrate how such policy and direct White House engagement leads to USAID P/CVE
policy and implementation, the agency implemented programs in concert with this
speech, organizing a “Regional Conference on The Role of Religious Leaders in
Advancing Development in Asia,” which brought together over 70 religious leaders
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around the region to discuss interfaith understanding (The White House, 2009).
Prior to these P/CVE related policy speeches in Cairo and the UNGA, some of the
earliest modern P/CVE related thinking was defined by President Obama in the
Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-6. This document gave explicit importance to the role
of development in contributing to national security objectives. Thus, PPD-6 served to
mobilize and link development resources with national security. PPD-6 also demonstrates
policy coordination by referencing the NSS, stating:
Through an aggressive and affirmative development agenda and commensurate
resources, we can strengthen the regional partners we need to help us stop
conflicts and counter global criminal networks; build a stable, inclusive global
economy with new sources of prosperity; advance democracy and human rights;
and ultimately position ourselves to better address key global challenges by
growing the ranks of prosperous, capable, and democratic states that can be our
partners in the decades ahead (White House, 2010, p. 4).
While PPD-6 never explicitly provided guidance on P/CVE, it spoke frequently on issues
directly attributed to root causes of violent extremism, such as working to help countries
emerge from poor governance and instability, as well as to disrupt global criminal
networks and emerge from post-conflict challenges (White House, 2010, p. 4). Further,
the PPD-6 was used as another key referenced policy document for DOS-USAID policy
coordination, such as in the 2010 QDDR, which will be discussed below.
Also taking guidance from the NSS are other key policy documents within the
DOS and jointly with USAID. Among the two most important documents include the

149
2010 and 2015 QDDR and the DOS-USAID Joint Strategic Plan (JSP). Looking first at
the 2010 and 2015 QDDR documents, we see some of the first and most significant
elements of policy coordination taking place as it pertains to P/CVE, and DOS-USAID
strategy in general. The 2010 QDDR lays out policy coordination requirements between
USAID and DOS, which also mentions and fulfills congressionally mandated federal
compliance within the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010, which requires federal goals to
be aligned with the agencies’ Strategic Plan and Annual Performance Plan (U.S.
Department of State, 2011, para. 1). In serving this coordination function, it serves not
only as the first QDDR, which is a broad strategic DOS-USAID review, but also
simultaneously functions as the first DOS-USAID Joint Strategic Plan (U.S. Department
of State, 2011, para. 4). These documents serve as some of the most important P/CVE
related policy coordination, but also look well beyond P/CVE specifically.
P/CVE issues only get explicitly mentioned in the 2010 QDDR 13 times.
However, it is not as much about how often it is mentioned, but rather the philosophical
shift in thinking that the 2010 QDDR represents. This shift in thinking is the result of
long growing interest in orienting non-military responsibilities in unstable regions,
including in counterinsurgency and stabilization operations, away from an abundant
reliance on the armed forces and toward USAID and DOS personnel and tools. This
approach is emphasized in the 2010 QDDR stating,
Civilian power is the combined force of civilian personnel across all federal
agencies advancing America’s core interests in the world. Leading through
civilian power is required by the nature of the problems we face in the 21st

150
century. Even the world’s finest military cannot defeat a virus, stop climate
change, prevent the spread of violent extremism, or make peace in the Middle
East. (U.S. Department of State, 2010, pg. 1)
The 2010 QDDR also does three other important things as it pertains to PCVE.
First, the QDDR begins by making a key point of focus on P/CVE issues, discussing it
first in its list of most urgent threats requiring diplomatic and development attention,
stating the Department and USAID will focus on “…violent extremism, nuclear
proliferation, climate change, and economic shocks that could set back global prosperity”
(U.S. Department of State, 2010, p. iii). Doing so places P/CVE right at the center of the
discussion for USAID’s and DOS’s strategies, and thus reinforces the need for resource
support for those endeavors. Secondly, it brings into existence a new P/CVE policy
coordinating entity at DOS and discusses another at USAID, both of which focus on CVE
and counterterrorism, which is Department’s Bureau for Counterterrorism (which was
later changed to counterterrorism and countering violent extremism), and USAID’s work
under the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA),
including the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), and the Office of Conflict,
Management, and Mitigation. (CMM) (DOS, 2010, p. 132). Finally, making clear the
intent to use strategic communications as a significant tool in CVE, the document
introduces the interagency focused, Center for Strategic Counterterrorism
Communications, meant to “coordinate, orient, and inform whole-of-government
communications activities targeted against violent extremism to audiences abroad” (DOS,
2010, p. 62). Given these changes, the 2010 introduced important coordination
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mechanisms, as well as advanced P/CVE into policy and strategy. In addition, some of
these organizations, tools, and concepts were developed further in the 2015 QDDR and
the current DOS-USAID JSP, which will be further expounded upon below.
The 2015 QDDR served the same overall function of the 2010 QDDR but
advanced the effort of broadening the conceptual understanding of issues and practices
relevant to modern P/CVE in the interagency. By 2015, USAID had its own CVE policies
and guides in place, which evolved from the policy frontier-pushing 2009 Guide to the
Drivers of Violent Extremism (USAID, 2009) and the 2009 Development Assistance and
Counter-Extremism: Guide to Programming (USAID, 2009). While these 2009
documents introduced important concepts and methodologies, they were developed to
initiate the broader conversation to advance what is known about CVE (USAID, 2009, p.
iii) and to offer methodological approaches to understand the environmental context and
how to use existing development tools to design CVE programs (USAID, 2009, p. i).
These guides appear to have succeeded in generating greater interest in USAID’s role in
countering extremism, as it was soon followed by other higher-level policies that
advanced DOS’s and USAID’s role and focus on P/CVE related tasks, including the
DOS’s QDDR, The White House’s PPD-6, and USAID’s The Development Response to
the Drivers of Violent Extremism and Insurgency (USAID, 2011). Thus, this strongly
suggests USAID’s leading efforts in interagency P/CVE policy and strategy coordination.
The nature of how these policies influence other subsequent policies at differing
levels lends additional value for using policy feedback theory for explanatory purposes to
understand how P/CVE policy linkage and coordination has occurred. USAID’s
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Development Response to the Drivers of Violent Extremism and Insurgency not only
solidified USAID’s role with the issuance of a formal P/CVE policy, but it also moved
forward the understanding of how development tools can be harnessed to counter violent
extremism. Up to that point, the use of non-lethal development tools to counter violent
extremism had long been theorized within the academic community, and relatively well
understood within the broader development community, but was rarely explicitly found
in formal development policy.
The documented policy was also an important step forward for coordination
purposes. As reflected in the literature review, USAID, and its predecessor agencies, have
long used various development tools to counter extremism in its various forms and as
such the concept is nothing new. Yet, little of that work was consolidated into a formal
policy to develop a common understanding within the agency and that could be shared
with other government agencies tasked with working in and on CVE challenges. Such
policies, even during the nascent years of USAID’s P/CVE policy development, helped
create a shared understanding of USAID’s capabilities, and thereby seemingly generated
increased enthusiasm in non-military P/CVE approaches, as evidenced by President
Obama’s foreign policy agenda and subsequent DOS-USAID joint policies.
The DOS-USAID JSP takes its lead from the National Security Strategy and
serves as the “guiding document for the development of all bureau and mission strategic
plans for FY 2018-2022” (Dept. of State & USAID, 2018, p. 16). As such, this document
simultaneously takes direction from higher level strategies, such as the NSS, while also
guiding lower level strategies, such as the DOS’s Integrated Country Strategy (ICS),
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USAID’s Regional Development Cooperation Strategy (RDCS) at regional missions,
USAID’s Country Development Cooperation Strategies (CDCS) for individual bi-lateral
countries in which USAID works, and bureau level strategies in DOS and USAID (U.S.
Department of State, 2019, para. 2). The JSP’s primary objective, which is to ensure
coordinated policy and strategy through the JSP process, is highlighted in the Foreign
Affairs Manual, stating that “Robust, coordinated strategic planning processes are
essential to make informed decisions; develop innovative ways to cope with tight
budgets; prioritize resources; ensure alignment with key policies and improve the way we
do business” (DOS, 2019, para. 1). The 2010 QDDR, which laid out these policy
coordination requirements also served as the first JSP, simultaneously creating, while
also implementing this policy of strategy coordination within DOS and USAID, ensuring
policy coordination and compliance (DOS, 2019). The 2015 QDDR, served as the next
iteration of the JSP and further progressed P/CVE concepts while also solidifying this
policy coordination approach.
The 2015 QDDR was followed by the 2018-2020 JSP. However, the 2015 QDDR
is particularly noteworthy in that its focus on P/CVE helped facilitate the first DOSUSAID joint strategy on CVE, which emerged in 2016, titled the DOS & USAID Joint
Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism (U.S. Department of State & USAID, 2016).
This joint strategy placed a direct focus on P/CVE policy coordination between the
primary foreign affairs agency, the DOS, and the primary foreign aid agency, USAID.
Reflecting the extensive policy coordination between DOS and USAID in the
field of P/CVE, the DOS & USAID Joint Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism is a
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product of multiple policy documents that are referenced throughout the document. The
policy and strategy documents in which this P/CVE strategy derives from includes an
array of documents. These include USAID’s 2010 The Development Response to Violent
Extremism and Insurgency, The White House’s 2011 U.S. National Strategy on
Counterterrorism, President Obama’s 2014 UN General Assembly CVE speech, the
White House’s 2015 National Security Strategy, the 2015 White House Summit on
Violent Extremism, several more focused regional CVE summits, and the 2015 QDDR
(U.S. Department of State & USAID, 2016). By referencing so many P/CVE policies and
strategies over a range of years, it helped coalesce, summarize, and bring up to date
previous documentation.
This attempt at summarizing such an array of key policy documents is ambitious
in that it used twelve pages to discuss a very wide range of issues covered in several
robust policy and strategy documents, topics ranging from defining CVE, shared
governance and stabilization end-states, the five strategic objectives, the approaches and
methods to achieving these objectives, prioritization criteria, the need to measure results
and effects, and finally the importance of sound implementation. Further, while less
materially substantive, it sought to do this in as few of pages as possible, breaking from
the often lengthy hundred-plus page policy documents, thus helping ensure readability in
understaffed and overworked agencies. While it provided nothing materially new, this
consolidation of focus makes this document important to a coordinated approach.
However, as we will explore, this is the last substantive document that follows this
integrated DOS-USAID P/CVE approach, as the new Trump administration brought in a
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different posture and ideology toward the use of P/CVE as a foreign policy tool.
Despite the strong emphasis since roughly 2009 on foreign aid as a tool for
P/CVE, the future trajectory of P/CVE and level of interagency coordination is less
certain due to recent broader policy shifts that in part affect P/CVE policy and resource
levels. The latest iteration of the NSS has in some ways reoriented foreign policy toward
a stronger reliance upon the hard power defense tools and resources and a greater focus
on disengaging with regions that are experiencing violent extremism. To expound, the
“America First” policy is frequently referenced as the foreign policy approach in the
2017 NSS, and focuses on defense buildups, cybersecurity capability, American
prosperity, “peace through strength,” and relatively vague references to American
influence (White House, 2017, p. 4). As such, with the new administration beginning in
early 2017, there has been a notable shift in the P/CVE policy approach, reflecting a
decreased interest in using foreign aid for P/CVE. Yet, this is not to say the new
administration’s policy is entirely devoid of P/CVE interests, as the 2017 NSS reinforces
general approaches that could be used toward solving specific P/CVE challenges, such as
anticorruption interventions in poorly governed regions and private-sector-led
engagement in poverty affected regions (White House, 2017). However, due to the lack
of publicly available documents as to what that means for P/CVE policy changes and
resource levels, it is unclear beyond those statements the specific nature of how that
policy will be implemented in USAID.
What can be understood from the 2017 NSS is that the focus is a more limited set
of intervention options. Private sector led development may prove uniquely challenging
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to implement. As acknowledged by the World Bank, private-sector-led engagement is
uniquely challenging as a P/CVE tool as adversely affected regions introduce higher than
average risks for private sector led implementation and sustainability due to such
challenges as capital and human resource flight, often referred to as brain drain (World
Bank, 2011). Nevertheless, anticorruption interventions are among the most widely
referenced tools for P/CVE, albeit not as a panacea due to the differing push or pull
factors contributing to violent extremism in a respective region. In short, while both
approaches have acknowledged merit in certain circumstances relative to the drivers of
violent extremism, neither are a panacea. Also, while the 2017 places far less emphasis
on foreign aid, it does not mandate the cessation of P/CVE tools and programs. This may
come down to funding and therefore if Congress provides the funding. As has long been
the case with development program funds around the world, should P/CVE related
earmarks on program funds continue, then P/CVE may continue steadily as it has over
the past decade or so. While the White House’s interest in P/CVE, and the Congress’s
interest in funding it, has little bearing on the immediate quality of policy development
and intervention, as those are tasks at the DOS and USAID level, it will affect the policy
viability of P/CVE in the future.
The White House’s 2018 Counterterrorism Strategy derives from the 2017 NSS
and reinforces many of the same points, such as the “America First” doctrine. It aims to
go into greater detail regarding how the administration wishes to employ development
and diplomacy to prevent and counter violent extremism. Like previous policies, it
promotes the use of strategic communications, bilateral and multilateral diplomatic
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engagement, burden sharing, information sharing, private-sector-led development, and a
focus on developing local solutions to identify and mitigate grievances that extremists
exploit (White House, 2018). While all those tools are advocated by many P/CVE
experts, albeit not universally, the historic existence of those concepts are reflected in the
literature review of this study. Further, those approaches have long been employed in
P/CVE interventions in some regions by DOS and USAID and thus are not novel
approaches to the field of P/CVE. However, as noted in the interviews, those approaches
are not always suitable to all environments, especially private sector led approaches in
deeply unstable regions. Given this, in contrast to the NSS, it demonstrates an interest in
maintaining soft power tools to fight counterterrorism. This is yet further reflected in the
NSS chart analysis in that extremism and development are still topics of relative
importance. As we have seen, the differences with previous administrations may come
down to terminological differences as much as ideological policy differences. In short,
there is no clear evidence that P/CVE will dissipate due to recent changes in
administration.
While the documentation reflects a well-coordinated approach over many years to
P/CVE policy making, foreign aid is not implemented in Washington, and thus an
analysis must be made between as to how the level of coordination between Washington
policy making and the implementation in the field. For the purposes of this study, the
case study for analysis is the TSCTP, which USAID has primarily contributed to via the
Peace Through Development (PDEV) program iterations (i.e., PDEV and PDEV II). It is
noteworthy that the documentation reflects that policy interlinkages from Washington
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(White House, DOS, and USAID policies) to the field is done through a similar
relationship with various levels of collaboration between DOS, USAID, DOD, and
several USAID missions throughout the West Africa region. Many of these USAID
missions also have their own P/CVE programs independent of the regional mission, as
does the Office of Transition Initiatives, an independent office (USAID, 2016). These
independent P/CVE programs operate in TSCTP countries to include Niger, Mauritania,
and Mali, which in some cases are shared development spaces with the USAID/West
Africa regional mission programs (USAID, 2016). To coordinate these many efforts,
USAID holds frequent coordination meetings under the guidance of a specialized CVE
office, which is appropriately named The CVE Unit (USAID, 2016). The CVE Unit is
located in USAID/West Africa’s Regional Peace and Governance Office in Accra,
Ghana, and is comprised of six USAID technical officials, one U.S. Special Forces
officer, an OTI Senior Regional Specialist, and a USAID technical specialist located in
Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, and even including a non-TSCTP country,
Cameroon (USAID, 2016). The CVE Unit has the mandate to “think regionally; promote
interagency, intra-USAID collaboration; and be a focal point for coordination, learning,
planning and management of USAID CVE programming in West Africa” (USAID, 2016,
p. 6). In short, regional P/CVE coordination and communication is the CVE unit’s
primary objective.
The regional responsibility of USAID’s contribution to TSCTP falls to the
USAID/West Africa regional mission. While recently concluded, USAID’s primary
regional TSCTP related programs was its Peace Through Development, launched in 2009
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to better coordinate USAID’s CVE related programs and to address cross-border
challenges through a regional platform (USAID, 2016). When PDEV launched in 2009, it
focused on only two countries, Chad and Niger, for the initial three-year program
(USAID, 2016). However, seeing PDEV as a success, it then expanded to include
Burkina Faso in 2011 with the launch of PDEV II, another five-year program, and
thereafter also included Cameroon (USAID, 2016). The program concluded in 2016,
having spent approximately $61 million over its five-year life (IRD, 2016). However,
PDEV II has since been replaced by numerous other programs currently underway,
including such multi-country regional programs as Partnerships for Peace (P4P), Peace
Through Evaluation Learning and Adapting (PELA), Conflict Early Warning and
Response, Mitigating Election Violence Through National Early Warning Systems
(NEWS), Reacting to Early Warning and Response Data (REWARD) (USAID, 2019).
Due to those programs recently launching, and their sensitivities, little public
documentation is available, and thus no further analysis on those programs can be
offered.
Yet, USAID/West Africa has a dedicated group committed to P/CVE
coordination and that serves as an extraordinary feature that goes beyond ordinary
practices, but such practices should ostensibly help the mission to fully meet USAID
policy requirements for coordination. To expound, the Country Development
Cooperation Strategies (CDCS) and the Regional Development Cooperation Strategies
(RDCS) are mandated by USAID, which can be found in ADS Chapter 201, Program
Cycle Operations Policy. It states“ A CDCS defines a Mission’s goal and objectives for
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an agreed-upon period of time, based on a given level of resources, and supports DOSUSAID Joint Regional Strategies, Integrated Country Strategies (ICSs) and the DOSUSAID Joint Strategic Plan” (USAID, 2019, p. 13). Being that USAID’s West Africa
mission is regional, it uses the RDCS framework for the 21 countries it works within
(USAID, Regional Development Cooperation Strategy, p. 2), Thus, it can be surmised
that The CVE Unit contributes to P/CVE regional policy coordination as well as regional
P/CVE programming, just as OTI contributes to the USAID/Mali CDCS on P/CVE
related issues (USAID, 2015).
Looking beyond country and regional strategies, and close to the point of
implementation, it becomes a study of bureaucratic contracting management and
oversight processes, most of which is beyond the scope of this study due to the required
level of detail and unrelated technical contracting processes outside of the technical
aspects of P/CVE programs. In short, it becomes more about procurement, program
design, oversight and management, all of which are governed by unique technical policy
manuals rather than by P/CVE policy. The actual programs are also typically
implemented by an “implementing partner” (e.g., a non-governmental organization) who
follows the guidance written in the grant or contract. Such implementation is broadly
overseen by a Contracting Officer (CO) or Agreement Officer (AO), but more intimately
managed in the field by their designated Agreement Officer’s Representative (AOR) or
Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR).
For the purposes of this study, it is enough to summarize the responsibilities of
the COR/AOR as technical liaison between the CO/AO and the implementer, and of
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paramount importance, to ensure the implementer is achieving the grant’s or contract’s
intended purpose (USAID, 2019). Such management processes are set forth in policy
found int ADS Chapter 300 Functional Series, to ensure the awards and the appropriate
guiding policies are being implemented as designed (USAID, 2019). Thus, the
implementing partners implement programs that should at that point be clearly linked to
policy. The previous paragraphs established that the policy flows from the highest levels
down to the country and regional missions. From the missions, implementation is carried
out and therefore it can be reasonably concluded that the P/CVE awards are coordinated
with higher level policy and strategy.
In summary, there are multiple levels of policy coordination and interlinkages
from the White House down to the point of implementation. There are the highest-level
policies and strategies, including the NSS, which are issued every few years, to joint
DOS-USAID policy and strategy, to USAID agency level strategy, to regional and
country level strategy and policy. At the point of implementation, a relationship based in
management and oversight between USAID and the implementer is established through
extensive policy and regulation. Given this extensive documentation trail that reflects a
significant focus on policy and strategy coordination, it can be concluded that P/CVE
policy coordination occurs at throughout all levels. Yet, it is important to point out that
this is not a conclusion that P/CVE policy is being developed and implemented
appropriately or even effectively, as that is beyond the scope of this study, but only to
conclude that P/CVE policy and strategy is reasonably well coordinated from the highest
levels of government, down to the point where it is implemented in the target region.
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Theme 2: Shifting policies have reflected coordinated periods of policy change, from
high-level national P/CVE policies and strategies to the regional P/CVE strategies.
As such, the policy documents reflect distinct P/CVE policy phases.
In this theme, I discuss P/CVE policy coordination and some of the ways in which
the policies connect, as well as some of the characteristics of these connections. To begin,
there has long been an interest in the importance of policy coordination. As Hudson,
Hunter, and Peckham argued, poor policy coordination can undermine the best of
intentions if such coordination fails to be inclusive, and if enough common ground is not
sufficiently established (2010). P/CVE is no exception and the policy coordination
processes suggest that awareness of this principle is necessary.
The interviews, literature, and policy documentation reflected considerable policy
coordination over time. And while the fact that the coordination is occurring is important,
this study does not yield an opinion regarding the quality of that coordination as it is
beyond the scope of the study. However, this theme reflects the notion that coordination
has occurred, and that the nature of the coordination can be discernible through a clear
recollection by interviewees as well as a robust policy documentation trail. Further, these
changes can be classified into various phases over time, which help reveal the level of
importance each administration placed on P/CVE policy in relation to other competing
policy agenda issues.
During the interview phase, it became clear that distinct P/CVE policy and
strategy phases were being identified by interviewees. When the interviewees were
discussing P/CVE at the higher levels of governmental policy making, they often
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referenced specific administrations and how they maintained specific interests, and how
they perceived those interests shifting from one administration to another. This was
particularly salient in discussing the way in which the current administration viewed
P/CVE in contrast to those of previous administrations. However, in other cases,
interviewees discussed similarities between administrations, including administrations
from decades prior to current policy and practice.
As will be discussed in specific detail, these P/CVE phases are quite clearly
defined in the National Security Strategy documents. Yet, NSS policies, and how those
specific strategies evolved were not discussed by interviewees. Rather, interviewees
spoke of the administration that directly affected their work at a specific point in time and
which was most relevant to them, such as the P/CVE related policies of the
administration in office during their time undertaking this work. For example, when an
interviewee was asked about what events they thought influenced regional or agency
P/CVE policy, he stated,
The election of Trump for one. I think those people have seen the lack of progress
in CT [counterterrorism] work. The higher-level task forces have seen no real
progress. The Togo Togo [Mali] ambush was the single biggest foreign policy
disaster of the Trump administration. Then they responded badly. Today, USAID
is poorly set up to respond to CVE. (Interviewee A, April 2019)
Further, the tendency to examine and reflect on P/CVE through political
administrations’ respective policy interests extended to other interviewees as well,
particularly those interviewees with a breadth of experience acquired over many years, as
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well as with those who have conducted scholarly analysis of P/CVE. For example, one
academic specializing in violent extremism, discussed how various administrations
shifted the policies of P/CVE over time, each adding to the other. The interviewee stated,
CVE was politically appealing as a smart use of soft power. Obama continued the
CVE angle. For many years, the State Department had criminal justice training
institutes for ROL [Rule of Law] work and civil society capacity. Those networks
and institutions were in place. They seem to be continuing that work, but it was in
place since President Clinton began focusing on law enforcement and justice
departments as foreign policy to stop crime. So, CVE brings together a bunch of
stuff. It can be distinctive but also is adaptations of preexisting things. It is the
most significant thing since 9/11 as a policy. (Interviewee E, May 2019)
This tendency to discuss specific administrations was not limited to only these
interviewees. Rather, every interviewee discussed in some way how specific policy
periods existed and which affected their own work. Given that trend, it was important to
examine how each administration focused, or opted not to focus, on P/CVE and related
policies. To that end, the most effective and efficient method was to examine the National
Security Strategies.
In addition, interviewees also identified specific events that they felt shifted the
ways in which the U.S. P/CVE policy evolved. Several interviewees identified specific
events that they felt affected not only broad P/CVE policy, but also regional policy in the
TSCTP region. The policies identified were drawn from their own understanding and
experiences as few individuals have analyzed from the perspective of how each event
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affected broad P/CVE policy. For this reason, it was necessary to triangulate these
perspectives with policy documents to determine which events were cited and examined
within P/CVE policies, as well as to understand how those events were used for learning
and policy development.
In examining the most cited events, all interviewees discussed that September 11,
2001 was the most pivotal point affecting P/CVE policy. This was expected considering
the magnitude of the event and that it led to ongoing conflicts that affects foreign policy
even today. Yet, several other interviewees also focused on less well-known events that
they considered centrally important to how P/CVE policy has shifted. The events
discussed varied, from major news events, to more arcane events that likely only regional
policy specialists may follow. The interviewees’ cited events included the following:
•

2017 ambush in Togo Togo, Mali (Interviewee A, April 2019; Interviewee C,
April 2019)

•

Embassy bombings of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya
(Interviewee B, April 2019; Interviewee D, May 2019)

•

Fall of Muammar Gaddafi (Interviewee B, April 2019)

•

Rise of violent extremist groups, such as al-Qaeda, ISIS, Boko Haram, and alShabab militant groups (Interviewee C, April 2019; Interviewee D, May
2019; Interviewee F, May 2019)

•

Bombing of the USS Cole in 2000 (Interviewee D, May 2019)

•

Death of Osama bin Laden (Interviewee F, May 2019)

•

2012 coup d’état in Mali (Interviewee G, July 2019)

166
Each of these events in some way altered or affected American foreign policy, and
especially so in those regions most directly affected by these events. But each event
occurred within its own specific circumstances and led to specific changes. The
underlying message conveyed by interviewees was that P/CVE policies evolved due to
continuously evolving circumstances, and as an effect, policy adjustments were made
over time and by various administrations. Yet, the broad nature of these referenced events
reflected the need to analyze more specifically how those events may have shaped P/CVE
policy priorities by USAID and DOS over time, and particularly how they affected
presidential priorities found in the NSS. To successfully undertake such a task with
enough documentary evidence to support any such conclusion, a thorough examination of
the policy documents was necessary.
The literature suggests that P/CVE policy change has occurred predominantly for
the key reason that ongoing conflicts have necessitated ongoing P/CVE policy and
strategy examination and improvement. That is not a new understanding, as it is well
known, and critically discussed in the scholarly community and throughout the news
media, that the U.S. has been in significant perpetual conflict for almost two decades.
This naturally has brought on countless foreign policy changes across a broad spectrum
of interventions. But that has consequences, and for the purposes of this study, one of
those consequences involves the rise and growth of P/CVE policies and implementation.
This has led to increased resources for P/CVE and it is therefore not surprising that policy
makers, leaders, and practitioners, have become increasingly involved in P/CVE policy.
Through the National Security Strategy, the highest U.S. national security policy
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document, the importance was heavily driven by the U.S. President Barrack Obama and
was subsequently supported by senior government leaders, including the Secretaries of
State, Hillary Clinton and John Kerry, and several USAID administrators. The many
conferences, policy papers, academic papers, evaluations, and other documents support
this notion of heightened interest of many parties.
Yet, while numerous entities have contributed to P/CVE over the years, and
continue to do so, P/CVE evolution has been relatively well organized in terms of policy
coordination and lineage. This is especially the case post-2010 following the release of
some of the earliest and still relevant P/CVE policies within USAID and the DOS. There
is also a discernible trail of intellectual breadcrumbs that can be identified prior to 2010,
during the time in which there was a growing interest in finding ways in which civilian
entities could support in the effort against violent extremism. This study developed an
audit trail approach to tracing P/CVE foreign aid related policy documents and public
policy statements from the highest levels (e.g., the NSS) to the region and country level
strategies (e.g., USAID’s West Africa RDCS). This provides observable periods of
change as well as interlinkages throughout the years.
The study, inclusive of policy documentation and interviewee feedback,
demonstrates that policy interlinkage and coordination is an important factor for policy
evolution over time. Further, in a field defined by so many definitional variations, these
policy interlinkages served to strengthen the guidance for a richer understanding of
P/CVE concepts and goals. These policies, and the supporting documentation of the
policies, serve as memorialized evidence of leadership efforts toward providing guidance.
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Yet, within USAID, this clear policy interlinkage was largely absent until the publication
of the 2010 NSS, which helped solidify P/CVE within the agency. This policy guidance
has served important functions.
Perhaps most importantly, the 2010 NSS assisted in obtaining resource allocation,
which in turn has further facilitated the implementation of P/CVE policies. Certainly,
without resources, the ability to implement the respective policy is compromised, and
without effective implementation the policy has little to no value. The implementation of
policies, which invariably requires resources, is thus arguably the most important litmus
tests of the perceived value of a policy in the eyes of government leadership. The level of
resources and attention placed upon P/CVE in recent years points to the fact that it has
been an important policy. This was reinforced by several interviewees concluding that
P/CVE was often seen more as a funding mechanism. As one interviewee stated, “I think
it's a way of disbursing funds. I have been told by officials that there is no violent
extremism in the region but then they're using that platform to fund projects labeled
CVE” (Interviewee D, March 2019). Therefore, in examining the multi-faceted growth in
P/CVE through the eyes of interviewees, particularly since 2010, P/CVE has proven to be
important at all levels of government. This is further reinforced when examining the
increase in resource levels, and the way in which funding has been specifically allocated
for P/CVE interventions. Thus, this reflects the notion that P/CVE has been a significant
foreign policy focus in recent years, and further reinforces the notion that P/CVE has
rapidly evolved.
Turning to the examination of the policy documents, policy coordination has
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proven important in understanding policy evolution. Numerus changes have been
incorporated into policy documents through such long-standing programs as the TSCTP.
This then feeds into additional policy updates over time, reflecting what amounts to stark
differences between P/CVE policy between predecessor policies during the GWOT phase
versus current policies that comprise a more distinct focus on the nuances of preventing
violent extremism. In this sense, it is a type of policy feedback loop that suggests learning
and modification have continued to occur over time.
Clear internal guidance and policy enables P/CVE practitioners to understand how
policy makers define the often complex and amorphous nature of P/CVE foreign aid
interventions. This guidance is important in that it enables practitioners to better design
programs to meet the expectations of policy makers and senior leaders and provide more
useful feedback on lessons learned over time. The importance of this was reinforced by
interviewees who expressed the value of joint USAID-DOS QDDR documents, USAID’s
VEI policy, and DOS’s counterterrorism guidance. As one interviewee stated, “When it
comes to the recent stuff, I look at the CVE [VEI] strategy from USAID” (Interviewee C,
March 2019) Yet another interviewee emphasized the importance of the QDDR and
USAID’s VEI strategy, as well as a need to move beyond a reliance upon military led
approaches, stating:
Those two internal documents, the QDDR and the USAID VEI strategy, are the
most important. Without those two there is nothing to begin with. Beyond those
two documents, there have not been much else. The policy makers say kinetic
actions on the ground and DOD work was often reinforcing the grievances.
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Interviewee G, April 2019)
Given the distinct P/CVE phases of evolution over time, the documentary evidence, in
support of interviewee assertions, provided an informational audit trail of documentation
and testimony, suggesting that this feedback loop has indeed been operating in the
intended manner to enable coordination as well as to provide guidance from the agency
level down to the point of implementation.
However, while this policy feedback loop appears to have been functional over
the years, that is not to say that it is perfect, or even if those policies are leading to
effective interventions, just that the communication and coordination is occurring today,
and that the documentation analysis and interviewee testimonies suggest this is a
relatively new phenomenon due to recent key policy guidance, to include joint strategies.
Yet, perhaps paradoxically, the evidence suggests that the ongoing changes in P/CVE
policy thinking are also a factor in why P/CVE continuously takes new forms and
evolves.
Change generates change, and each new adjustment renews attention on the topic
and invites scrutiny and reform, leading to ongoing changes over time. This phenomenon
is also not surprising in that policy makers and senior leaders are constantly in flux, and
each new individual brings with them their own set of interests, ideologies, and
experiences. In turn, these leadership differences affect the way in which policy is
drafted, interpreted, and implemented. One interviewee, a well published CVE scholar,
summed up the important relationship between policy leadership and policy change:
The future is tied to politics. CVE must have sustainable policy space and have
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legitimate policy objectives. We need to move beyond the glitzy new policy idea
of CVE to tried and true policies. This means we need to better understand what
works. It burst on to the scene back in the day because it had strong political
support, but that could go away. (Interviewee E, May 2019)
In sum, while there is clear evidence that P/CVE policy has been of some importance in
modern politics, the erratic nature of the policies also exposes a potential vulnerability to
its long-term sustainability and viability. As suggested by the interviewee, policy
normalization is key to P/CVE policy and conceptual sustainability. Given this, it is
imperative to understand what formal policies and strategies exist, and the way in which
they have come into existence and changed over time. Thus, it is important to understand
how P/CVE policy and strategy are viewed by current policy leaders throughout the
government, which in turn gives clues to its long-term viability. To fulfill this goal, a
document analysis is necessary.
Given this, it is important to identify the most consistent and authoritative
documents within the U.S. Government. This in turn provides a clear picture of the
national and agency level priorities, such as the level of policy importance provided to
P/CVE foreign aid policy and programs. Authoritative policies lay bare whether P/CVE
will receive policy attention and resources and are thus relevant to the broader policy
agenda. Examination of the U.S. Presidents’ NSSs proved to be among the most telling
ways in which this study determined the nature of U.S. P/CVE policy evolution. Within
these documents are explanations in the way in which politics is tied to P/CVE and its
predecessor policies, such as counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and stabilization.
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The central importance of the NSSs, and the ways in which those policies shifted
focus between administrations directly affected foreign aid P/CVE policy as we know it
today, as it did for a vast array of other policy issues. These shifts told a distinct story of
policy change over time. Yet, the NSSs also reflect the rapidly changing nature of these
policies over the decades, with only military led counterterrorism consistently well
supported. However, military led counterterrorism approaches are quite different from
modern P/CVE policies. As the interviewee stated above, to survive, today’s concepts of
P/CVE must have policy space and identified objectives. P/CVE must be normalized and
move beyond being the shiny new object which may attract short-term attention but
perhaps not long-term policy support.
To capture the way in which the P/CVE and predecessor policies have shifted
over time, they were categorized into various P/CVE policy phases. These phases were
characterized by specific events, priorities, and contexts that defined different eras of
foreign policy and foreign aid, as well as P/CVE policy and the nature of its
implementation. Further, while some interviewees described specific events and periods
of political leadership, only the NSS documents offered the necessary specificity that was
directly correlated to each Presidential administration over time. In that sense, it offered
an exceedingly rare policy constant for examination. Therefore, the phases are best
defined by those strategy and policy priorities described in each respective NSS. In this
sense, the NSS triangulate interviewees’ testimonies regarding various Presidential policy
objectives over the years. Yet, the NSS documents are definitive and intractable, thus
they offer far stronger support in understanding and defining these policy phases. For the
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purposes of this study, not only did I developed this classification system of P/CVE
policy phases, but I also provided a rough estimate of the dates to delineate the way in
which P/CVE has evolved. These phases are as follows:
Phase 1—1980s until the Fall of the Soviet Union: State terrorism concerns
during Soviet era was characterized by worries over nuclear war,
conventional conflicts, and state-sponsored terrorism, such as from Iran
and Libya. No clear role for development in this context. P/CVE not yet
developed, but counterterrorism is a major issue. Counterinsurgency, an
early contributing field to P/CVE, has faded from mainstream policy
consciousness and is not referenced in the NSSs.
Phase 2—Fall of the Soviet Union until Sept. 11, 2001 attacks: Chaotic period of
radicalization and de-centralized terrorism. No clear development
assistance strategy in place. P/CVE not fully developed but thinking is
clearly evolving and reflects a more open and exploratory nature.
Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency are significant issues.
Phase 3—Sept. 11, 2001 attacks until approximately 2010: Largely the period
throughout the Global War on Terror. Military-centric strategy in place.
Little implementation of development as a major tool, but the discussion is
emerging on the need for new approaches rather than strict use of military
approaches. Discussion being driven by key senior government leaders,
including military leaders.
Phase 4—Approximately 2010 until 2017: This period marks the modern P/CVE
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era. P/CVE thinking is beginning to take strong policy root and thinking is
developing and evolving rapidly. In many ways, this reflects the beginning
of a post-9/11 era, shunning the War on Terror’s military heavy concepts
and instead looking for new tools to confront violent extremism. This
provides policy space for foreign aid to be seriously explored as a tool for
P/CVE interventions. USAID is now at the national security table, literally
and figuratively.
Phase 5—2017 until current period: Return to a more military-centric and
defensive posture. While this phase does not mark the end of P/CVE, it
places a palpable focus on military buildups, “America First” notions with
less discussion of diplomacy and development, and less focus on civilian
funding and capacity. Simultaneously, it places a strong focus on
withdrawal from American’s previous foreign policy commitments and
interventions. This combination suggests a notable shift away from
previous conceptualization of P/CVE under the Obama administration.
However, P/CVE is not gone.
As can be surmised from these policy phases, P/CVE has derived from a long lineage of
politics and policies. There has been no clear predetermined path as to how exactly
P/CVE has arrived to where it is today. It has traveled a circuitous and unsure path and
the future may prove to be a relatively similar trajectory.
There have also been many forms of irregular conflict interventions, and these
many variants have existed for many years, many of them contributed to by civilian
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organizations and agencies. Such interventions have included humanitarian aid,
stabilization operations, post-war reconstruction, counterinsurgency, and
counterterrorism, all of which have a lineage and relationship to P/CVE interventions,
albeit each with their own distinct purposes. There is no shortage of such examples of
those various forms of interventions, many of which date back many decades. However,
when it comes to the P/CVE, only since 2010 has the U.S. Government had in place fully
developed and distinct policies designed to guide foreign aid P/CVE programs. As such,
dating back over the past nine years, there is ample evidence of policy alignment at all
levels, from the White House to the DOS and to USAID. This theme will explore the
period from 2010 until today, as 2010 marks the beginning of what can best be described
as the first phase of modern P/CVE.
At the highest level, the 2010 National Security Strategy charted the course for
P/CVE, and most importantly, used the modern terminology of countering violent
extremism. Certainly, names have power and meaning in policy, primarily for the
purposes of acquiring resources and providing defined purposes of the tool, which in
turns supports policy viability. This is not to suggest that prior National Security
Strategies (NSS) did not recognize violent extremism as important. However, this study
revealed those concerns were frequently viewed through a defense policy lens, such as
that found in the NSS, and in broad and less nuanced terms, often invoking
counterterrorism. To illustrate this evolution, President George W. Bush’s 2006 NSS
discussed the need for democratization to fight violent extremism and other forms of
conflict, arguing that “Because democracies are the most responsible members of the
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international system, promoting democracy is the most effective long-term measure for
strengthening international stability; reducing regional conflicts; countering terrorism and
terror-supporting extremism; and extending peace and prosperity” (The White House,
2006, National Security Strategy, p. 3). While not entirely out of step with today’s
thinking, since the modern aperture of P/CVE interventions has broadened, and P/CVE
objectives, tools, and approaches have become more defined as a distinct field. For
example, similar concepts were expressed in President Barrack Obama’s 2010 NSS, but
the policy dealt with P/CVE approaches and counterterrorism as distinct tools. For
example, the 2010 NSS states in clear P/CVE terms, “we will place renewed emphasis on
deterrence and prevention by mobilizing diplomatic action, and use development and
security sector assistance to build the capacity of at-risk nations and reduce the appeal of
violent extremism" (White House, 2010, p. 48). This demonstrates the way in which
countering violent extremism policies have evolved from more abstract
conceptualizations of terrorism and extremism to a more modern and nuanced policy that
embraces P/CVE policy. In this sense, President Obama’s approach placed a finer and
more defined point on the approach, assigning specific policy tools and resources that are
to be applied, rather than vague theories and concepts. This is one such example of the
way in which P/CVE policy thinking has become sharper and better defined over time,
even at the highest levels of U.S. government. This is not a criticism of President Bush,
as many of the Bush-era GWOT policies moved toward modern P/CVE, but it reflects the
distinct challenge in shifting policies in such turbulent times.
The 2015 NSS goes even further in this shift toward soft power approaches. It
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makes no attempt to hide this policy shift by stating in clear terms in the opening pages of
the document, “Indeed, in the long-term, our efforts to work with other countries to
counter the ideology and root causes of violent extremism will be more important than
our capacity to remove terrorists from the battlefield” (White House, 2015, p. 3). The
2015 NSS provides highly detailed P/CVE approaches, many of which are foreign aid
interventions, such as seeking to address underlying conditions by focusing on the
mitigation of extreme poverty, inequality, and “supporting alternatives to extremist
messaging and greater economic opportunities for women and disaffected youth” (White
House, 2010, p. 9).
While the NSS does not seek to remove the option of military force when needed,
it aims at opening the policy aperture to a new way of thinking. For example, it advocates
the use of non-lethal approaches aimed more at assisting societies overcome extremism
through alternatives rather than strictly through force and violence (White House, 2015).
Therefore, it is not surprising that it was in this policy phase that P/CVE grew into a
major foreign aid approach. It was in this period that we saw extraordinary policy
coordination from the NSS documents to DOS and USAID policies.
Despite this extraordinary change over the past two decades, the future is
uncertain as it pertains to P/CVE policy. This is largely because the current NSS is like
NSSs found in the 1980s, where NSSs focused more on defense capabilities during the
Cold War. Today this is also joined with an interest to withdraw or reduce overseas
engagements and aid programs. This is not to suggest that P/CVE is ending, as it
certainly is not and this work continues in many parts of the world today, including the
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TSCTP, which shows no signs of ending.
Many of these programs continue today, including USAID’s contributions
through P/CVE related programs in West Africa. Yet, what is undeniable is that with
smaller DOS and USAID budgets and resources, it is unclear how robust P/CVE policy
development and implementation will remain. In short, P/CVE is now entering a new
period of uncertainty which has yet to be fully written. As one interviewee, who served
decades in government stated, “I've been around long enough in government to know that
names change constantly. It doesn't mean the problem is any different. Changing names
is about getting more attention to it. I don't really care about it as a name. But the general
concept of extremism will be around for a long time to come, but it will morph over time
(Interviewee B, April 2019). Given this, P/CVE policy will likely continue to evolve and
change, which in part will be addressed by the next research question.
Theme 3: Some P/CVE practitioners have uncertainty about the way in which
P/CVE is implemented, how it is defined, and whether it has a viable future.
This theme is unique in that it is based predominantly on interviewee feedback.
As such, this is the perceptions identified as important by each of the interviewees. There
are no supporting policies and strategies that can be analyzed to directly confirm these
perceptions. This is in large part because policies and strategies are meant to provide
guidance rather than report sentiments and perceptions. Yet, likely reflecting these oftcited challenges involving a lack of definitional and conceptual clarity of P/CVE,
particularly so soon after the development of formal policies, former USAID
Administrator, Dr. Rajiv Shah, spoke of the need to clarify agency policy on the topic in
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the 2011 VEI policy stating, “Clarifying USAID’s role in the context of violent
extremism and insurgency does not come without controversy. Some hold strong views
on whether development agencies generally—and USAID in particular—should engage
on these issues” (USAID, 2011, p. ii). Further, as found in Appendix C, the existence of
25 policy and strategy documents issued since September 11, 2001, providing some
manner of guidance on P/CVE and predecessor policies and strategies, suggest that
policy makers have also concluded the need to continuously update and clarify guidance
Therefore, it is perhaps not surprising given these continuous changes and updates
that interviewees state some uncertainty about what exactly P/CVE aims to achieve and
how it is defined. Such frequent changes may even suggest that the policy makers
themselves continue to struggle with the right direction for P/CVE policy and strategy.
But identifying this theme of uncertainty about P/CVE policy and strategy from those
tasked with implementing these activities reflects an important point as part of this study,
which is that there are critical policy and strategy issues that still must be resolved if
P/CVE is to be truly effective and viable in the future. This in turn relates to past and
future policy evolution. These sentiments are a result of continuous and at times
bewildering levels of change, as well as an amorphous conceptual nature, bringing
together a vast array of development approaches, albeit aiming to achieve a discrete and
often highly nuanced objective guided by specific conditions and problem sets in the
field.
The interviewees generally reinforced that they believed the P/CVE policies were
in alignment, and in general agreement, with other related policy documents across the
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hierarchical levels of government. Further, all the interviewees demonstrated some
degree of awareness of policy related to P/CVE, respective of the time, place, and the
roles and responsibilities for which they served. Yet, that is certainly not to suggest that
they agreed with those policies or thought they were effective. At times, some
interviewees explicitly stated they did not agree with some of the policy guidance they
have received over the years and during the periods in which they performed this work,
or they felt what existed is not relevant. One interviewee with several years of P/CVE
related intervention experience stated:
I do not dwell too much about policy documents. I'm interested in where the
funding is appearing. To me, it doesn't matter much what people are saying if it
turns out that funding isn't there. So, I am interested in connections and funding. It
[P/CVE policy] is subjective, scattershot, and inconsistent. Also, some groups just
use their standard approaches and try to make it fit CVE projects. (Interviewee D,
May 2019)
Similarly, another interviewee with years of academic research on P/CVE, argued a
similar sentiment of how P/CVE combines perhaps too many fields, and simultaneously
has a perceived bias in its approaches. He stated, “We always thought that CVE was a
whore covering everything. USAID funding youth, clubs, etcetera, but those who work
on CVE often come from a CT perspective (Interviewee E, May 2019). Therefore, many
of the perceptions of the erratic evolution of these policies, and the intellectual
disagreements with some of the policy approaches that continue to exist, appears to have
contributed to some doubt in these policies. These strongly worded statements also
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suggest the possibility that P/CVE was never fully embraced due to these concerns, long
recognized by subject matter experts and experienced implementers
Outside of any policy disagreements that may exist, there were varying levels of
awareness of P/CVE policies. Those who served more recently in the field of P/CVE
were generally more aware of a larger body of P/CVE policies. And while only two
interviewees demonstrated a well refined knowledge of P/CVE policies, having spent
years studying them, all the interviewees were at least familiar with at least one key
policy they found important for P/CVE related work, particularly the policy guidance
documents that helped inform field work. Each interviewee demonstrated this knowledge
during the interview by citing key P/CVE related policy documents. Specifically, the
interviewees discussed the below listed policy and policy analysis related documents. The
documents cited spanned a broad spectrum, from multi-national policies, specific
regional policies, and policy analysis. These included the following:
•

USAID West African Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS)

•

AFRICOM regional policies

•

2010 and 2015 QDDR

•

UNDP Journey to Extremism

•

TSCTP USAID regional evaluations

•

USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) and the Office of Conflict
Management and Mitigation (CMM) P/CVE publications

•

USAID’s Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism

•

USAID’s The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency
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•

The White House’s National Strategy for Counterterrorism

The breadth of policies that were identified is noteworthy. Each of these identified
policy guidance documents were products derived from USAID, DOS, the White House,
and the United Nations, and thus most were within the scope of this study, the exception
being the UN document. The breadth of these identified policies reflects a broad span of
time, from before September 11, 2001 to as recently as 2018, and are indicative of the
period in which the interviewee worked in the field of P/CVE. Yet, the interviewees drew
predominantly from their direct experience on the topic, with the exception of two
scholars who study P/CVE, this lack of broader awareness is likely a commentary on the
complexity of evolving policies and the confusion in which rapidly changing policies
imbues in those charged with implementing the work. That complexity pertains primarily
to the difficulty in defining it, due to its nebulous and its evolving nature.
The end result of the challenges and difficulties in defining P/CVE, at least
through the eyes of the practitioners, is that there is a lack of clarity not only on what
P/CVE is supposed to be, or how it is distinct from other international aid tools that often
resemble it, but also how it should best be implemented. As the literature review
reflected, this has caused many P/CVE practitioners, policy makers, and organizational
leaders, to focus on specific technical fields under the auspices of P/CVE, not dissimilar
to other foreign assistance tools such as communications, health programs, youth
interventions, gender work, and other such fields. This was also a finding within a broad
literature review conducted by Nasser-Eddine, Garnham, Agostino, & Culaya (2011),
which argued that P/CVE literature was generally “event-driven, reactionary, and
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technically oriented” (p. 4). Yet, few studies exist at the time of this study that effectively
synthesize P/CVE data and interdisciplinary case studies.
Interviewees acknowledged this lack of clarity in P/CVE and at times argued that
P/CVE was more of useful as a funding mechanism than a distinct approach. One highly
experienced P/CVE practitioner and scholar summarized this well stating,
I don't closely track the policy. I'm a bit cynical. I'm not sure how influential that
voice is, and I feel that it is auto evolving…I'm interested in where the funding is
appearing. To me, it does not matter much what people are saying if it turns out
that funding is not there. (Interviewee D, May 2019)
This may reflect a clear distinction between the priorities of the P/CVE practitioners and
those of policy makers. While policy makers may seek to define and harmonize policy
across the hierarchical levels of government, practitioners and implementers appear more
focused on whether the funds exist to operationalize the policies. This is a seemingly
logical approach in distilling whether a policy is well enough established to be funded
and operationalized. Therefore, it is likely that the interviewees, even those expressing
policy cynicism, have at least some awareness of P/CVE policies because the resourcing
of P/CVE programs have in some ways legitimized the policy.
However, this limited awareness does not necessarily reflect how deeply P/CVE
is understood conceptually, or whether practitioners feel it important enough to review
and incorporate the policies and guidance beyond the limited scope of their work. While
this may seem like a trivial detail, it is important to note that the individual decision to
not invest the time and energy in being aware of these policies, and reviewing to ensure
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the guidance is fully incorporated into current programs, may reflect the lack of
accountability to the policies, the lack of intellectual rigor going into the programs, and
the perception that these policies and strategies are not well enough defined to be useful.
All of these may point to broader issues and challenges as P/CVE continues to evolve.
And while these issues more closely pertain to the quality of the policy and the way in
which it is being implemented, which is beyond the scope of this study, those questions
are important for future analysis, and will be particularly important for agency and
organizational leadership.
While there was general awareness of P/CVE policies among interviewees, the
fact that cynicism was expressed by all interviewees, and that approximately half of the
interviewees stated that they felt P/CVE had no future as it currently exists, was notable.
However, this is not to suggest that those interviewed believed that P/CVE would
disappear, but that it would continue to evolve. Many expressed that the evolution is
critical to policy survival. As one highly experienced, former senior foreign policy
official stated in the interview,
I do not really care about its name. But the general concept of extremism will be
around for a long time to come, but it will morph over time. For example, Somali
piracy is part of extremism, and that has ended for now, but it could come back.
Another example, al-Qaeda took a back seat to ISIS and that again is changing.
So, this is always changing on the margins and nothing remains the same. The
future is that the basic problem will remain, and it will morph. (Interviewee B,
April 2019)
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In reflecting on a long career in government, this official summarized the importance of
evolution and potentially touched on why some cynicism exists in these early stages of
P/CVE policy evolution, whether it be cynicism rooted in P/CVE being a trendy topic or
whether it’s seen as just another iteration in a constantly changing policy name, the fact is
that it is fundamentally a very old policy issue and one that is very likely to continue for a
long time to come.
To summarize, these three themes contribute to answering the first research
question as well as contribute important context toward a deeper understanding of the
phenomenon of policy alignment and coordination. The first observation most directly
responds to the first research question. It discusses the fact that USAID takes significant
guidance from external and internal processes, and these processes ensure policy
coordination within the agency down to the point of implementation. This is of central
importance in that jointly developing policy and strategy, and then the co-adoption of that
policy guidance, can serve as a major component and catalyst of P/CVE coordination,
just as it likely can for many other policy topics. In this sense, it creates a common set of
playbooks for agencies tasked with developing and overseeing the implementation of
P/CVE policy. When looking across the interviews, this common policy development has
clearly helped codify which documents are centrally important to P/CVE policy and
strategy. This is the case even though cynicism is well rooted across the spectrum of
those interviewed, from senior policy makers to experienced implementers. Similarly,
when looking across the policy and strategy documents, the frequency of referencing
other related policy documents demonstrated a relatively robust level of policy

186
coordination in at least the development of the policies themselves. Yet, it must also be
acknowledged that the lack of clarity of how P/CVE is clearly distinct from other
development approaches, as well as its efficacy and future, calls into question the level of
success between the policy makers and those tasked with implementing P/CVE in the
field.
The second theme speaks to the way in which this coordination has evolved. It
also addresses some of the ways in which changing policy both affect and are affected by
interagency policy coordination. National and agency level policy is not stagnant, it
changes and evolves based on national priorities. This often changes from administration
to administration, and those priorities are frequently captured in the NSS documents. Like
all Executive branch government agencies, USAID takes significant guidance from this
document, either directly or through additional guidance provided by the DOS. This topdown policy development has enabled USAID to be aligned with higher-level policy and
strategy. Thus, as shifts occur at higher levels, USAID likewise adjusts to changing focus
in P/CVE and related predecessor policies, such as stabilization and counterinsurgency.
Clearly, what one administration may deem important to P/CVE may not be what
is considered important by subsequent administrations over the years, and these shifts can
be broken down into P/CVE related foreign policy phases. These changing focuses are
well reflected in such documents as the QDDR, DOS-USAID joint strategies,
counterinsurgency, and CVE policies. Therefore, the delineation of these eras
demonstrates and provides additional clarity on the nature of P/CVE policy evolution and
coordination.
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Theme 3 is unique in that it was derived from interviews alone. The observation
focuses on frequently expressed uncertainty by practitioners regarding the way in which
P/CVE is being implemented, how it is defined as a distinct approach, and whether it has
a viable foreign policy future. In some ways, this provides context regarding coordination
and the symptoms of the way in which it has been undertaken rather than coordination
itself. It reflects the need for not only policies to be clearly coordinated among the key
stakeholders, but also that the concepts that undergird the policy must be clearly defined
and communicated at all levels of government and to the non-governmental
implementers. Also, this demonstrates that all levels involved in P/CVE, from agency
leadership to the field implementers, must be held accountable to understanding and
incorporating policy guidance for implementation. Otherwise, the policy is vacuous,
chipping at away at its future viability, and thus causing it to lose credibility over time, as
such practices have done on occasion, as discussed in the recollections of some
interviewees.
It also demonstrates that coordination alone is insufficient if those tasked with
implementation are not clear how that policy specifically applies to their efforts. Or
perhaps even more troubling, if the implementers do not believe the agency understands
what it wants or how to go about achieving those ends. Further, it may reflect that those
outside of government may not be sufficiently clear on the respective policies as some
inside the government. This may indicate a communication, management, and
accountability breakdown that requires greater agency attention. Thus, when partnerships
occur on P/CVE efforts, USAID may want to explore ways to more effectively ensure
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that there is a common understanding of the policy guidance and the related concepts that
underscore the program goal. Otherwise, even the best coordinated policy and strategy
efforts within the agency may not be properly utilized upon first contact with those
outside the agency.
Conversely, a lack of clarity at the implementation level may highlight some
weaknesses in P/CVE policy and strategy communication from a bottom-up perspective.
For example, this may be an indicator that more bottom-up coordination and
communication is necessary to address the conceptual and policy gaps that exist. This
may also help legitimize the policy, with practitioners more confident with the
knowledge that the implementation level is being more significantly considered. As some
of the interviewees often recalled, they felt as though higher-level policy and strategy
often failed to consider the most appropriate data from the field. As such, this
observation reinforces the need for a duel-track approach to policy communication, with
a tandem top-down and bottom-up approach to ensure common understanding and a
healthy mutual partnership.
RQ 2: What factors have led to changes in P/CVE TSCTP regional policy as well
as the broader USAID P/CVE foreign assistance policy?
In this research question, I will explain the facts that have in some manner led or
driven changes to regional P/CVE policy as well as that of broader agency-level policy.
There is a strong policy linkage between the higher-level P/CVE policies to all
subordinate regional and country specific policies. This is shown through an existing
hierarchy of policies, evidenced through subordinate policies referencing within them
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more senior level policies, moving from the presidential level down to the point of
implementation. Despite this, there are distinct contextual differences to each region and
country that must be accounted for when it comes to implementation. In other words,
there is no one-size-fits-all approach to foreign aid, including P/CVE. This is an
important consideration as broad policy cannot always address unique challenges.
Therefore, some countries in which P/CVE programs occur require adapted policy and
implementation approaches based on these unique factors. This question discusses the
factors that have led to P/CVE changes at the varying levels of policy making and policy
implementation.
As I touched upon in the response to the first research question, key policy
milestones have guided much of the ongoing P/CVE change. P/CVE is not new and has
existed in various forms over decades, and since September 11, 2001, P/CVE has gone
through tremendous conceptual and policy changes. Each of these policy phases are
delineated by distinct phases or shifts in policy thinking. In the analysis of question 1, I
explained that in 2010 there was a particularly salient shift in foreign aid policy under the
auspices of USAID, shifting away from a significant reliance upon military doctrines and
manuals toward USAID and DOS guidance. Analysis of the factors which influenced
these shifts are explored in the following pages.
Theme 4: P/CVE policy evolution is characterized not only by documented policy
change but has also been influenced by key events and conceptual shifts in thinking.
In this theme, I describe the nature of how P/CVE policies have evolved and been
catalyzed by certain events as well as by changes over time in P/CVE thinking by key
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policy makers and events. What I aim to demonstrate is that major events play a
significant role in the way in which P/CVE has evolved, as does the way in which those
events are interpreted and conceptualized by policy makers. Those events range from
political leaders coming into power and setting new policy agendas to major attacks that
change the operational environment and focus for P/CVE program implementation. In a
sense, these events shift the paradigm around P/CVE, changing not just P/CVE but often
larger foreign policy and foreign aid approaches and priorities. Changes that fit into this
category are in a sense push factors that create change through forceful and often violent
events. Such examples include the attacks of September 11, 2001 which spawned the
Global War on Terror, one of the earliest iterations of modern P/CVE approaches. While
this is the most extreme and well-known example, other more subtle yet forceful events
has occurred that have pushed P/CVE policy to evolve, such as the 2012 Mali coup, a
TSCTP country, which led to significant setbacks for CVE related programs, and which
led to significant American policy and foreign aid adjustments (Vandiver, 2012, para. 4).
In such cases, changes in P/CVE policy making and implementation is symptomatic of
major events or changes rather than driving the change itself. Later in this study, I will
explore how smaller events often play major catalytic roles as well.
During the interview phase, interviewees offered a broad set of factors that they
perceived as factors leading to changes in P/CVE regional and agency level policy. These
factors were identified as key events, political leadership, and the implementation of key
policies. While few of the interviewees have systematically examined this issue on their
own, they offered important perspectives and reflections on the factors that proved
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important during theirs specific and differing experiences pertaining to P/CVE related
work. This also resulted in their identified events spanning across large timeframes, from
the 1990s to the current period. The key events that were identified as catalyzing P/CVE
policy change were described in some detail in theme 2, which included major events
such as September 11, 2001, and also much lesser known events, such as the Togo Togo
ambush of American forces in Mali.
Yet, in addition to key events identified by each interviewee, they also discussed
shifts in P/CVE thinking as being found within and outside formal policy and strategy.
Many of these identified policies and strategies are discussed as part of theme 3, as those
policies also served to encourage inter and intra agency policy and strategy coordination.
As mentioned, those internal policies include such documents as the 2010 and 2015
QDDR, USAID VEI policy, and the DOS-USAID joint strategies. However, five of the
interviewees also identified other internal guidance that came in the form of internal
reports and analysis from specialized internal USAID organizations and specialized
external organization. The internal USAID offices identified included OTI and CMM,
both offices having worked intimately on P/CVE, and which have written and reported
extensively on P/CVE over the years. As one interviewee, a current P/CVE senior
implementer, stated, “I've seen an evolution of understanding of P/CVE. There have been
evolving definitions, partly informed by OTI field reports” (Interviewee A, April 2019.
Another interviewee, a long-serving senior official and academic, stated,
In USAID, it changed probably more than State [DOS]. I have the impression that
in USAID they were trying to give a different focus on how to counter these
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issues. CMM did try this and were instrumental in taking a broader look at how to
grapple with this problem. They felt that a military centric way of thinking was
not working. So, I give credit to USAID for having that broader thinking and did
use the term extremism. But in terms of implementing it, I do not think they were
there yet. They were trying to figure out USAID's roles at that point. (Interviewee
B, April 2019).
As such, given these perspectives, key conceptual changes have been pushed from
internal sources within USAID, namely the specialized offices of OTI and CMM.
In addition to internal organization, external academics and organizations have
also played a key role in helping shape and evolve P/CVE policy. One interviewee, a well
published CVE academic, credited two key intellectuals as having contributed to P/CVE
conceptual evolution. He stated:
Martha Crenshaw published an article on 9/11 on studies in conflict. It was called,
Counterterrorism Policy and the Political Process. This book was like a lightbulb
going off because there are many variables that help explain the results. It is very
insightful. Paul Pillar has important insights from prior to the events of 9/11
[September 11, 2001]. He lays out many instruments prior to CVE existing, such
as law enforcement and the military. He offers a good discussion on the
challenges of policy of CT. (Interviewee E, May 2019)
Another interviewee, an academic and experienced evaluator of P/CVE programs,
identified reports coming from the U.S. Institute of Peace as being an important
contributor to P/CVE conceptual evolution. He stated:
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USIP just unveiled something new on CVE. They said that terrorism since 2001
has increased 5-fold worldwide. We have protected the homeland, but terrorism
worldwide has gone up markedly. There has been an understanding that when we
saw the rise of ISIS and the attack in Sri Lanka, there was also a rise in the use of
military action, such as Mali and the AQIM, ISIS in Syria. From Somalia, the alShabab attack on Westgate Mall. On those, there have been involvement of the
Kenyan military and U.S. military. There is recognition that there must be a
military component to all of this, but it is growing well beyond the other options.
(Interviewee C, April 2019)
These interviewees point to important contributors for P/CVE conceptual evolution. Yet,
those reflections are perceptions. Given this, it was necessary to analyze the existing
policy documents to determine the accuracy and supportability of these statements. And
while there was substantial evidence that conceptual evolution existed due to scholarly
analysis by internal and external academics and theoreticians, formal policies and
strategies generally also suggested the major importance of other internal documents, as
well as key events over time that required P/CVE adjustments. Thus, while perceptions
by interviewees on the events are important and noteworthy, a document analysis also
reveals the way in which policy contributes to itself over time.
The policy and strategy document analysis reveals that both large and small
events can have significant roles in changing policy, and P/CVE policy is no exception.
What is perhaps even more important than the events themselves, is how events are
interpreted and conceptualized by policy makers and implementers. In other cases,
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P/CVE can affect policy decisions, particularly in cases where P/CVE is deemed
effective or serves as a distinct area of interest for key agency stakeholders or policy
makers, such as the U.S. President or the Secretary of State. Examples of this high-level
interest driving P/CVE policy can be found in President Obama’s NSS documents, which
led to the 2010 and 2015 QDDR documents. These high-level policies in-turn led to
greater resources for P/CVE programs, reflected in the annual budget plans that
increasingly funded P/CVE programs during the Obama administration. Further, the way
in which P/CVE has moved from one policy phase to another, as described earlier, can in
part be attributed to the interrelationship between policy and politics. Collectively, these
two phenomena, the push and pull effects, also touch upon the theoretical aspects of how
P/CVE policy has evolved. As will be discussed later in the next chapter, it reflects not
only that PET is important to understanding the evolutionary process of a P/CVE policy,
but also the way in which PFT plays a role in this changing process.
While the theoretical foundations of PFT and PET help explain some of the ways
in which P/CVE policy has evolved through a type of push and pull effect, path
dependence theory is also important to help pinpoint and categorize various P/CVE
evolutionary phases. The analysis demonstrated that it is possible to pinpoint policy
phases as it related to P/CVE as there were marked shifts that occurred following specific
events. PET helps mark these shifts by events, often directly discussed in the NSS
documents, while PFT helps explain the development of government policy frequently
driven by different political actors. PD on the other hand, helps show that some policies,
at least in part, can become entrenched and remain relatively constant. From the
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perspective of these three theoretical lenses, the analysis of National Security Strategies
revealed the points at which P/CVE policy shifts between phases, how it remains constant
for a time and then shifts again, and the relationship between the policies and the politics
of that policy phase. This will again be discussed from a theoretical perspective in the
following chapter.

Figure 3: Events Contributing to P/CVE Evolution

Theme 5: Due to ongoing conflicts, P/CVE policy has rapidly evolved due to both
significant punctuating events, as well as events that play outsized roles.
The literature review tended to overwhelmingly discuss major punctuated events
that have contributed to the development of P/CVE policy. Academic papers and policy
papers tended to dwell heavily on such events as the attacks on September 11, 2001 and
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the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. These are without question important to the
development and ongoing changes to P/CVE policy. In many ways, P/CVE as it is known
today would likely not exist without those events. Thus, those are truly punctuating
events in the context of this study as well as to American foreign policy in general. Thus,
it is not surprising that those are of core interest to academics and policy makers.
However, it was striking to hear the interviewees so frequently focus on lesser known
events, rather than the commonly held overriding interest and focus on the major
punctuating events, such as the attacks of September 11, 2001. As someone who has
worked in the field in stabilization and counterinsurgency, and following an exhaustive
literature review that tended to focus heavily on major events and technical development
approaches, I did not expect to hear so many individual references to lesser known
events.
In the TSCTP region, Mali was a major point of discussion. One senior
implementer argued that he felt that America regional policy was badly shaken and
became largely dysfunctional following a violent attack on U.S. forces. He argued that at
least in part the attack was a catalyst of a misguided strategic change. He stated:
After the Togo Togo ambush, our work was shut down. This was the result of us
[the U.S.] not implementing policies properly. But we doubled down by halting
all work. We divested. We then changed our entire approach to a process that
does not work. We went to private investment policy which does not make sense
out there. There is nothing there to invest in due to instability. We would have to
subsidize like China because there is nothing out there. (Interviewee A, April
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2019)
In further examining this statement, the interviewee reflects that a specific attack in Mali
in part led to new P/CVE policy, a private investment policy approach. He further argues
that this policy was not well conceived as it did not match the root causes and the current
operational environment. While this touches on a host of policy issues that require further
examination, it also supports the idea that certain events at specific times can have a
major effect on policy development and implementation, and even strategic reorientation.
Also reinforcing the way in which several events converged to create significant
foreign policy effects, a retired U.S. senior official recounted that it was the confluence of
numerous events within a short period of time, including both major and lesser known
events, that facilitated the emergence and evolution of P/CVE and other related
interventions. He stated:
During my time, the bombings of Dar es Salaam [U.S. Embassy in Tanzania]
caused a major focus on counterterrorism. It was about intel and killing them
though. It also came out of a policy decision around 2001, somebody went to the
Saudis and told them to clean up their act and stop pushing extremism and
terrorism out there. To an extent, that worked and had an impact by 2004 to 2006.
Obviously, 9/11 had an effect. Also, the money from gulf states was having
negative effects. There were also so many radical groups and we did not even
know their names. Somalia was a driver too. But overall, we needed more intel
and we were making bad decisions without good information. Khaddaffi’s
overthrow also had huge negative implications. You can make the argument for
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the overthrow and death of Saddam also being a major driver that led to violent
extremism. (Interviewee B, April 2019)
Examining this quote, the interviewee felt strongly that it was necessary to discuss a wide
range of issues to understand the way in which P/CVE policy has evolved. At times, he
identified largely non-public diplomatic oeuvres as being as important as major events
found in news headlines. He also points out the way in which information, or intel as he
phrased it, is pivotal to policy decision making. In doing so, he reveals the significance of
understanding the operational environment, which contributes to policy decision and
implementation. In other words, it is not just about major events that should be the focus,
but rather the daily contributions to policy decision and the way in which policy
implementation occurs and in the environment in which it is implemented. With this, he
further reinforces the earlier notion of the major importance of field level changes and
conditions, and to find effective ways to incorporate that information in policy decisions.
Without that timely awareness, decision making can and will likely be flawed, which in
turn undermines effective implementation of policy. Therefore, understanding P/CVE
policy evolution requires an understanding of policy operations, implementation, and the
way in which P/CVE policy, environment, and events interact.
Other interviewees also reinforced similar concepts that the confluence of events,
both major and minor events, led in large part to the continuous evolution of P/CVE
policy and strategy. Given this, it became increasingly evident during the study that an
analysis was necessary to understand the way in which these issues combined to affect
policy. As the interviewees discussed, many lesser known events seemed to play outsized
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roles as it pertains to P/CVE policy evolution, and particularly so when compounded with
other major events. A document analysis was conducted to further understand and
confirm this potentiality.
From September 11, 2001 until today, the United States has been in conflict. The
strain on foreign aid systems and resources resulting from these conflicts has long been
considered and studied by academics and practitioners (Woods, 2005). These conflicts
have required extraordinary resources. It is estimated that DOS and USAID have spent
approximately $131 billion in conflicts since 9/11 and about $6.4 trillion has been spent
in total by the U.S. Government in conflicts since the attacks on September 11, 2001
(Crawford, 2019). In examining the rate of foreign aid and military spending before and
after the 9/11 attacks, Brookings concluded that from 2000 to 2004, foreign aid expanded
by one eighth and military spending expanded 125% (Brainard, 2005). This evidence
strongly reinforces the observation that the attacks on 9/11 led to major increases in
foreign aid for conflicts. This in turn, has led to increased funding for USAID’s P/CVE
programming, of which over $100 million has been spent supporting the TSCTP alone
(USAID, 2016).
War and conflict interventions require not only extraordinary financial and human
resources, they also demand near constant reevaluation and modification of policies,
strategies, and processes. Demonstrating the nature of how governments often are forced
to adjust during periods of conflict, one study concluded that war and conflict leads to a
significantly expanded scope of government and policy change (O’Reilly, C. & Powell,
B., 2015). As discussed in the previous observation, there is a growing body of P/CVE
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related foreign aid policies and strategies that continue to evolve, even though the
certainty of support is less clear than it was in years past. As explored throughout this
paper, this phenomenon corresponds with the foundational concept of PET which states
that shocks to the system (i.e., punctuated events) create significant and rapid changes to
the status quo, introducing rapid change following major catalyzing events. In terms of
P/CVE, the documentation suggests that the attacks of 9/11 and the U.S. responses served
as a substantial shock to the U.S. government and to society, which in turn affected the
way in which policy evolved.
Yet, beyond just the major shocks of the attacks on September 11, 2001, less
significant global events have also played outsized roles in shaping policy and
implementation. This is because policy consequences have secondary and tertiary effects
on other policies and the way in which implementation can and will be conducted. In a
way, this is not dissimilar to falling dominos, one striking the other, thus creating a chain
reaction of events. For example, the attacks on September 11th led to major military
interventions, strategies and policies were developed to support these interventions, major
resources were dedicated to that approach, mounting casualties and costs without tangible
success became onerous, numerous ongoing attacks in other parts of the world led to
additional unforeseen interventions driving up casualties and costs yet higher, which then
led to the realization that new approaches were needed, which then led to new policies
and strategies. In short, the policy has gone from overwhelmingly hard power focused, to
the attempt to implement soft power approaches, and now seemingly returning to hard
power yet again. Given these dynamics and the multitude of factors at play, events, even
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minor ones, have had significant effects, even those that are not widely seen as critical
factors to specialists and non-specialists alike.
This effect can be observed through a few key milestones. For example, President
George W. Bush announced only nine days after the attacks of 9/11 that, “Our war on
terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist
group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated” (White House, 2001, para.
23). Thus, following the attacks on 9/11, the Global War on Terrorism was launched with
a broadly defined scope, which paved the way for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)
against the Taliban in Afghanistan, The Iraq War, conflicts in North-West Pakistan,
Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) against ISIL in Syria, and various other military,
humanitarian, and stabilization interventions throughout the world, including in the Horn
of Africa, Philippines, Trans-Sahara Africa, the Caribbean, and Central America. And to
be clear, this list identifies merely a portion of the related interventions in which USAID
has supported (Moss, Roodman, & Standley, 2005, p. 6; Shahzad, Sarwar, Farooq, &
Qin, 2019). Each of these events was supported by enormous resources and policy
guidance. This effect of constant policy change is further exacerbated when current
policies and strategies do not work according to plan, and many of these major events did
not work to plan. This then required yet more reevaluation and modification, culminating
in a dizzying array of new policy and procedural guidance, capable of sowing confusion
in even the most ardent student of P/CVE policy.
However, while the onset of major conflict is certainly a significant punctuated
event that has generated policy change, more minor secondary events have also catalyzed
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important policy changes. Numerous interviewees with years of experience in foreign aid
P/CVE programs identified specific events that had major effects on P/CVE policy. One
interviewee stated that while Mali’s Togo Togo region is relatively little known to the
public, the attacks there against the U.S. Army had a dramatic effect in hindering the
implementation of regional policy, and led to the subsequent shift to a less effective
regional policy approach (Interviewee A, April 2019). Another interviewee argued that
while the attacks on 9/11 has clearly had the largest effects on P/CVE evolution, P/CVE
as it is known actually originates with the attacks on the USS Cole in 2000, as that was
the point in which policy awareness became palpable (Interviewee D, May 2019).
Another interviewee suggested that it was not only military attacks, but combined
political and military events that contributed to major P/CVE change, identifying U.S.
President Obama’s CVE focused speech in Egypt’s al-Azhar University, the death of
Osama bin Laden in 2011, and the fall of Raqqa in Syria in 2013, all being key catalyzing
moments for P/CVE policy evolution (Interviewee F, May 2019). In sum, while some
events may not rise to the major shocks of the attacks on September 11, 2001, many have
had significant roles in policy evolution. Over time, some seemingly less significant
events have become touchstones to understanding the way in which P/CVE policy
evolution has occurred and when such changes began.
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Figure 4: Events Leading to P/CVE Policy Evolution
Looking at such events through the theoretical prism of PET, it is apparent that
while the larger events often have substantial effects, the less robust events also have
policy significance. While research overwhelmingly and consistently identifies the
attacks on September 11, 2001 as the single most important event that led to P/CVE
evolution (e.g., the rise in P/CVE predecessors such as counterterrorism,
counterinsurgency, stabilization operations, etc., which in turn led to the development of
P/CVE), this study reveals that less significant interventions and events have also had
significance in P/CVE evolution. In the case of the TSCTP, the oldest ongoing P/CVE
intervention by the U.S. Government, which has been significantly supported by USAID,
it has facilitated evolution of the field as well as evolved due to lessons taken from other
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interventions. Much of this evolution is attributable to the TSCTP because it was the first
P/CVE related program of its kind, has been examined by numerous scholars and
practitioners, and is frequently referenced in various DOS and USAID P/CVE related
policies. Further reflecting these changes, broader USAID P/CVE work has evolved
substantially over the years, shifting from ad hoc assistance in conflict interventions to
more policy driven programs from 2010 onwards, due in large part to the release of
agency P/CVE related policies and guidance. As such, it is both major events and more
discrete events that are important, some of which have served in surprisingly outsized
roles regarding P/CVE policy evolution.
Theme 6: Leaders and policy makers realized that an overreliance on military
solutions was not achieving success. This led to civilian agencies entering the policy
equation, interagency coordination developing, and P/CVE related policies rapidly
evolving.
Among the most frequent points of discussion during the interviews was the
perception that there has been an overreliance on military solutions as part of P/CVE
efforts. This point was voiced by every interviewee in one way or another, and based on
this feedback, ranged a broad span of time, from the 1990s until today. The arguments
ranged broadly, including:
•

A lack of P/CVE policy focus by DOS

•

Perceived USAID and DOS risk aversion

•

A lack of civilian presence in the field
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•

The ease of employing military tools quickly to the field

•

More timely results following military actions

•

A tendency to focus on robustly funding the military at the expense of civilian
agencies and interventions.

Discussing the lack of policy focus, a senior implementer argued that USAID was
often risk averse. He argued that USAID was not ready to integrate with the population
and military forces in the most violence affected regions, to include remote regions in
Mali. He stated:
To me, there was not a genuine effort to address radicalization in the
communities. I worked with SOF [Special Operations Forces] because they were
the only ones out there. Risk aversion was a problem. OTI was doing some stuff
far off, but not at the heart of what was problematic. There was a disconnect with
SOF and OTI. SOF wanted USAID's support but it was not happening. The
USAID implementer would not touch working with the military. (Interviewee A,
April 2019)
This sentiment was further reinforced by a senior evaluator, who stated “There is a
recognition that there must be a military component to all of this, but it's growing, and all
throughout Africa” (Interviewee C, April 2019). And the notion that military solutions
are generally easier, faster to implement, and show more timely results was argued by
well-published academic stating, “It [P/CVE] was an experimental area and outside
mainstream policy. For funding, mainstream kinetic CT work was getting a lot more
money… It was easy to spend money on weapons. (Interviewee G, July 2019). Taken
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together, these three references reflect the notion that military solutions are generally
perceived by policy makers as easier to employ, fund, and show more effective results.
Conversely, some see USAID as risk averse and not willing to do the work that is
necessary to address the root causes of violent extremism in highly volatile areas.
However, interviewees also discussed another key perception. Interviewees at
times spoke on the adverse effects that can come with military interventions and how
they felt policy makers were beginning to come to terms with those limitations. Others
also addressed that they felt that the DOD has a growing desire to see more P/CVE
related work from USAID and DOS, which would allow them to step out of the type of
work that DOD is not designed to undertake. One retired senior official recalled USAID’s
and DOS’s lack of interest in P/CVE, stating:
I am not too sure how seriously CVE is taken at State [DOS]. There are individual
actors that support it, but I suspect he gives it priority. But in terms of upper
levels, I am not sure I see that much focus on it. In terms of policy actions and
statements I do not see it. Probably not a priority with the current administration
either. I have spoken with AFRICOM, they understand it, but they say they are
not the people to do it. They are out catching and killing bad guys. I think DOD
wants to see State [DOS] and USAID do more. They are trying to fund it
themselves. Killing is not getting them far. (Interviewee B, April 2019)
Therefore, the interviewees described the irony of the current situation. While the DOD
has long wanted to step away from leading P/CVE work, they are far better resourced and
funded to do the work, and simultaneously less risk averse to undertake CVE in areas that
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are negatively affected by violent extremism. However, P/CVE is not the DOD’s core
strength, in part due to the necessary development tools and approaches not part of the
primary mission of any American military forces. As such, DOD has long wanted civilian
agencies to step into the leading role in P/CVE. Yet, scarce funding to civilian agencies
have ensured DOD would remain the primary P/CVE lead in regions affected by violent
extremism.
Over the past decade, several senior military and diplomatic leaders have
expressed important revelations regarding working in regions dealing with violent
extremism, including such areas of counterinsurgencies, political instability, and
counterterrorism. The traditional paradigms of military thinking such as the seemingly
logical conclusion that the use of greater force and technology leads to a better chance of
victory has evolved significantly over America’s two decades of continuous conflict. A
touchstone policy document that provides substantially new thinking within the military
is found in FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency (U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps, 2006). And
while the document does not exhaustively explore the role of civilian agencies, it does
stress the need to work together in complex modern conflicts that are characterized by
P/CVE related environments. For example, it emphasizes the need for strong interagency
coordination and awareness of other organizations in the operational space, and how each
contributes to the objective. FM-3-24, while innovative in the modern era, was still
focused on emphasizing the need for military operations to better understand that success
in complex counterinsurgency environments “requires Soldiers and Marines to employ a
mix of both familiar combat tasks and skills more often associated with nonmilitary
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agencies, with the balance between them varying depending on the local situation” (U.S.
Army and U.S Marine Corps, 2006, p. 2). As such, it was still military oriented, yet
making the significant step toward more enhanced interagency coordination.
In 2009, this military counterinsurgency manual was followed by the U.S.
Government Counterinsurgency Guide, drafted by a panel of agency representatives and
led by the DOS, which argued very much the same principles of the need to balance
military and civilian resources and specializations (U.S. Department of State, 2009).
However, what is noteworthy is that these policy and guidance documents were focused
on major ongoing counterinsurgency operations, which at the time were going poorly. In
short, the focus at the time was to turn around military-centric endeavors that were
largely failing. These documents laid the path to a deeper understanding of the need to
reform the military-centric approach, but it was not yet representative of fully developed
P/CVE thinking. Further, this new way of thinking was not widely embraced at the time,
as the interviewees alluded to in past quotes, and was still largely the role of the conflict
intervention specialist and those assigned those regions. For the wider population to
begin to see the need for change, it would take access to the public, outside the
specialized world of policy and doctrine. And to sway holdouts who disagreed with larger
civilian roles, it would take years of policy emphasis and greater accountability. As noted
by interviewees, that is perceived as still an ongoing challenge that has not yet fully come
to fruition.
U.S. Navy Admiral, and then the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mike
Mullen, made an extraordinary statement in 2008. To some it may have been surprising
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that the senior-most military leader was effectively conceding that in these conflict
environments, “we can’t kill our way to victory” (Nordland, 2017, para. 4). This major
revelatory policy statement still reverberates and shapes thinking today. It was nothing
less than saying in clear terms that the way in which the United States was intervening in
irregular complex conflict environments around the world was not working, and thus new
approaches were immediately required. It was a windfall moment for many in the policy
community and government agency leadership levels alike. It highlighted the need for
alternative solutions outside of traditional military-centric approaches. In its place,
whole-of-government solutions arose, calling for the need for additional soft power
approaches to achieve better success in these complex P/CVE environments. “Boots on
the ground,” even with the best of intentions, was simply not enough, and in some cases,
outright counter to achieving the desired results.
In recent years, this statement is frequently referenced in a wide variety of outlets,
from policy papers to media articles, and as such it appears to be among the most
important events that has led P/CVE related evolution. Further, the policy and media
record, supported by the personal reflections of interviewees, demonstrates that one of the
most important factors that led to change was a growing realization that there was an
unbalanced and unsustainable reliance on military intervention, which was clearly not
effective for many environments. Admiral Mullen’s statement merely stated aloud what
others were realizing, or what some had long known, but which now had the policy
gravitas and support of the senior-most U.S. military officer. Naturally, when the seniormost military officer makes such a major policy related statement, leaders below take
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notice and seek to offer new solutions and approaches in support of that approach. That is
after all, what is expected as part of being a good soldier. Such is the nature of the
military chain-of-command and government hierarchical system. Yet, even more
importantly, not long after Adm. Mike Mullen’s statement, there was also a significant
policy shift in the NSS mandating a whole-of-government approach. The whole-ofgovernment, discussed previously, is an approach which advocates using the full range of
defense, diplomacy, and development resources in concert with one another, and in this
case, in support of the effort to counter violent extremism (White House, 2010). This was
a particularly important issue to policy makers and practitioners alike during that period
and continues to be sought by the Congress, the military, and civilian agencies (Houck,
2017). Thus, this simple yet important statement by Adm. Mike Mullen has had
enormous influence on P/CVE related policy evolution.
While Adm. Mike Mullen may have given an early prominent voice to the idea
that the government needs to look beyond just military interventions for viable solutions
to P/CVE challenges, he did not set it into formal policy. That level of policy making
responsibility lies with senior elected officials, namely the U.S. President. Thus, the
policy of involving foreign aid in P/CVE efforts was solidified into high-level policy in
the 2010 NSS, in which President Barrack Obama states, “we will place renewed
emphasis on deterrence and prevention by mobilizing diplomatic action, and use
development and security sector assistance to build the capacity of at-risk nations and
reduce the appeal of violent extremism." (White House, 2010, p. 48). That same year, the
first QDDR was released in 2010, which set policy and strategic thinking for DOS and
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USAID on matters pertaining to civilian resources aimed at P/CVE interventions. The
2010 QDDR addresses the importance of civilian contributions to combatting extremism
alongside the military. In many ways, the QDDR set out to redress the imbalance of
influence and capacity between the U.S. military, DOS, and USAID. Reflecting this
objective, its introduction states, “to realize the full potential of civilian power, to give
the U.S. military the partner it needs and deserves, and to advance U.S. national interests
around the world, U.S. foreign policy structures and processes must adapt to the 21st
century. The President’s commitment to ‘whole-of-government’ must be more than a
mantra” (U.S. Department of State, 2010, p. 4).
Following the lead of the DOS’s QDDR and other policies, USAID focused on
contributing to using civilian resources and expertise to implement the whole-ofgovernment vision. In USAID’s policy, it focused more specifically on the development
tools and approaches that serve P/CVE objectives. It states:
Development is one of several tools of U.S. national power. As the 2011 National
Strategy for Counterterrorism states, ‘We are engaged in a broad, sustained and
integrated campaign that harnesses every tool of American power- military,
civilian, and the power of our values, together with the concerted efforts of allies,
partners and multilateral institutions. These efforts must also be complemented by
broader capabilities, such as diplomacy, development, strategic communications,
and the power of the private sector.’ Implementing this policy should also serve to
strengthen USAID’s interagency voice on development’s contribution to
addressing these critical national security issues. (USAID, 2011, p. 1)
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To that aim, USAID offers numerous unique tools, including sector expertise in
fields such as health, education, democratic governance, and agriculture, as well as
specific tools that have since been jointly used within the military, such as the District
Stabilization Framework, which offers “systematic ways of analyzing issues related to
violent extremism and insurgency as well as crafting development responses based on
local conditions” (USAID, 2011, p. 1). What the study has distilled from the many U.S.
military, DOS, USAID, and interagency documents is the intense focus that has been
placed on whole-of-government approaches.
The earliest concepts were strongly advocated by the military out of necessity in
trying to succeed in irregular conflict environments when traditional approaches were not
working, but these ideas have grown steadily with strong policy contributions and
support coming from a range of civilian agencies. In the case of USAID, it has been
among the leading agencies exhibiting strong support in this effort, reflected in its own
established P/CVE related policy, including some of the earliest civilian developed
P/CVE related policies.
In summary, the second research question examined the factors that have led to
changes in P/CVE TSCTP regional policy as well as the broader USAID P/CVE foreign
assistance policy. Three themes were developed to respond to that question. Looking at
the first theme, I discussed how P/CVE policy evolution is characterized not only by
policy but also marked by major and lesser known events. Thus, this theme explores
several ways in which events, both large and small, have contributed to the evolution of
P/CVE policy. Many alive today are aware of the events of September 11, 2001, and it is
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widely known that it set into motion events that led to major conflicts that are still
ongoing today.
These current and ongoing conflicts that originated with September 11, 2001 will
affect generations to come, and are thus significant enough to be declared punctuating
event as viewed through the prism of PET. Like falling dominos, just as September 11th
set the stage for global conflicts, those conflicts in turn set the stage for other major
events that were incredibly significant in scale and global impact. Such events included
mounting war casualties, regional political and economic challenges, increases in violent
extremism, global defense and foreign policy shifts, aggressive homeland security laws,
major war expenditures, and diplomatic fissures, to name but a few.
Not all impactful events were so high-profile, and as expressed by some
interviewees, many important events that shaped policy have remained relatively
unknown. As this study points out, some important events were relatively small in
contrast to such events as September 11th, and yet were still significant within the lens of
P/CVE. It could be argued that these events were symptomatic of the larger scale events,
or viewed differently, secondary events in response. Some of these events that are
important to this study include attacks against key U.S. interests, popular demonstrations,
the growth and mobilization of extremism, P/CVE policy issuance and implementation,
and many others discussed throughout the study.
Not only are influential events defined by being physical events, such as terrorist
attacks, but can also be characterized by significant policy change. Such events can
change the current paradigm in some fashion, often having follow-on effects as one
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action often begets another set of actions. Thus, when examined as a collective whole, a
wide range of factors can have the ability to affect significant change, as it has in P/CVE
policy. As such, analysts and policy makers should look holistically at the arc of history
to understand more fully the way in which policy evolves. Ultimately, P/CVE is no
aberration in the ways in which policy can evolve, but rather what makes it unusual is the
speed of that change brought upon by the intensity of those factors.
The second theme is related to the first theme in some ways. However, the second
theme is an attempt to delve more deeply into the issue of policy evolution. This theme
addresses more exhaustively the characteristics of the factors that prompted P/CVE
policy evolution. In this theme, I demonstrated that because of ongoing conflicts, P/CVE
policy has rapidly evolved due to both significant punctuating events, as well as events
that play outsized roles. The more well-understood punctuating events are covered in the
first observation, yet the smaller and more discrete factors were not explored. In the
second theme, I attempt to lay out the argument that more minor events were markedly
impactful on P/CVE policy.
While perhaps it is not immediately clear to many why small-scale events play
such important policy and strategy reorientation roles, to those who study the history of
irregular conflict, it is well understood. That is because history is replete with examples
of how seemingly small things can compound upon themselves to create major effects.
That is in many ways the core characteristic of irregular conflict, which is the way in
which violent extremists have organized in recent years. In fact, most serious scholars of
irregular conflict would express the fallacy of not taking irregular conflict seriously as a
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viable military approach to winning over much stronger powers, and thereby achieving
military and social aims. The copious number of books and articles dedicated to the topic
reflect the importance of such conflicts and the need to better understand them. This is
largely because irregular conflict approaches give power to the disenfranchised and
seemingly powerless, and that makes it a powerful tool, just as we see it strengthening
violent extremists in many regions around the world. This point was widely
acknowledged by several interviewees.
To expound upon this concept, and to bring to light how small-scale events
compound to create major change, Mao Tse-Tung once stated that militants wear down
their opponent not with overwhelming force, but rather like gnats who are constantly
biting and exhausting the victim over time (U.S. Marine Corps, 1989). In many ways,
that is the fate of great powers struggling against large-scale violent extremism. This is
reflected in the way in which America’s recent conflicts have played out in its numerous
conflict regions, such as the TSCTP region of West Africa. Despite the large investment
of financial resources, violence continues to thrive, which at times has resulted in
devastating losses to the civilian population, as well as military losses to foreign and
domestic forces. Over time, these events compound upon themselves and can eventually
tip the scale that triggers a sudden change. Some of these rapid changes may even be
strategic in nature, such as military withdraw, or a complete reorientation of the
approaches being used. This has been the case in the TSCTP region as the civilian
approaches have become increasingly important. Therefore, this theme illustrated that
P/CVE policy has been characterized by changes due to the numerous ongoing smaller-
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scale events. In this sense, I demonstrate that it would be a mistake to solely rely on only
large well-known events to understand P/CVE evolution. Rather, a more comprehensive
examination is required as many lessons can be drawn from those lesser known events, as
is the way they combine to facilitate change. This was reflected not only in the policy
documentation in which smaller events were frequently referenced, but also in the
reflections of P/CVE practitioners who often identified both large and small scale events
as having substantial importance in the way in which P/CVE has evolved over the years.
The third observation examines how leaders and policy makers have increasingly
realized that an overreliance on military solutions was not as successful as may have been
hoped. This realization has enabled civilian agencies to become more important in
P/CVE policy and implementation. In many ways, this observation addresses the most
impactful factors driving P/CVE policy evolution. The U.S. military has long undertaken
all forms of countering extremism, from fighting terrorist organizations to performing
civil-military functions to assist allied foreign countries. The U.S. military’s robust
capabilities and resources have also meant they have often been the first to be called upon
to undertake such work. However, the U.S. military is primarily designed to fight and win
wars. Its personnel and infrastructure are oriented toward achieving that primary
function. Yet, countering extremist sentiments, and undermining those factors that drive
extremism sentiment and support, should not be assessed as the equivalent to fighting a
war. Therefore, the same approaches as fighting a war should not be used. If it is, then it
is likely to inflame the tensions and drive it to outright violence. Rather, it involves
nuanced contextual and social understanding of the distinct causes of instability in a
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respective region, and then designing interventions that will reduce support for violent
extremism. While violence is a frequent characteristic of countering violent extremism,
be it violence by the extremists or the opposing forces, several interviewees stressed that
military solutions should not be the primary way in which to counter or prevent violent
extremism. If it were, then civilian agencies play little to no role, yet the conflicts over
the past two decades reveal the fallacy of such an approach of omitting or minimizing
non-violent and non-military approaches.
This point of not relying on militaristic approaches is even more important to
understand when discussing interventions by foreign governments. To prevent violence
from growing and escalating in a region, often a non-violent approach is called for, such
as addressing the root causes that are driving grievances and popular support for violent
extremists. The military has limited capabilities in these functions, such as Civil-Affairs
units, but those functions are not the foundation of the U.S. military. The U.S. military’s
foundation and primacy of focus is combat arms. As such, those non-militaristic civilianfocused skills are expected to exist in the civilian agencies, such as USAID, America’s
premier foreign aid agency.
Instead, USAID has long been oriented toward traditional long-term development,
and conflict interventions such as counterinsurgency and stabilization has been a niche
part of USAID. The era in which USAID had a robust cohort of resources and specialists
for such operations has long disappeared and much of its capacity in this discipline has
atrophied due to limited resources. As such, by the time there was a realization that the
military cannot be solely relied upon for P/CVE interventions, USAID had only limited
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resources available, such as those found in rather niche USAID offices, such as OTI and
CMM. Naturally, those resources are substantially dwarfed by the U.S. military, and thus
largely unable to fill the void in massive conflict regions around the world. Quick
changes were needed, such as influxes of personnel and financial resources, as well as a
major examination of P/CVE related policy, to include counterterrorism,
counterinsurgency, stabilization policies, strategies, and practices. Further, by the time
this realization took hold in 2010, the surge of policy change, personnel, and resources
into USAID and DOS was overwhelming and shocking to the system, arguably creating a
reactionary approach that some have argued was sub-optimal, and in some perspectives,
not effective or properly implemented. In short, it was too little, too late. What is certain
is that this realization was among the most important contributors to significant P/CVE
policy evolution. The question of whether it was fully realized is yet another question for
future study.
Summary
In conclusion, this chapter has explored various aspects of two research questions
involving the coordination of P/CVE policy as well as factors that have contributed to the
evolution of P/CVE policy within America’s primary international development agency,
USAID. Regarding coordination, the two observations reflected that there is substantial
coordination from the highest levels of government policy making, the White House,
down to the point of implementation. For the purposes of this study, the point of
implementation being USAID’s contributions to the TSCTP in West Africa. This
coordination has taken place because of the hierarchy of policy making that is well-
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defined in American government, with subordinate organizations taking guidance from
higher-level policies, and then referencing that guidance. In the case of P/CVE related
policies, National Security Strategies provided guidance to the DOS’s strategies, which
often jointly provided guidance to USAID in the form of QDDRs and other related
documents, which then provided guidance for regional offices around the world, often in
the form of CDCS and RDCS documents. There have also been several specialized
documents written by DOS and USAID that provide more in-depth guidance to
practitioners, which helps progress policy making, as well as assist managers and
implementers of foreign aid programs, such as USAID program managers and NGO
implementers executing P/CVE programs in the field. However, this is not to argue that
the policies are effective, only to show that coordination is taking place and reflect policy
alignment. Further, the data does not demonstrate whether implementation is taking place
effectively. This study only aims to show that guidance is provided and linked at various
levels for consistency of policy guidance. Additional studies would be required to
examine the effectiveness of these policies and the quality of implementation.
In the second research question, the data reflected that there were a few key
events and policies that relatively rapidly pushed P/CVE to evolve. Naturally, the shock
of the attacks on September 11, 2001 against some of the most iconic American
structures and institutions prompted a rapid reevaluation of American foreign policy.
Perhaps by design by those violent extremists who orchestrated the attack, the
circumstances practically ensured this foreign policy reevaluation was done in the fog of
crisis, pain, and rage. In short, it practically guaranteed large-scale retaliatory approaches,
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most suited to military dominated solutions. This in fact, was indeed how the modern era
of American conflicts have ensued.
For the first several years after that attack, the responses were overwhelmingly
military and defense related, including multi-year military invasions of countries, smallscale special forces operations in various regions, and major homeland defense increases.
Over time, the documentation and public statements reveal that there was an increasing
realization that military force was not a sustainable or even complete response to
countering militant extremism. In fact, violent extremism was growing worldwide, even
in those regions receiving substantial attention, and several attacks had outsized effects
on the way in which America was responding. Many of these attacks were relatively little
known outside the foreign policy community and had only a short life in the news. Yet,
these attacks were demonstrating that this was going to be an exceptionally long
undertaking, and particularly so if the United States was to try to eradicate terrorism and
violent extremism, as was often proposed by senior politicians, including President
George W. Bush. Further, to not alter course would have entailed ever growing use of
military forces and resources, which is exhausting financially and erodes public support
domestically. In short, it was not a sustainable or realistic approach over the long term,
particularly when long and costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were ongoing.
The data shows in 2010 there was an explosion of interest in preventing and
countering violent extremism using new approaches to include development tools. This
was a period of rapid change for the field, producing numerous key documents at all
levels of the government, from the White House to the regional strategies. This period
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lasted approximately seven years until 2017.
Even today, CVE is a topic of strong interest, and while it is not anywhere near to
the level it had enjoyed under the Obama administration, it remains a significant area of
focus, and still proportionately higher than any other administration prior to President
Obama. While admittedly, it now faces an uncertain future as it remains unclear what that
precipitous decline in high-level focus will mean for P/CVE resources into the future.
What is also still unknown, as those future chapters have not yet been written, is what
will occur when other future administrations encounter P/CVE. As noted by interviewees,
it may simply morph in response to new variations of extremism, conceptually remain the
same under new titles, or as some suggest, simply fade away and be replaced by
something completely new.
In Chapter 5, I explore these six themes through a more theoretical lens. The
theories that will be used include punctuated equilibrium theory, path dependency theory,
and policy feedback theory. This will be accomplished by discussing how the use of the
theories help explain the nature of the themes. Each of these three theories offer unique
analytical tools in which to help better understand these findings and help describe what
the findings could mean in the future for P/CVE policy. Further, the chapter will discuss
the limitations of the study as well as areas that may be useful for further study.
As the reader may surmise, each of these themes has multiple aspects to it which
can be further elaborated upon. However, due to scope limitations, some aspects were not
delved into. What is clear is that many additional studies can be undertaken by other
researchers that would likely yield important insight to further the understanding of the
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way in which P/CVE policy has evolved over time. These issues and others will be
discussed in greater detail in the final chapter.
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Chapter 5: Summary, Conclusion, and Recommendations
Introduction
The purpose of this qualitative study was to understand how and why foreign
assistance policy, as it pertains to P/CVE, has evolved in recent years. This study is
qualitative in nature, exploring the rapidly changing nature of P/CVE policy. This case
study examined the interrelationship between USAID’s higher-level foreign aid policy
and the regional level implementation, exploring the factors that have led to P/CVE
policy evolution and the extent to which the USAID’s P/CVE policies are in alignment
and in coordination with one another.
As an overview of the findings within Chapter 4, there were two research
questions. The first question explored the nature of P/CVE policy coordination across the
government, from the highest levels of policy making to the point of regional
implementation. The three themes identified in the first research question reflected that
there is substantial coordination from the highest levels of government policy making
down to the point of implementation in the TSCTP countries of West Africa. While
P/CVE has evolved very rapidly in recent years, P/CVE has really developed over
decades of foreign policy changes due to evolving global events and responses. Yet, the
fact that there has been coordination across the government as it pertains to P/CVE policy
development and communication does not suggest that the policies are effective, only
that coordination is generally occurring and thus reflecting a degree of policy alignment.
Rather, the third observation, examining the lack of definitional clarity and general
concern about the future of P/CVE, likely reflects that the policies require a deeper
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examination. The interviewees often spoke at length about the lack of clarity in what
exactly constitutes a P/CVE approach and what makes it truly distinct from other
development and stabilization approaches. Or, as also suggested, is it just a catch-all
approach meant to be more of a way of distributing funds and checking boxes for
earmarked congressional funds than defining a clear approach with unique goals. Further,
the interview data suggested that policy alignment and coordination is not necessarily the
underlying problem affecting P/CVE policy and implementation, but rather that there are
other challenges undermining this definitional clarity.
The second research question was an examination of the factors that have
contributed to P/CVE policy evolution. The findings reflect that there have been key
events and policies that helped catalyze P/CVE evolution. Most notably, the attacks on
September 11, 2001 prompted many military related responses that led to long-term
effects across the globe. This was by far the most consistent and dominant theme found in
the document and interview analysis. However, while this is a catalyzing moment in
P/CVE evolution, it does not tell the entire story of how and why the policy has evolved.
In the early days of those responses to September 11th, international development was
not a significant component of the Global War on Terror. However, there was an
increasing realization over time that military force was not a panacea to mitigating
violent extremism and that a more sophisticated approach was required. In fact, over the
next two decades, evidence suggested that violent extremism was only growing in scale
and intensity. Slowly, development interventions began to gain a more prominent place in
programs aimed at countering and preventing violent extremism.
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The document analysis demonstrates that in 2010 there was an explosion of
interest in preventing and countering violent extremism using new approaches, notably
substantially including development tools. This led to a period of rapid change for the
field, producing numerous key policy and guidance documents at all levels of the
government, from the White House to regional and country level strategies. This period
lasted approximately 7 years until 2017. Under the new administration, policy focus has
lessened, but not disappeared. In fact, P/CVE remains relatively robust in the field, Thus,
despite the lack of significant senior level government focus, its continued existence may
reflect that it has entered a normalization period in which it no longer requires such highlevel focus for sustainment.
Today, P/CVE remains a topic of strong interest, and while it does not have the
level of focus on it as it did under the previous administration, it remains a significant
policy field with programs being implemented internationally. The West African region
hosting the TSCTP remains ongoing today. The field now faces a more uncertain future
as it remains unclear what the decrease in high-level policy focus means for P/CVE
resources in the future. The lack of definitional clarity also is troubling to practitioners
and policy makers alike. Yet, these questions are opportunities for future studies to
explore.
Interpretation of the Findings
There has been little research that discusses in a significant manner the issues
relevant to the study’s research questions. Thus, little exists that speaks to P/CVE policy
alignment in the U.S. government, and few if any significant peer-reviewed papers
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directly discuss what factors have led to P/CVE policy evolution. Further, few if any
peer-reviewed papers analyzed P/CVE policies and factors of evolution through the lens
of PET, PD, or PFT. As such, this study serves to extend knowledge in this aspect of
public policy and administration.
A reading of the literature review reflects a strong emphasis on specific technical
fields of development and stabilization, including such programmatic approaches as
using education, governance, youth, and other such development interventions to achieve
the goal of countering or preventing violent extremism. There are also numerous P/CVE
related studies that suggest ways in which policies and/or programs can be made more
effective, or conversely, eliminated. Further, studies and literature reviews have also
discussed the disparate nature of CVE, calling on government policymakers to develop
more clear definitions and guidelines. However, none of this literature specifically looks
at policy alignment in government or the factors that have contributed to P/CVE policy
evolution, making this study novel in many ways. This contributes to the field by looking
at the topic with a new perspective rather than merely seeing it as a technical discipline, a
set of technical approaches combined to achieve some stated objective, or restating
definitional and programmatic limitations that have already been thoroughly explored in
past literature reviews. In short, I sought to examine P/CVE not from a technical,
definitional, or functional aspect, but rather through a deeper understanding of policy
connections and the way in which this set of policies has evolved over time. With this
study, I sought to examine P/CVE policy coordination across the government as well as
reflect how events, both large and small, have affected policy development and evolution,
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and then discuss it more fully through specific theoretical lenses.
Given this approach, the study’s findings do not directly speak to many of the
more technical aspects found in the literature review, or in most existing studies for that
matter. For example, this study did not explore whether one technical approach is
superior to another, the way in which certain approaches are effective or not, or which
development approach works best in countering or preventing violent extremism. Such a
study was outside the scope of this research effort as it would require extensive analysis
and several additional studies to include extensive impact assessments. Instead, this study
explored identified themes through a qualitative P/CVE policy lens, aided by a theoretical
framework, and examined the nature of the P/CVE policy coordination and evolution.
Nevertheless, the themes within this study at times touched upon the technical aspects
found within P/CVE programs, particularly those throughout the TSCTP region, and
other geographical regions. This is because high level policy can broadly affect
implementation across a broad spectrum of programs.
Certainly, the way in which Washington-level policy changes can affect, and be
affected by, regional politics and policy implementation. In part, this is because of an
increasingly interconnected world in that events in one region can ripple outward. P/CVE
policy and programs are not immune to this phenomenon. P/CVE policy and programs
are not wholly separate from other policies and global phenomena, but rather just one
small element of a broader global picture. Therefore, the same events that affect and
shape TSCTP policy have effects in East Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere. And
while detailed research on P/CVE policy and implementation in each distinct
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geographical region is necessary due to contextual differences in circumstances and
culture, this study can speak to some of the issues in other regions as well. This study
contributes to a broader geography and policy arena than merely the western Africa
region. Thus, lessons and discussions found within this paper can be extrapolated for
broader P/CVE policy analysis and consideration.
The first research question offers three identified themes. This research question
asks if regional policy, as reflected in the TSCTP, has been implemented in alignment
with USAID’s P/CVE foreign assistance policy. The study noted the following three
themes:
•

USAID takes significant guidance from external and internal processes, and
these processes ensure policy coordination within the agency down to the
point of implementation.

•

Shifting policies have reflected coordinated periods of policy change, from
high-level national P/CVE policies and strategies to the regional P/CVE
strategies. As such, the policy documents reflect distinct P/CVE policy
phases; and

•

Some P/CVE practitioners have uncertainty about the way in which P/CVE is
implemented, how it is defined, and whether it has a viable future.

In various ways, all three of these observations touch upon the three theoretical
lenses used throughout the study, to include PET, PFT, and PD. Thus, the lenses help
provide explanatory power to more deeply understand the factors of evolution and the
way in which this policy has been coordinated within the U.S. Government. Yet, it is also

229
important to note that the objective of using these theoretical lenses was not to make a
case as to whether the practices and approaches that USAID has taken relating to P/CVE
policy have been effective or ineffective. Rather, the theoretical lenses serve as an
important tool to deepen the understanding of how and why the observed P/CVE policy
events occurred. Further, these explanations help those in the field of public policy better
understand and examine the way in which these policies have evolved over the years.
To begin, it is important to acknowledge how punctuated equilibrium theory
broadly touches upon the research questions and observations holistically. This
theoretical lens serves as a foundation to understanding why P/CVE exists in its current
form. P/CVE and its predecessor policy approaches, such as the Global War on
Terrorism, burst onto the scene following September 11, 2001. Since then, the U.S. has
been involved in multiple conflicts around the world with the goal of mitigating terrorism
and violent extremism at home and abroad. In some ways, that rapid change can be
reduced to a single day, and it is reflective of the way in which punctuated equilibrium
theory can help explore this phenomenon. PET explores the way in which very rapid
change occurs after long periods of stasis or policy stability. It can be argued that few
events in American history have created the type of change that September 11, 2001 set
in motion, particularly after such a long period of relative foreign policy stability. This is
not to suggest that the events of September 11th occurred independent of other global
events, such as the end of the Cold War, changing global economics, the perceived
oppression of Muslims, and the Israeli occupation of Palestine, but it does point to a
single set of events in a very short period of time that have had enormous ramifications
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for the United States and many other countries around the world.
Further, while terrorist events in the 1990s made headlines, such as attacks in
Africa against diplomatic missions and a previous attack on the World Trade Center,
those paled in comparison to the extraordinarily deadly and effective attacks on
September 11th. It exposed domestic security vulnerabilities as well as poorly understood
foreign policy challenges and the way in which those challenges have evolved over time.
Today, the U.S. is still grappling with the fallout of this period of punctuated change,
which in part involves many ongoing conflicts it remains engaged in, or in some way
with which it is still affiliated. These conflicts are now multi-generational and many of
today’s young people have been born into these conflicts. Even more catastrophic is that
many have been directly involved in or affected by these conflicts and wars, be it
physical injury, psychological trauma, or the loss of a loved one. In short, these conflicts
have taken a heavy toll internationally, and especially so to the affected regions.
To further reinforce the punctuated nature of this event, that single day on
September 11, 2001 has been the predominant driver of follow-on events that have had
incalculable effects that will likely never be fully understood, and perhaps not fully
resolved for generations. Thus, while this was a punctuated event, it was a paradigm
altering event that scholars and policy makers will long study into the future. Given these
realizations, the attacks on September 11th serve as one of the ultimate examples in
modern history for which PET can impart insight into the nature of how the P/CVE
policy phenomenon so rapidly manifested and then evolve.
The first theme discusses the nature of how USAID takes policy guidance from
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internal and external processes. Policy feedback theory focuses heavily on the way in
which policies affect politics and thus political decision making. But it must be
understood that policies are crafted over time and often among multiple stakeholders
providing input and feedback. Policy coordination is one of those mechanisms, and it is a
major point of focus between USAID and the DOS due to their often-overlapping
mandates and efforts regarding foreign aid and other foreign policy interagency
requirements.
P/CVE is inherently political, not just within extremist circles but also within
policy making circles of those that seek to mitigate violent extremism. Thus, P/CVE and
its predecessor policies and strategies have largely been affected by political interests,
which in turn have affected policies. This phenomenon also can circle in the opposite
direction as well, and it can well be argued that P/CVE policies have affected political
decision making. Failed or successful P/CVE policies can, and have, influenced political
decision making. This can be traced back decades to previous conflicts, but also more
recently when examining political decision making and focus on less successful P/CVE
interventions in West Africa, to include the TSCTP countries. This fact is readily
observable in that the TSCTP has been in place since 2005, the January 2019 submission
of H.R. 192—Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Act, which states its aim as
follows:
To address critical security, political, economic, and humanitarian challenges in
these regions of Africa, a coordinated, interagency approach is needed to
appropriately allocate resources, share responsibility, de-conflict programs, and
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maximize the effectiveness of United States defense, diplomatic, and
development capabilities. (2019)
What this represents is not only the reality that politics can be inherently tied to violent
conflict, but that political approaches are also required to address this linkage. It therefore
requires that foreign policy agencies to come together to find solutions to violent
extremism. In this sense, not only does it directly argue that politics must be addressed to
counter violent extremism, but also reveals the way in which policies and politics
interact. Thus, there is an inescapable relationship between politics and policy, and
P/CVE policy is no exception.
Further, policy feedback theory can describe P/CVE policy within the
bureaucratic and institutional structures of the U.S. government. Policy coordination is
generally considered an effective practice as it helps ensure partnering agencies are
communicating properly for various purposes, such as for resource allocation and future
operational planning. Further, the DOS is a White House Cabinet level agency in the U.S.
Government as the lead foreign affairs agency, and thus USAID should and must
coordinate on many issues, to include at times coordinating on P/CVE policies and
programs. This has been demonstrated many times with P/CVE policy, such as in the
QDDR, joint strategies, and country level strategies coordinated between the agencies.
This is a significant point where policy feedback theory can offer explanatory assistance
to this study, particularly in that the DOS has a Cabinet level seat and therefore maintains
significant foreign policy agenda setting influence at the highest levels of U.S.
governance.
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The United States Cabinet is a critical bureaucratic structure that affords senior
political officials the opportunity to come together to consider politics and policies at the
highest and most influential point of U.S. governance. This is the manifestation of what
Moe (1993) discusses by stating, “bureaucracy arises out of politics, and its design
reflects the interests, strategies, and compromises of those who exercise political power”
(p. 267). Thus, this is the point at which agenda setting can and often does occur, and
where Cabinet level political interests are defined and formulated into policy to be further
expounded upon at the respective agency level, including the DOS and USAID. Further,
as agencies are governed by policy as well as political leadership in various
manifestations, it is where policy interests are communicated and thus affects political
decision making at the operational levels, from the highest levels of the agency to the
point of implementation, such as country and regional strategies (e.g., the TSCTP).
Therefore, not only does the Cabinet structure help demonstrate why USAID must
coordinate and take guidance from the DOS, but it also helps explain how politics and
policies, including those of P/CVE, affect one another through the interplay of policy
coordination throughout all levels of the organizations. In fact, one could argue that the
policy infrastructure is specifically designed to encourage and even mandate policy
coordination, and particularly so for foreign policy agencies such as the DOS and
USAID.
The second theme, focusing on the phases of P/CVE policy evolution, can be
examined through the lens of path dependence theory. PD states that policies have a way
of reinforcing other policy, often attributed to institutional and historical interests. These
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reinforcing policy interests have a way in which policies and practices are entrenched
over time. For example, the primary response to the attacks on September 11th was the
overwhelming use of military force. Over the nearly 20 years of constant warfare, an
overwhelming reliance on the use of military interventions remained relatively constant.
This has been ongoing despite civilian and military officials frequently stating that the
predominant reliance on the military will not achieve success. In short, the approach
became, largely due to systemic level drivers, deeply entrenched and self-reinforcing.
Today, we continue to see an overwhelming reliance on military force to achieve
CVE goals while civilian development agencies struggle against constant budget
limitations and ongoing attempts at major budget reductions, leading to staffing and
planning challenges (Saldinger, 2020). This in effect, reduces their effectiveness
regardless of how many influential military and political leaders call for greater
contributions from the civilian agencies, such as USAID. This is further reflected in a
vast budget disparity when contrasting military and development interventions. USAID
has budgeted approximately $68 million in the TSCTP region over six years (USAID,
2019) while the security assistance budget from the DOS alone, not inclusive of the
DOD’s assistance, has amounted to $323 million since only 2018 (Schmitt, 2020). This
trend has continued over the past 20 years even though security and regional stability
continues to slip and while military leaders have pleaded for years for greater
development and diplomatic assistance. One such example has been Admiral Mike
Mullen’s consistent statements for more robust civilian assistance, and recently stating,
“the more we cut the international affairs budget, the higher the risk for longer and
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deadlier military operations.” (Mullen, 2020, para. 9). However, while he and other
senior civilian and military official have consistently made these arguments over many
years, little has changed in the budget environment, if not having become even more dire
for USAID and the DOS.
This is a critically important point as it pertains to the entrenched approaches and
tools the government uses to counter extremism. Obviously, the budget and committed
levels of resources most clearly reflects how policy makers choose to approach a
problem. Therefore, significant budget allocations to military approaches at the expense
of development and diplomatic approaches reflects the desire to rely heavily on military
operations to solve foreign policy challenges. The budget numbers are self-evident of this
deep-seated trend of military reliance. Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. Government
has provided $2 trillion for the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget (also
known as the Global War on Terror), which is designed to fund overseas conflicts (CRS,
2019). Notably, this amount is not inclusive of the already expansive and growing U.S.
defense budget (World Bank, 2018), which has been further added to with $1.8 trillion of
the OCO budget, leaving only the remaining $200 billion for several other agencies to
split among themselves (CRS, 2019). The differences in operational capabilities, and the
overwhelming reliance upon defense-focused approaches over development approaches,
can hardly be clearer when contrasting those budgetary numbers.
Therefore, when examining P/CVE policies through the lens of PD, it is important
to understand the broader picture of how government agencies are funded and the
consequences of budgeting. Budgeting is arguably the most tangible aspects of agenda
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setting in public administration and policy implementation. Budgets affect government
agencies holistically, from staffing to procurement and just about everything related to
implementation. If there is no money to implement a policy, and the policy remains only
words in a document, then the policy is relatively insignificant when contrasted with a
well-resourced policy. Thus, those policies that can be implemented, especially robustly
implemented, gain traction through action while those that are not remain largely
irrelevant.
Further, policy industries and economic ecosystems form around well-funded
agencies tasked with implementing resourced policies. There are few better examples
than looking at how and where defense contracts are procured and the way in which jobs
are created from those contracts. Those contracts are a direct result of policies being
funded and implemented. However, USAID has extremely few contracts that are major
job generators on anywhere near the scale that DOD offers in various states and regions.
USAID operates overseas and the work can be characterized as far more specialized and
niche than the broad range of functions that comprise defense work. That contrast is
obvious to most policy makers and politicians. Given this, defense contracts are not only
seen as important to the defense of the country, but it is also a significant job-creator
across the country, and this is an especially important consideration for politicians and
private sector industry leaders. In other words, it can contribute to the welfare of a
politician’s constituency, and that can be a strong motivator for political decision making.
Yet, the question that remains is whether it has become too entrenched for these reasons,
and thus affecting policy making at the expense of deciding on the best policy approach.
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In short, there is a natural tendency to continue to opt for the most readily available
options, and in the case of P/CVE implementation, military options are almost always
readily available to policy makers. Yet, availability should not be the sole deciding factor,
by policy makers and other stakeholders, as tantamount to appropriateness in how
policies are implemented.
The key points on this matter that experts and long-time practitioners and senior
leaders like Admiral Mike Mullen consistently make is that the budget is
disproportionately focused on military solutions at the expense of development and
diplomatic solutions. This argument very much incorporates issues relevant to P/CVE
and related policy issues. Thus, when the civilian agencies are far less funded, it can have
the effect of inhibiting options and tools that may be more appropriate in the struggle
against violent extremism even in the face of data demonstrating that the current efforts
are not achieving success. Data also overwhelmingly demonstrates that the military has
long been, and will likely remain for the foreseeable future, the dominant foreign policy
budget recipient. Thus, the U.S. has entrenched itself in military reliant P/CVE policy
approaches, not only in the TSCTP region, but around the world. This is the very essence
of what PD points out as it pertains to reinforcing systems that affect policy making even
when change would be beneficial to meeting stated national security objectives. Thus,
USAID’s role in P/CVE policy implementation can in part be explained and further
examined through the PD lens.
The third observation, that practitioners have expressed concern about how
P/CVE is defined and its future viability, may in part be explored through a theoretical
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lens. However, given the limited nature of the three theoretical lenses used in this study, a
deeper exploration would likely require additional theoretical lenses outside the scope of
this study. Yet, some of the confusion expressed by the interviewees may be directly
connected to the way in which P/CVE policies have so rapidly evolved in recent years.
The rate of change was mentioned frequently in the interviews. Rapid change is a core
element of PET. As discussed, the predecessor policies and concepts have long predated
modern concepts of P/CVE, yet the field has undergone extraordinary change in recent
years.
Prior to the wave of P/CVE attention, some stasis had existed over the previous
past decades as the U.S. focused its policy attention to traditional combat operations,
particularly during the Cold War. One could even argue that irregular approaches, such as
counterinsurgency operations, had seen a degree of policy stasis during the Cold War.
However, since 2010, P/CVE has been on the forefront of changing policy pertaining to
conflict intervention, particularly as the focus of counterinsurgency declined with
American forces departing Iraq and decreasing its presence in Afghanistan. Thus, P/CVE
became the new policy receiving significant attention whereas merely a few short years
prior, counterinsurgency was the trending policy approach. This quick shift from one tool
to another may have had a hand in creating some cynicism as to what P/CVE is and
whether it has a viable future beyond being merely a short-lived policy trend.
Further, the definition of P/CVE has been challenging to distill and precisely
clarify the manner in how it differs from traditional development and stabilization
approaches. This is only amplified by the fact that P/CVE tools differ little if at all from

239
traditional development tools, but rather, predominantly, it is the expressed objectives
that differ, often within conflict affected regions. For example, P/CVE aims to achieve
fundamentally political and social objectives, such as addressing the root causes of
violent extremism, and at times the mitigation of violent extremism, to keep it from
developing or continuing in affected foreign countries or regions. However, that is often
the program objective in many foreign policy interventions, including USAID, DOS, and
DOD programs that do not explicitly mention CVE. This lack of clarity may be a
symptom of the way in which politics and policies interact, causing it to develop into a
sort of catchall concept in which nearly all approaches can fit.
As demonstrated in this study, P/CVE has been heavily affected by political
interests, never so much as during the Obama administration’s emphasis on developing
P/CVE policies, and doing so with an attempt at ramping up civilian agency operations to
assist military operations. This period reflects a deeply ambiguous and chaotic
environment during a time of multiple conflicts and a rapidly changing environment. This
is further complicated when examining how the Obama administration reoriented a
previous set of policies put into place by the Bush administration, then popularly phrased
as the War on Terror, which relied heavily on military intervention and implementation.
Further, many of the tools that are considered P/CVE tools are a mix of traditional
development approaches (e.g., economic, health, youth, justice, and governance
assistance), stabilization operations (e.g., assistance to stabilize a country or region
following a crisis), and counterinsurgency approaches (e.g., assistance using a
combination of development and military approaches to defeat insurgents), and often
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using similar terminology and stated objectives of those disciplines. Yet, despite the
muddiness of the P/CVE definitions and programs, it has continued to be a policy focus
from the highest levels of government, including the White House and Congress. Further,
the results have been mixed and violence continues to increase in many parts of the
world. These issues have come together to sow confusion in the minds of some
practitioners. It may be that little can be done in the interest of policy clarification due to
the inherent muddiness of the issues P/CVE seeks to influence. However, additional
analysis should be done to more fully understand this phenomenon so that policy makers
can craft clearer, and perhaps more effective, policies for implementers and analysts.
The second research question is a discussion of the factors that have led to
changes in P/CVE TSCTP regional policy as well as the broader USAID P/CVE foreign
assistance policy. This question led to the development of three themes:
•

P/CVE policy evolution is characterized not only by documented policy change
but has also been influenced by key events and conceptual shifts in thinking.

•

Due to ongoing conflicts, P/CVE policy has rapidly evolved due to both
significant punctuating events, as well as events that play outsized roles.

•

Leaders and policy makers realized that an overreliance on military solutions
was not achieving success. This led to civilian agencies entering the policy
equation, interagency coordination developing, and P/CVE related policies
rapidly evolving.

The first two themes in response to the second research question can best be
understood through the PET lens. Both of those observations touch on the fact that key
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events have continued to alter P/CVE policy. The findings incorporated into those themes
demonstrate that P/CVE policy has rapidly evolved due in large part to evolving
circumstances. Predominantly, these violent circumstances were a result of ongoing
violent conflict, whether it be in the West African TSCTP regions or elsewhere.
However, it is important to point out that it isn’t just violence in some form that has led to
change, but also that even new policies can affect significant change. This is noteworthy
in that in the field of P/CVE, which touches on violent extremism, it might be easy to
conclude that conflict and violence itself is what alters the course of policies that touch
on this issue. However, shifts in policy and strategy itself can holistically alter the way in
which P/CVE policies and programs operate. This is especially the case as it pertains to
regional and country level policies. For example, if high level policy supports P/CVE
operations, then it is likely that this will substantially affect regional and country P/CVE
programs. Likewise, if senior level policy withdraws support for P/CVE, then it likely
that those programs will be scaled back or eliminated at the point of implementation.
However, PET has its limitations as it pertains to these observations because
P/CVE has experienced extraordinarily little policy stasis yet. It is simply too new in its
current form and has undergone continuous change. However, if I were to expand the
scope of the study to include previous decades in which elements of P/CVE was
identified differently, such as including counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, counter
radicalization, stabilization operations, or other similar disciplines, then it could be more
readily argued that it has undergone relative stasis. However, in the interest of looking
specifically at the modern era of P/CVE, this study demonstrates that there has been little
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policy stasis to date. The rapid change in P/CVE policy also eliminates PD as rapid
change does not reflect entrenched practices. Further, PFT is likely also not an
appropriate explanatory theoretical lens for these two observations. That is because
rapidly changing policies due to specific key events, and how those factors have affected
P/CVE policy, do not necessarily provide insight into the way in which politics are
affects by those specific change. To explore that aspect would require an additional
study, such as attempting to show how P/CVE policy changes, and the events that have
led to those changes, to political decision making. However, from a broader perspective
the existence and support of P/CVE policies can influence politics, yet it is much more
challenging to isolate specific P/CVE related events onto causative factors of political
change.
The third observation is perhaps the best example of how all three theoretical
lenses can be informative in more deeply examining this phenomenon. The third
observation examines the way in which policy evolved due to a realization that military
solutions were not achieving the desired objectives of reducing violent extremism in key
parts of the world. Equally important to this observation is that this was widely and
unabashedly communicated to the public and policy making community, including from
military and civilian elites, including generals, ambassadors, and leading academics.
Given this, this study demonstrates three important theoretical aspects to understanding
P/CVE policy. First, it involves the initial events that created modern P/CVE approaches
and policies, which can be examined through PET. Secondly, it involves the politics of
P/CVE and related approaches, and how the discipline became a prominent discussion in
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the public, the policy making circles, and the practitioner community. As such, this offers
itself to examining P/CVE through the PFT lens. Third, it also incorporates the
standardized and long-entrenched approaches that the U.S. government has tended to lean
in favor of during times of conflict, which is the reliance on military might at the expense
of civilian approaches. Yet, as will be discussed below, there was a rapid change to give
greater attention to development tools to counter violent extremism, a fact that affords
P/CVE to be more fully understood through PD.
Looking first through the PET lens, as discussed, modern P/CVE came into being
due in large part to the attacks on September 11, 2001 and the violent conflicts that
unfolded afterwards. While USAID was early in the country after the initial invasion,
establishing its presence in 2002, it was asked to do work that it was not structurally
prepared to undertake nor part of its traditional approaches (USIP, 2002). Further,
USAID was not the lead agency tasked with providing much of the assistance and
making the most important strategic decisions on foreign assistance approaches in the
country, as that responsibility fell to the far more robust DOD. USAID’s approaches had
been traditionally more development focused in relatively stable environments conducive
to development. And while USAID has had organizations like the Office of Transition
Initiatives (OTI) since 1994, which focuses on laying the early groundwork for long-term
development, that work was a much more niche aspect of USAID’s toolkit (USAID,
2010, para. 1). In short, the early work required of USAID was an approach that USAID
normally would not electively undertake, as they were not scaled for that level of effort in
such a challenging environment, and very well may not yet be (USAID, 2017). In sum,
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the enormous impact on USAID drove overwhelming change within USAID which is
still be felt today. This level of impact based on a single event is the quintessential
example of how PET effects public policy.
Moving from how overwhelming events lead to change, we also see how PD
played an important role in this realization. The U.S. has long relied on overwhelming
military strength, which is well reflected in the level of resources expended on it and
political focus placed on it. As such, it is not surprising that policy makers turn to the
military to solve many conflict related challenges overseas. As demonstrated in this study
in contrasting budgetary levels, the resources spent on the military versus development is
vastly dissimilar in favoring defense. In fact, this has been the case for decades.
Naturally, vastly different budgetary allocations have palpable effects in the way in
which foreign policy is developed and implemented. This played out after September 11th
with the military being the leading agency in many conflict environments tasked with
combating violent extremism, including in the TSCTP countries and well beyond. This
reality reflects how entrenched approaches played into the way in which the United
States initially confronted P/CVE related challenges.
This palpable shift to incorporate development alongside defense-based
approaches, termed the 3Ds and inclusive of defense, diplomacy, and development,
began in earnest with the Secretary of State’s 2010 speech at the Center for Global
Development. Secretary Clinton stated that, “coordination among the so-called Three Ds
has often fallen short, and everyone has borne the consequences…The United States will
achieve our best results when we approach our foreign policy as an integrated whole,
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rather than just the sum of its parts” (Clinton, 2010, para. 43). This statement was
subsequently reflected in the pivotal 2010 QDDR policy, reflecting a major shift in the
strategy in which the U.S. government was approaching challenges such as P/CVE.
Coupled with critical statements coming from military elites regarding an overreliance on
military force in P/CVE related roles, it was clear that America was seeking a new path
forward in conflict and CVE environments.
These comments, and the subsequent QDDR documents in 2010 and 2015,
demonstrate how major events initially shocked the system and led to major reactions,
illustrative of PET, yet interestingly, also reflective of how entrenched approaches also
served as a sort of fallback during that chaotic period. The initial seismic changes were
clearly that America found itself, almost overnight, from being in peace to being in major
conflicts around the world. This forced enormous troop buildups and the preparation to
fight in irregular conflict environment, something America had an aversion toward since
Vietnam. Yet, what was not changed was the heavy reliance on military might, which
was a long-standing approach. Smaller, yet significant changes were to come later, and in
this case in 2010, a major policy shift from an excessive reliance upon the military to
incorporate development more readily into these many conflict environments, terming the
new approach the 3Ds. These changes, coupled with the ongoing critical statements from
military elites on the need to incorporate diplomacy and development in conflict zones,
reflects how PET and PD have had significant interplay in the modern CVE era.
While likely not necessarily as prominent as PET and PD, PFT also offers some
explanatory assistance to the broad realization that military might was not leading to the
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intended results in CVE environments. As mentioned, military and political elites were
increasingly discussing the need to expand America’s tools beyond the overwhelming
reliance upon military might. After approximately nine years of ongoing conflict it was
clear that the military may not have the tools and expertise necessary to be successful in
non-traditional conflict environments, such as fighting extremists and insurgents among
civilian populations. This realization alone is extraordinary, considering the U.S. yields
the most powerful military that has ever existed, yet finds itself coming up short against
very often low-tech combatants. This speaks volumes to the strategic power of irregular
conflict, such as those often employed by violent extremists, and why military might
alone is not sufficient in such environments.
Limitations of the Study
Due to the nature of the study’s substantial reliance upon document analysis as
part of the methodology, there were few limitations to trustworthiness of the data. In
terms of credibility, the document analysis methodology places strict limitations on
which documents can and should be included for analysis. In the case of this study, only
finalized and publicly available policy documents detailing P/CVE policies, and very
closely related definitional disciplines, or predecessor policies, were included for data
collection and analysis. This provided a clear audit trail in determining the credibility of
the policy document as all included documents were published on the respective agency’s
website. This methodology also provided the capability of data triangulation, as related
policy documents often cite other policy documents, particularly policies that are senior
level policies from higher levels of government. Policy documents are also very
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frequently referred to in peer reviewed papers and in published analytical studies.
Further, the interviewees often identified specific policies and strategies that they felt
were most relevant and played a significant role in their work in the field. Collectively,
this affords the analyst the ability to determine the level of credibility for each respective
policy document.
The level of credibility of the interviewees was also attainable through their
record of published papers. Each interviewee has published papers in some form over the
course of their careers. This provided an audit trail of sorts for their respective level of
experience. Further, many of these interviewees have published widely known papers and
studies over the years, which again provides an audit trail for their knowledge and
experience in the P/CVE discipline.
The methodology was designed to follow strict guidelines to only include formal
published policy documents, thus helping to ensure the source credibility and
trustworthiness. Further, the methodology for interviewees was designed in a way so as
to only recruit and include interviewee participants who have specific experience
pertaining to programs that were classified as P/CVE or its predecessor policies, to
include stabilization operations, counterinsurgency, and non-military counterterrorism
interventions prior to the development of modern P/CVE policy. Many of the
interviewees had robust experience across the range of programs that fell under the
auspices of current P/CVE policies and its predecessor policies. Given these
methodological procedures, the integrity and trustworthiness of the collected material, the
analysis, and the conclusions was maintained throughout the study.
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Recommendations
Each of the recommendations touch on the themes identified during this study. As
with any academic study, there are scope limitations that limit how far a study can go in
terms of collecting and analyzing documents and interviews. However, studies often
uncover and touch upon additional questions and concerns that may warrant further
academic research for the future. This study is no exception in that regard. As such, there
are reflections and recommendations associated with each of the study’s themes. Each
theme is restated below along with the associated recommendations for future study.
The first theme in research question 1 argues that USAID takes significant
guidance from external and internal processes, and these processes ensure policy
coordination within the agency down to the point of implementation. This reflects
significant evidence that policy coordination is occurring at all levels of the P/CVE
policy making process. However, while the policy documentation, and which was
confirmed by interviewees, offered significant evidence at a higher level of coordination,
including finalized interagency policy documents, this study did not go into significant
details as to the many coordination mechanisms that are ongoing. This was avoided due
to the interest of not disclosing sensitive information. Conducting a new study on the
specifics of which meetings and how these committees are formed would be important to
building an understanding of the intricacies of policy making as it pertains to P/CVE and
other fields. Further, because P/CVE is a rapidly evolving discipline, such an exercise
would be informative for future policy makers as to the lessons learned in coordinating
such a rapidly evolving policy field. Much of this analysis may only be achievable
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internally to the respective government agencies but would remain valuable for senior
policy makers, agency leadership, and historians. Naturally, releasing an unclassified
analysis to the public would offer additional value to the wider academic community of
public policy scholars and thus likely inspire broader application. Such an internal study
of how P/CVE evolved would also be highly credible and thus of significant interest to a
wider community.
The second theme examined how shifting policies have reflected coordinated periods
of policy change, from high-level national P/CVE policies and strategies to the regional
P/CVE strategies. As such, the policy documents reflect distinct P/CVE policy phases. In
this theme, discernible policy themed trends were revealed in key high-level policy
documents, such as the White House National Security Strategy. The theme also explored
some of the catalysts that led to those emerging policy themes that in part defined
specific P/CVE related policy periods. However, while the published policy documents
supported this observation, it did not examine exactly how they affect violent extremism
in those countries during those periods. For example, it is often discussed in various
academic papers the way in which the Cold War led to an increase in insurgencies and
the use of terrorist tactics. However, it remains relatively unclear if those circumstances
set the stage for today’s challenges in countering and preventing violent extremism.
Such a study would likely provide important analysis in linking past actors and events
to today’s challenges in P/CVE. Naturally, this would often be specific to the
circumstances applicable to respective regions and countries, and even specific extremist
groups and how responses were made to those groups, but a strong understanding in how
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historical actors have set the stage for today’s challenges may help scholars and policy
makers better understand how to address root causes before they evolve into a broader
and potentially deadlier set of challenges. Further, understanding in greater detail
specifically how and why P/CVE, and its predecessor policy eras evolved from one stage
into another, would be informative for current and future policy makers and P/CVE
practitioners.
The third theme discusses how P/CVE practitioners have uncertainty about the
way in which P/CVE is implemented, how it is defined, and whether it has a viable
future. This theme was a unique observation that was derived from interview analysis
rather than policy documents. This theme is an important point of consideration because
it touches upon the way in which the field of P/CVE is perceived by those who know it
best. While this theme placed a lens on the broad perceptions of P/CVE, particularly in
how coordination occurs, it does not go into detail as to the effects of policy
implementation resulting from these perceptions.
It is sometimes stated that perception is a form of reality. The way in which a
policy is perceived may very well shape the reality in which a respective policy is
implemented. As such, a potentially important aspect of this observation was not fully
explored in this study, which is the question of whether the nature of perception by
P/CVE practitioners have an effect in the way in which it is applied in the field. There is
a certain psychological aspect to this, and that question is arguably outside the specific
realm of public policy, but an exploration of perception and P/CVE policy
implementation may be useful to understand the discipline more fully. As such, another
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recommendation would be to examine the relationship more deeply between the way in
which policy perception occurs and the nature of the respective policy implementation.
The next three themes that comprise the response to research question 2, referred
to here as observations four through six, explore the factors that have led to changes in
P/CVE TSCTP regional policy as well as the broader USAID P/CVE foreign assistance
policy. The fourth observation examines how P/CVE policy evolution is characterized
not only by documented policy change but has also been influenced by key events and
conceptual shifts in thinking. This theme brings to the fore the issue that the way in
which certain events affect P/CVE has not been well anticipated. Predictive analysis
appears to be lacking and therefore much of the change was reactive rather than
proactive. The next two themes, five and six, touch on this reactionism approach to
P/CVE policy, and therefore I strongly believe more quality analysis would strongly
benefit policy development in this field. For example, as I undertook this research and
read into the history of countering violent extremism, I was surprised to find that so much
of what the world experienced in places such as Vietnam was playing out so similarly in
places like Iraq and Afghanistan, and now in places like the TSCTP region of West
Africa. Volumes have been written over the past few decades about the need to place a
strong emphasis on non-military approaches, and thereby work closer with the population
to limit opportunities for violent extremists and other militants to gain favor with the
population. However, as the next two observations point out, America was again slow to
learn these past lessons and develop solutions that were well documented in detail. As
such, I recommend greater attention be placed on historical and comparative analysis
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within the foreign policy community, to be better positioned for future and ongoing
conflicts. And further, ensure these lessons are maintained as part of continuous
professional development and training in military and civilian agencies alike. In short,
they should not be learned and then forgotten, just to see the same mistakes repeated.
The fifth theme discusses that due to ongoing conflicts, P/CVE policy has rapidly
evolved due to both significant punctuating events, as well as events that played outsized
roles. Similarly, this points out that major and minor events play major roles in shaping
P/CVE policy. This theme surprised me in that I thought I would find that major events,
such as major attacks against the United States, were more impactful. From my early
perspective, that seemed more logical. However, the documents and interviewees often
pointed out that just as though major events may jolt the system emphatically into major
reforms and changes, the cumulative effect of smaller and seemingly more minor events
also have a major effect on policy. In this sense, considering a phenomenon as the sum of
the whole provides a more important glimpse into evolution than singling out one major
event or another. Further, this approach helps distill how choices and agendas that result
from the major events, are often more important than the initiating event.
Further, although a major event may trigger a response, success is often judged
over time. For example, constant setbacks evidenced by ongoing attacks destroys
momentum and confidence of both the military and the public. These setbacks are in
many ways a result of the choices made by various parties after an initiating punctuating
event, and thus drive the way in which policy evolves. These choices, often laid out
within policy, illustrate this evolutionary policy process and are factors of change
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themselves. Thus, I have concluded that a focus should also be placed on the
accumulation of minor events over time rather than an excessive focus on the major
punctuating events that may draw more newspaper headlines. I believe that doing so
would allow for more important analysis on how policy should be adjusted and therefore
place the United States government into a more productive learning posture than what the
last twenty years of war suggest.
The sixth theme also touches on the learning aspects of P/CVE policy change.
This theme discusses how leaders and policy makers eventually realized that an
overreliance on military solutions was not successful. Over time, this eventually led to
civilian agencies entering the policy equation to a far greater extent than in years past,
thus enhanced interagency coordination developing, and then P/CVE related policies
rapidly evolving. Unfortunately, this took approximately a decade to reach a robust level
of policy support and was then rushed into implementation without fully understanding
what was needed and how best to achieve those ends. Again, it was a reactionary
approach due to the lack of policy understanding and historical awareness from similar
experiences in American history, such as counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam. And
while military personnel losses have been relatively minimal in comparison to previous
wars, the toll it took on the respective countries’ civilian populations has been extreme
and tragic, and tarnished America’s reputation as a human-rights focused nation. Given
this, not only has a military heavy approach not produced the intended results the United
States has sought, but it has also come at arguably unsustainable costs in life, national
reputation, and financial burden. Yet, it took almost nine years of intense combat
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operations in several countries around the world before there was an awakening and
admission that this reliance was failing. And yet, in some corners of the government, this
thinking has still not been fully embraced.
While civilian agencies have long been involved in many P/CVE operations
around the world, it was not until 2010 that a determined effort was put forth to utilize
USAID more effectively in these environments. However, after nearly a decade of
combat operations in violent regions, where destroyed or severely damaged communities
now exist, it can be argued by that point the damage is done. At such a point, reversing
such negative trends becomes nearly impossible in the short-term and even extremely
difficult in the long-term. Therefore, given America has extreme reliance on the military,
I believe this phenomenon and its root causes must be better understood. In terms of
P/CVE, it is imperative to understand why even in non-traditional military environments
this endures.
While a few of these factors were discussed in this paper, such as governance and
policy entrenchment that favor military resourcing and approaches, it was not as deeply
studied as it could be, as doing so progresses beyond the scope of this study. Certainly,
while policy that focuses on military solutions has its merits, such as ensuring a robust
national defense posture, an overreliance can lend itself to policy inflexibility. I believe
that is what occurred in the case of P/CVE policy in the TSCTP countries and beyond.
This inflexibility must be better understood and shared broadly with the policy
community to assist in offering more successful policy approaches, and particularly so in
respect to non-traditional conflict challenges such as P/CVE environments.

255
Implications
This study lends itself well to positive social change on a variety of social change
topics. First, it offers unique insights into important policy themes that have not been
thoroughly examined previously. To this end, it adds new material to the body of
scholarly work which serves to reinforce the notion that military led solutions are not
always effective in countering and preventing violent extremism. Often throughout
history, the U.S. government leaned heavily on military solutions to violent engagements,
and certainly there are circumstances where military force is required, but the analysis
shows that is not a foregone conclusion in all circumstances. Each situation should be
examined carefully to weigh the pros and cons of using military force, civilian aid
approaches, or an orchestrated approach using both. However, even in orchestrated
approaches, one may be more prominent than the other and that too should be considered
carefully.
Development solutions which seek to mitigate the underlying causes of violent
extremism are an especially important aspect in devising an effective P/CVE associated
strategy and policy. This has been demonstrated time and again throughout history. While
violence is always an easy option, in today’s world it has not been effective in mitigating
many of these types of challenges throughout the world. This has been especially so
regarding the TSCTP countries where extremist-based violence has flourished. This is
further exacerbated when civilian populations dominate the operational space as many of
these P/CVE related problems are in urban population centers. Obviously, the blowback
from disproportionate violence often exceeds the gains made in the short-term, and over
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the long term can lead to undesirable results and protracted conflict. Such violence often
fans the flames leading to furthering violent extremism, which can be argued has been the
case in western Africa. Rather than violence meeting violence, or the face of U.S. aid
being represented by American soldiers, it is often more effective to demonstrate to the
population that it is civilians assisting civilians, even when attempting to implement
P/CVE-based foreign aid programs in conflict regions. In this sense, optics matter and
should be carefully considered when devising policy that aims at reducing violence. And
while implementing this concept may require policy reorientation to strengthen civilian
foreign aid organizations, it may be a worthwhile endeavor as it would better balance
America’s ability to mitigate extremism as well as offer America’s civilian and military
leaders with additional strategic and tactical options when confronting violent extremism.
Further, as this study has described in the literature review, this is far from being
an ideological point, but rather this observation is rooted in recent history and a rich body
of existing analysis, much of it by notable military scholars within the last fifty years.
Further, scholars and observers of P/CVE policy need look no further than the many
rigorous studies that have shown the trend of growing violent extremism which has
grown in spite of the enormous sums of money and resources sent to fight violent
extremism in its many forms, including the TSCTP region. This is well understood and
often stated within USAID’s own policy documents which have long acknowledged the
growing violence in West Africa, stating:
In recent years, the landscape of violent extremism in West Africa has grown
increasingly fractured and complex. Boko Haram has devastated livelihoods in
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the Lake Chad Basin. Conflict in northern Mali appears increasingly intractable,
allowing violent extremist groups to operate with relative impunity and carry out
attacks throughout the region. The continued trouble in Libya threatens to export
new strains of violent extremism and ethnic tension to West Africa. Taking place
against a backdrop of persistent social and economic vulnerability, this insecurity
has sparked a surge in migration and smuggling. The regional trade routes that
once moved salt and myrrh increasingly facilitate the flow of guns, drugs, people,
and violent ideology. (USAID, 2016)
In short, the situation has not improved, but rather has grown and evolved to become an
even more daunting challenge. One solution that policy makers may opt to consider more
deeply is ramping up civilian led approaches to the region. Such a shift may serve to
dampen violent extremism in the region. Naturally, that approach comes with some risks,
as extremists will likely increase the targeting of civilian aid workers, particularly if they
deem an increase in civilian-led aid to be a threat to their sway over the population.
Achieving the goal of a more prosperous and peaceful West Africa region, able to
cope with the growing challenges and instability associated with violent extremism,
would be an extraordinary positive social and governance change for the region.
Naturally, there is no single solution to such a complex international challenge but
enabling viable policy and strategic options to complex emergencies is sound
governance. Such an outcome has the potential to contribute to positive social change that
can lead to more peaceful communities in violence affected communities as well as a less
strained American population, military, and economy.
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A plausible recommendation regarding this is to study whether having a stronger
foreign aid civilian structure in place, properly staffed, trained, and resourced in P/CVE
and other such related foreign aid approaches, would help achieve the foreign policy
objectives of P/CVE and thus that of the TSCTP region and beyond. P/CVE approaches
have been discussed as a priority within numerous national level policies and strategies.
As such, it would seem to be in the national interest to better understand where the
shortcomings are and how best to strengthen the organizations responsible for
implementing these national priorities. As this study has highlighted, while much
technical analysis has been conducted as it pertains to specific development tools and
disciplines, little P/CVE policy level analysis has been completed. As the study’s
literature review and other past literature reviews have highlighted, most of the analysis is
highly technical in nature, such as examining youth, education, health, economics, and
other technical fields as related to P/CVE. However, noncomprehensive technical
approaches will not solve the complexities of violent extremism. Rather, it will likely
require multidimensional, interdisciplinary, and coordinated tools and programs, guided
by sound policy and strategy, to provide effective solutions. This is the primary
recommendation resulting from this study and which in my opinion will serve as both a
policy and societal benefit.
Conclusion
Throughout this study, several dominant themes emerged that encapsulate the
research questions, much of the literature, and the six identified themes. These broad
conclusions serve as what I perceive to be key lessons that policy makers may wish to
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consider as P/CVE policy is developed and issued. In addition, practitioners and scholars
may also wish to consider these broad conclusions to assess whether policy has been
soundly developed and communicated, as well as fully understood by the target
audiences.
First, P/CVE policy development has served to reinforce the fact that policy
coordination is an important function. The evidence suggests that policy coordination has
in fact been done reasonably well through joint strategies and policies being issued every
few years, many of such documents at least touching on P/CVE and others significantly
focusing on P/CVE. Yet, what also is clear is that policy coordination is merely one
aspect to effective policy development and implementation. This study illustrated that
there are a wide range of stakeholders that are in some fashion responsible for effective
P/CVE policy and strategy implementation. For the civilian agencies, this coordination
has generally occurred at the various governmental levels, such as jointly between
USAID and the DOS and within USAID bureaus and offices. However, those levels are
often not implementing the policies themselves, but rather manage contracts and grants
for those that implement the P/CVE programs. Thus, coordination is extremely important
between government and non-governmental stakeholders. And while non-governmental
organizations often contribute input at the policy level, the critical component of P/CVE
is at the field implementation level, where policies come to fruition or fail. Thus, based
on the vast amount of policy material and the interview feedback, greater focus should be
placed not just at the intergovernmental coordination levels, but also greater coordination
at the nongovernmental field level. This would likely enhance the quality of P/CVE
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program implementation as well as better inform government policy makers and
coordinators.
Second, history is replete with demonstrations and lessons that can and should be
deeply studied by P/CVE policy makers, agency leaders, and implementers. In short, all
levels should be familiar with P/CVE and its predecessor policies to distill from those
experiences key lessons that remain relevant today. This study has demonstrated that
P/CVE and its closely related policy predecessors have gone through many periods of
change. Some of those changes were catalyzed by major events that reshaped America’s
policy priorities, while others gradually changed over time due to new leadership and
shifting political and policy priorities. This is natural in many ways and policy change
often occurs organically across all sectors of government. However, those many changes
offer opportunities to study how and why those changes occurred and whether they
achieved success or not. This is particularly the case for events like Vietnam, which had
robust counterinsurgency efforts over many years, and which left behind a robust body of
academic and non-academic literature. Thus, in many cases, there are applicable lessons
that may well be applied to today’s P/CVE challenges. I believe more comparative
analysis would contribute much to better informing today’s P/CVE policy makers and
practitioners. Further, robust and well-supported studies of recent historical interventions
should be conducted as timely as possible in order to capture the salient lessons from
those involved before that generation passes and academics are no longer able to capture
critical data directly from those individuals.

261
Third, this study demonstrated that important catalytic events, such as September
11, 2001, are not the only events that are important in understanding how and why
P/CVE policy has changed. As reflected in the interviews, while many acknowledged
major events such as September 11th playing an initial role, usually in the sense that the
importance is commonsensical, all the interviewees listed several other lesser known
events as also playing significant roles in their respective regions. While some of these
events made it into major national media outlets, others are far lesser known by those not
specifically attuned to the West Africa region. Further, it is not only events per se that
remain relevant, but also conditions on the ground play a role. In addition, policies have a
way of shaping events and conditions, and thus an understanding of secondary effects of
new policy should be factored into what is driving P/CVE policy change.
Policies reflect decisions, and decisions have consequences. Therefore, close
study by stakeholders should be continuously undertaken to understand all the relevant
factors that have driven P/CVE policy change, as new factors will emerge and old factors
will evolve, and these are important to understand and communicate. This is an important
understanding to ensure that policy change is not reactive, as much of it has been over the
past twenty years, but rather proactive in that when policy reforms occur, it is well
informed change and not excessively focused on one event over the aggregate of many
events over time. In turn, this helps avoid replicating past mistakes or overcorrecting or
under-correcting existing P/CVE related policy.
Fourth, P/CVE is still an emerging policy field and discipline. While its
predecessor approaches, such as counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and stability
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operations have long existed, P/CVE is relatively new and continues to rapidly evolve.
However, relatively few policy documents focus solely on P/CVE. Much of the P/CVE
guidance has been part of much broader policies and strategies that cover numerous
foreign policy topics. Thus, P/CVE has developed in many ways independent of formal
policy guidance, arguably down to the field mission and even individual level. In short,
the way one practitioner perceives P/CVE can be dramatically different from another
practitioner. This has only been compounded by rather stark definitional problems which
struggle to differentiate P/CVE from related approaches. Given this, it may be time for
more frequent P/CVE policy reviews to more clearly articulate P/CVE to DOS and
USAID bureaus, offices, field missions, and implementers. Thus, an important lesson
from this study and the existing literature is that there is currently a lack of clarity in how
P/CVE should be defined, how to best apply it in varying environments, and how to
understand if success is being achieved.
As interviewees stated, if P/CVE is to have a future in foreign aid, it needs to be
more than something considered a funding mechanism requiring programs to be termed
P/CVE to receive budgetary support. Nor can P/CVE be considered merely a
combination of pre-existing development approaches repackaged and termed P/CVE.
More frequent formal guidance, with contributions to government and non-government
entities, would be beneficial for an array of stakeholders in better understanding what sets
P/CVE apart in policy and in practice.
Fifth, this study argued that there has been relatively thorough coordination at all
levels of government on P/CVE policy. However, that level of coordination does not
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seem to exist between government and non-government entities. According to the
existing scholarly literature, the technical USAID literature, and interviewee feedback,
there is little policy coordination between the government and the implementers. In this
sense, while there are contracts and grants that lay out desired outcomes, and routine
reports from implementers to field missions, it is not clear if the feedback is being
strongly considered for policy amendment. In short, while there is documentary support
showing top-down policy coordination, there is far less support to indicate that there is
bottom-up coordination occurring. This may be a cause of the considerable confusion
and skepticism from field practitioners about the existing P/CVE policies. To achieve
greater understanding between governmental and non-government organizations,
particularly those who manage P/CVE grants and contracts and those who implement
them, greater inclusion of field level implementers in policy making would be beneficial.
In addition, companies and NGOs who implement P/CVE programs should be held more
accountable to ensure their staff are more fully informed on USAID P/CVE policy, just
as government managers should ensure their staff who manage such programs are well
informed.
Knowledge of organizational policy is reflective of competence and
professionalism, particularly in emerging disciplines without a long track record, and this
awareness helps ensure coordination and common understanding. This top-down and
bottom-up combination of policy coordination would likely serve future P/CVE policy
amendments well by reducing confusion and skepticism by implementers and
government program managers.
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Finally, there is now a realization, even if not a broad realization and acceptance,
that military solutions are not always the best option when mitigating violent extremism.
Naturally, the U.S. military is robust and well-resourced and can be mobilized at a
moment’s notice. Thus, as a policy maker, it is easy to default to the military solutions
and interventions for P/CVE challenges. History reflects that trend. However, as history
has demonstrated repeatedly over decades, this should not be an automatic default
decision in favor of military approaches. In fact, undertaking such interventions in urban
populations, which often characterize P/CVE interventions, gains are frequently
undermined by military entities being the face of such efforts. Seeing soldiers delivering
food and goods is often perceived negatively by the population who feel threatened or
violated by such military interventions, even when humanitarian in nature. In short, they
can be viewed as uninvited and threatening guests, even when violent extremists exist in
their community, but are just that, often seen as part of their community.
Alternatively, civilian agencies working with the local population can have a
more effective result by reducing the threat and community tension. Further, civilian
personnel are often more effective at working with local organizations and local
community leaders to help stem the tide of radicalization and violent extremism. When
civilians work with other civilians, it is perceived less as coercive and more as a
partnership. In these environments, perception is reality, and the perceptions of the
civilian population must be constantly understood, assessed, and adjusted to achieve the
intended results of mitigating violence and extremism. However, the key to such effective
interventions is having civilian agencies robust enough in personnel and resources to
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undertake effective P/CVE programs throughout the world. This change would go quite
far in furthering policy options for civilian and military leadership alike to more
effectively prevent and counter violent extremism in West Africa and around the world.
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Appendix A: Recruitment Email Notification
To Whom It May Concern:
Thank you for your interest in being a participant in my Dissertation research. The
purpose of this study is to examine the following questions related to
Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE).
1) Has regional policy, as reflected in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism
Partnership, been implemented in alignment with USAID’s P/CVE foreign
assistance policy?
2) What factors have led to changes in P/CVE TSCTP regional policy as well
as the broader USAID P/CVE foreign assistance policy?
If you consent, the interviews will be audio taped to ensure accuracy of the notes.
Information from the interviews will be confidential, and you will remain anonymous for
the purposes of this study.
I am reaching out to you because it is my understanding that you meet one or
more of the following criteria:
1) Current employee practitioner of a NGOs or corporation that implement P/CVE
programs. However, due to ethical considerations, I am not seeking to interview
employees working on current USAID programs.
2) Academic with strong knowledge of P/CVE as it pertains to U.S. development
assistance
3) Published author with strong knowledge of P/CVE as it pertains to U.S.
development assistance.
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4) Think Tank specialist with professional experience and knowledge of P/CVE as it
pertains to U.S. development assistance.
5) Independent P/CVE practitioner working in the field of U.S. development
assistance (e.g., independent contractors, or grant recipient, undertaking P/CVE
work pertaining to U.S. development assistance).
If you meet the above criteria and would like to participate in this study, please return the
response notification at the bottom of this page in the addressed via email
(Jason.alexander2@waldenu.edu). Once I receive your reply, I will contact you to
arrange a date and time for our interview. If you do not wish to participate, no one will
contact you, and your anonymity will remain protected. Should you choose to participate,
please do not discuss any sensitive information during the interview. Thank you for
considering being a part of this study.
Sincerely
Jason S. Alexander

Response Notification
Yes. I am interested in being a participant in your study. Please contact me to arrange an
interview or to give further details.
Name: ……………………………………………………….....
Phone number or email address: ……………………………….
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Appendix B: Interview Protocol
Interview Protocol for P/CVE Regional and National Policy Experts and
Practitioners
Dissertation Topic:

Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism: U.S.

Foreign Policy and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
Time of the Interview:

XXXX

Date:

Month Day, Year

Place:

XXXX

Interviewer:

Jason Alexander, PhD Candidate, Walden University

Name:

XXXX

Interviewee category (circle): 1) researcher/academic, 2) practitioner, 3) NGO, 4)
Think Tank, 5) Other
Brief description of the Project: This study, which will be public upon
completion, seeks to better understand the nature of P/CVE policy evolution as it pertains
to Official Development Assistance. The data collecting during this interview will
contribute to the analysis in identifying the relevant factors that have led to policy change
over time. In turn, this will help to effectively respond to the research questions. Please
do not discuss any sensitive information.
Research Objectives
1)

Has regional policy, as reflected in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism

Partnership, been implemented in alignment with USAID’s P/CVE foreign assistance
policy?
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2)

What factors have led to changes in P/CVE TSCTP regional policy as well

as the broader USAID P/CVE foreign assistance policy?
Interview Questions:
Objective 1: Has regional policy, as reflected in the Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership, been implemented in alignment with USAID’s P/CVE
foreign assistance policy?
1.

Which policies do you consider the most important related to USAID

work on P/CVE? Please explain.
2.

Which policies do you consider the most important related to USAID

work on the TSCTP? Please explain.
3.

Do you think there is alignment between agency P/CVE policy and the

TSCTP? How so?
4.

Does the TSCTP policy and USAID P/CVE policy intersect? Are they

mutually reinforcing?
5.

In your opinion, has the TSCTP policy been implemented to achieve

P/CVE? How so?
6.

If you think there were policy changes to P/CVE or TSCTP policies, has it

been agency wide, regional, or specific to certain countries? Please explain.
7.

Have certain TSCTP countries had more success with P/CVE? Please

explain.
Objective 2: What factors have led to changes in P/CVE TSCTP regional policy as well
as the broader USAID P/CVE foreign assistance policy?
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8.

Has USAID’s P/CVE foreign policy changed over time? How so? Why /

why not?
9.

Has USAID’s TSCTP policy evolved over time? How so? Why? / Why

10.

What events in the past do you think have had an effect on regional or

not?

agency P/CVE policy? Explain.
11.

If so, what factors do you think have been the most important in defining

USAID’s role in P/CVE?
12.

Have there been any particular circumstances that have led to changes in

regional or agency level P/CVE policy? And for the TSCTP policy?
13.

What information or factors do you rely on when trying to understand how

the P/CVE policies have, or have not, changed over time?
14.

Have there been any previous regional or agency policies, regulations, or

political decisions related to P/CVE that you think have had an effect on current P/CVE
policy? Please explain.
15.

What current policies, regulations, or political decisions do you think have

influence on the way in which agency or regional P/CVE policy is developed and
implemented?
16.

Do you think that P/CVE is seen as an important policy approach in the

agency or at the regional TSCTP level? Please explain.
17.

Do you think that P/CVE policy has a viable future in the agency or at the

regional TSCTP level? Please explain.
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Conclusion: Thank you for your time, candor, and responsiveness. The information you
have provided will be of value to this study. No names will be used during this study nor
will names be included in the final dissertation. The collection of this information is for
analytical purposes in support of this study only.
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Appendix C: List of Collected Documents for Document Analysis
Appendix C
List of Collected Documents for Document Analysis
Category
Document Title
National Policy and Strategy
National Security Strategy 1987
National Security Strategy 1988
National Security Strategy 1990
National Security Strategy 1991
National Security Strategy 1993
National Security Strategy 1994
National Security Strategy 1995
National Security Strategy 1996
National Security Strategy 1997
National Security Strategy 1998
National Security Strategy 1999
National Security Strategy 2000
National Security Strategy 2002
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
National Security Strategy 2006
National Security Strategy 2010
Fact Sheet: The White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism
National Security Strategy 2015
Developing an Integrated Global Engagement Center to Support Governmentwide Counterterrorism Communications Activities Directed Abroad and
Revoking Executive Order 13584
National Security Strategy 2017
National Strategy for Counterterrorism
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Act of 2018
Agency or Specialist Assessments
USAID/West Africa Peace through Development (PDEV) Program
Assessment Report
U.S. Efforts in Northwest Africa Would Be Strengthened by Enhanced
Program Management
Peace Through Development II: Impact Evaluation Endline Evaluation
Countering Violent Extremism in West Africa
Department of State and USAID Strategies
USAID West Africa RDCS 2015-2020
2010 QDDR
DOS & USAID Joint Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism
US Government Counterinsurgency Guide
2015 QDDR
Agency Policy Support
U.S. State Department and USAID Supported Initiatives to Counter Violent
Extremism
New Frameworks for Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Deputy
Secretary of State Antony Blinken
P/CVE Policies
Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism

Year
1987
1988
1990
1991
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2002
2006
2006
2010
2015
2015
2016

2017
2018
2018
2005
2005
2005
2017
2005
2005
2005
2009
2015
2015
2016

2009

293
Development Assistance and Counter-Extremism: A Guide to Programming
USAID Evidence Summit Development to Counter Insurgency
Integrating the Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency
Policy in the Program Cycle

2009
2010
2014

